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ABSTRACT 
 
The conflict events that comprise asymmetric warfare are a primary killer of both 
combatants and civilians on the modern battlefield. Improvised explosive devices (IED) 
and direct fire (DF), the most common of these attacks, claim thousands of lives as 
conventional and unconventional forces clash. Computer-based predictive analysis can 
be used to identify locations that are useful for these events, potentially providing the 
awareness needed to disrupt or avoid attacks before they are launched. 
In this dissertation, I propose an analytical framework for predictive analysis of 
asymmetric conflict events. This framework incorporates a tactics-aware system model 
based on attacker roles that is populated with a set of geomorphometric and visibility-
constrained features describing terrain and proximity to necessary supporting structures. 
Features that identify and assess the utility of terrain for use by risk-averse attackers are 
important contributors to the model. Statistical learning is used to extract spatially and 
temporally constrained tactical patterns. These patterns are then used to predict the 
utility of future or unvisited locations for conflict events. 
Major contributions of this dissertation include: 
(1) A concise, accurate feature representation of conflict events in non-urban 
environments; 
(2) A system model based on attacker roles that captures the tactical patterns of 
conflict events; 
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(3) Accurate conflict event classification algorithms that support predictive 
analysis; and  
(4) A novel method for detecting and describing features that support risk-averse 
attackers. 
  The framework has been implemented and tested on real-world IED and DF data 
collected from the conflict in Afghanistan in 2011-2012. Several learning techniques are 
assessed using two dimensionality reduction schemes under a variety of spatial, temporal 
and combined constraints. A resource-unconstrained version of the framework 
accurately predicts conflict events across a wide range of terrain types and over the 19 
months covered by available data. A limited version of the framework that assumes less 
computational capability provides useful predictive analysis that can be performed in 
mobile and resource constrained environments.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Low intensity conflict (LIC) is defined by the U.S. military as “a political-
military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and 
above the routine, peaceful competition among states.” [1]. These confrontations can 
range from organized protest to armed combat and use a variety of social, political, and 
economic tactics. Similar conflict exists between criminals and law enforcement. In both 
types of conflict, opposing sides attempt to gain advantage by exploiting asymmetry. For 
military conflicts, there is often asymmetry of force: a large number of attackers engage 
in combat with a smaller number of targets. The classic ambush is an example. 
Asymmetry may also be kinetic, where attackers employ some weapon that exploits or 
maximizes target vulnerabilities. Improvised explosive devices (IED) leverage this type 
of asymmetry. For both military and criminal activities, there may be asymmetry of 
information. The burglar is likely to know more about neighborhood patterns than the 
policeman. Similarly, an attacker from the local area may take advantage of knowledge 
of roads and paths to outmaneuver a target from a distant location.  
An asymmetric conflict event -more simply a ‘conflict event’- is a particular 
instance of the cat-and-mouse game played between opposing forces with unequal 
capabilities or knowledge. Collectively described as asymmetric warfare by the military, 
conflict events include both lethal and non-lethal encounters between forces where the 
encounter is planned and executed in order to obtain some specific outcome like 
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casualties or favorable propaganda. A key concept of this definition is the idea that all 
elements of the conflict event are selected by the attacker using unknown and possible 
unknowable criteria. Thus, the choices made by the human decision maker are critical to 
the execution of the event.  
In many conflict events, the impact of correct decisions is clear. For example, 
asymmetry of force is the result of human preparation and planning where attack 
location and configuration are chosen to ensure a minimum number of targets are 
engaged by a maximum number of attackers. A human chooses to initiate the event only 
when the attacking force is large enough to dominate the target. Similarly, a command-
detonated IED is carefully emplaced in a location that provides adequate concealment 
along roads and paths that can be carefully monitored. The IED will only be triggered 
against a vulnerable target vehicle. Civilian conveyances and heavily armored transports 
are ignored.  In both of these cases, the attack will occur only when a human assesses 
that the outcome will be favorable. 
The exact choices made in the preparation and execution of a conflict event will 
almost always be unknown prior to the attack. In the typical case, there are many 
unknowns, most of which are difficult or impossible to measure: 
- Number of attackers  -   Available tactics 
- Available war material  -  Past successes and failures 
- Attacker training   -  Attacker experience 
- Doctrine    -  Organization 
- Change drivers   - Desired outcome 
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Choices made regarding these unknowns are the results of complex, decision-
making processes that are influenced by a variety of factors:  
- Local terrain constrains attack emplacement site and execution strategies.  
- Nearby terrain provides critical support elements for control and overwatch 
but may constrain the utility of otherwise satisfactory attack sites.  
- War material and personnel availability/training constrain tactics.  
- The sophistication of the target and its ability to react or respond with 
countermeasures influences tactical choices and drives attack evolution. 
In spite of the unknown factors and influences, the execution of a conflict event 
exposes some of the decisions made by the attackers. For example, once the attack is 
complete, several things are known or observable: site and nature of the attack, number 
and location of active attackers, likely locations of observers and overwatch positions, 
and the advantage gained by the attacker from the terrain. Collection and analysis of 
these knowns allows a target to leverage its strengths to improve the predictability and 
recognition of high-threat locations. These strengths include:  
- An ability to collect and retain measurements of historical conflict event 
sites. 
- Knowledge of human factors in combat, acquired over many years of warfare 
against a variety of adversaries. 
- Powerful computers and algorithms. 
Thus, the main theme of this dissertation is the development of a conflict event 
model that incorporates measurable outcomes of the decisions made by attackers in the 
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preparation and execution of a conflict event. These results of these decisions, captured 
as features of the attack site and its environs, provide insight into an unknown and 
probably unknowable system that produces conflict events. This model –essentially a 
hidden human behavior model constrained by terrain and tactics– adaptively evolves to 
changing conflict situations. Two observations about human and their decision-making 
processes are central to its development.  
First, humans instinctively avoid risk and seek benefit with their choices. This 
risk aversion is a factor of many conflict event choices regarding siting, timing and use 
of terrain. It is important to note that risk aversion is not necessarily correlated with fear. 
Risk aversion simply implies that risk is mitigated when possible. Similarly, benefits do 
not have to accrue to the decision-maker. The benefits may be abstract or may accrue to 
some other actor in the conflict event. 
Also, all non-trivial human decision-making processes are probably unknowable. 
Humans integrate data collected by their senses, information from other humans, past 
experience, and a myriad of other inputs to make even simple decisions.   Therefore, 
observable outcomes of a decision, like the emplacement location of an IED, are, at best, 
pale reflections and partial measurements of a complex and unobservable human 
process. 
Based on these two observations, this work begins to interpret human behavior 
into math and programming and incorporates the result into a framework for modeling 
and predictive analysis of conflict events. Historical conflict events and their environs 
are modeled at various resolutions to capture the site-related choices made by the 
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humans involved. Beyond conventional terrain analysis, the model incorporates 
measurable characteristics of the actors’ historical site selection and event execution 
processes and may be used to estimate the utility of unvisited sites for conflict events.  
Modeling human behavior directly is difficult. Quantification of abstract 
concepts like experience, level of training, and risk tolerance is impossible without direct 
access to the individuals being modeled or similarly trained and motivated surrogates. In 
this research, we focus on capturing features that quantify observable results of 
behavior-driven choices. Risk aversion, human eyesight and rifle marksmanship are all 
used to constrain the range of locations suitable for the conflict event site and nearby 
support requirements. While the degree of risk aversion is impossible to determine from 
the existing dataset, it is possible to observe that features implying risk aversion are 
common to many conflict event sites. Likewise, many direct fire sites share common 
viewshed features, supporting the intuition that humans who shoot tend to select similar 
vantage points and fields of fire. While none of the features mentioned directly assess 
human behavior, they all reflect the conscious and unconscious human decision 
processes involved in their selection. The production of features that capture human 
behavior or the outcome of human decision-making processes is an important 
contribution of this research. 
Complicating this modeling effort is the varying importance of features over 
terrain and time. A set of features that accurately captures a tactic and site used one year 
may completely fail to describe another tactic and site used one year later. Conflict 
events in rugged terrain may require a very specific geographic configuration while flat 
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terrain is less constraining. Different attackers with different experience and training 
may adopt different tactics, even in similar terrain. Even sets of events that share the 
same features may weight those features differently. Adaptively selecting and weighting 
relevant features to populate a realistic model is an important contribution of this 
research. 
The anchoring of the features and associated model in real historical data is an 
important distinguishing feature of this research. The original conflict event data used 
for this analysis is messy. It is the outcome of real events in the real world where bullets 
were fired and explosions were triggered. Thus, there is no clean control set and no firm 
hypothesis against which all events can be tested. The quality of individual 
measurements is unknown and the manner in which key information was collected 
probably varied. Instead, the data emerges from a series of uncontrolled experiments 
(conflict events) where location and timing is estimated, the data collector and collection 
methods were different for every event, and the true desired outcome is unknown. 
Developing models and incorporating learning algorithms that can handle this type of 
uncertainty is an important contribution of this research. 
The overarching purpose of this research project is the protection of human life. 
The bottom line is that targets with an ability to predict possible conflict event sites are 
more likely to survive an attack. As proposed in this research, predictive analysis can 
play an important role in conflict analytics by neutralizing knowledge asymmetry and 
providing situational awareness and decision-support facilities. 
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Overview of Asymmetric Conflict Events 
US military conflicts in the last 40 years have been largely asymmetric. Over this 
time and in years to come, the operational needs of asymmetric warfare (AW) are 
increasingly defined by the availability and delivery of timely and relevant information 
for decision makers and tactical forces. The cost of failure in terms of personnel, public 
opinion, money and equipment is a strong driving force behind developing counter-AW 
methods, yet AW challenges remain formidable because of changing threats and a high 
expectation of success. 
Actors in these conflicts leverage asymmetry to achieve their goals. In counter-
insurgency operations, the military enjoys overwhelming firepower and a high degree of 
mobility while the insurgents are more familiar with the terrain and have the tacit 
support of the civilian population. The military has sophisticated intelligence gathering 
abilities but may be blind in areas where its sensors can’t reach while insurgents enjoy 
access to less sophisticated but more pervasive reports from the population that hosts 
them.  
This dissertation examines two types of asymmetric conflict in Afghanistan: 
improvised explosive devices (IED) and direct fire attacks (DF).  
Improvised Explosive Devices 
An IED is a homemade bomb constructed from materials easily available to 
people located in conflict areas. Its construction may range from an unsophisticated mix 
of common household cleaning products to extremely sophisticated assemblies involving 
custom circuit boards, shaped charges and remote triggers. Most IEDs lie between these 
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extremes. IED explosive content has included fertilizer, rapidly oxidizing propellants, 
repurposed commercial explosives, gasoline, and artillery shells. IEDs are typically 
deployed in unconventional configurations that attempt to maximize concealment and 
lethality.  
Roadside bombs are probably the most common use of IEDs in modern conflict. 
This implementation of the IED is triggered in several ways. Victim-detonated IEDs 
explode when the target actuates the trigger in some way, perhaps by stepping on it. 
Human-borne and vehicle-borne IEDs are triggered by the attacker accompanying the 
Figure 1. IED attacks in Afghanistan, February 2011 - August 2012. 
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device. Command-detonated IEDs, one of the more lethal configurations, are triggered 
by an attacker from a distance, using a command wire or radio signal to explode the 
device.  
In Afghanistan, IEDs are one of the most lethal weapons, accounting for an 
estimated 1,337 deaths by the end of 2012 [2]. Figure 1 shows the distribution of IED 
attacks in Afghanistan from February, 2011 to August, 2012. 
Direct Fire Attacks 
Ranging from a lone sniper concealed on a mountainside or in a building to a 
force-on-force battle, direct fire attacks are probably the most common conflict event. 
These attacks occur when the attackers fire weapons directly at the target. Direct fire 
attacks in asymmetric conflict are typically performed using rifles and pistols but may 
include any type of weapon that can be pointed directly at the target. Notably, artillery 
and mortars are not direct fire weapons. Direct fire attack configurations are limited only 
by the imagination and weaponry of the attackers. However, all direct fire attacks require 
that the shooter be able to see the target.  
In Afghanistan, there are two common forms of direct fire attack. The most 
common form is probably engagement at a distance, where a small group of attackers 
engage a military patrol from a distance, attempting to kill or wound their targets 
through the use of high accuracy marksmanship. While this attack seldom yields high 
numbers of casualties, it slows the movement of the target. Also, this type of attack 
allows a small number of attackers to impede the efforts are a much larger target force. 
Another common form of direct fire is the ambush, where a group of attackers attempt to  
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engage the target by launching an attack from concealment. In this case, the attackers 
will try to configure the attack in a way that guarantees numeric superiority and high 
rates of fire, at least during initial execution. Terrain support for this type of attack is 
important because attackers typically rely on concealment and the element of surprise to 
achieve success. A properly executed ambush often results in a large number of 
casualties due to the high rates of fire and the close proximity of the attackers to the 
target. Figure 2 shows the distribution of direct fire attacks in Afghanistan from 
February, 2011 to August, 2012. 
Figure 2. Direct fire attacks in Afghanistan, February 2011 - August 2012. 
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Organization of the Dissertation 
After a discussion of Related Work in Chapter II, this study starts in Chapter III 
with the elaboration of a model that describes the event site, the surrounding terrain, and 
relationships between event actors, the event site, and the surrounding terrain. The 
essence of the proposed model is a combination of conventional terrain analysis and 
human use of terrain for conflict events.  
Chapter IV describes the algorithms used to collect features that populate the 
model. Ranging from conventional terrain analytics to visibility-constrained features 
extracted from cumulative viewsheds, a subset of representative features are 
mathematically described and statistically analyzed. Our purpose is to demonstrate a 
cross-section of features and describe their relevance to the model. (For conciseness, 
only a subset of features is included in the body of the dissertation. All other collected 
features are presented in Appendix B.) 
Predictive analysis of conflict events is examined in Chapter V. Classification of 
potential event sites is performed using discriminant analysis, support vector machines, 
and nearest neighbor algorithms. The topics of data normalization, spatial and temporal 
constraints, dimensionality reduction, feature selection, and classification algorithm 
parameter selection are also addressed.   
Figure 3 offers an overview and roadmap of the dissertation. 
The dissertation concludes with Conclusion, References and several supporting 
Appendices.  
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Figure 3. Analytical framework for asymmetric conflict events. 
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CHAPTER II 
RELATED WORK 
 
Overview 
Predictive analysis of conflict events incorporates elements from diverse 
domains. Related work falls into three categories: general conflict knowledge, feature 
extraction, and predictive analytics. General conflict knowledge is a catch-all category 
that includes information about friendly and enemy tactics, military and law enforcement 
processes and procedures, social and cultural behaviors of civilians in a conflict zone, 
and other topics useful in describing the expected actions, techniques, tactics and 
procedures of combatants and non-combatants. Feature extraction includes all efforts to 
add interpretation or information to raw measurements. Ranging from simple 
measurements and transforms to complex model-based assessments, features are an 
underlying and necessary component of every analytic effort supporting prediction. 
Finally, predictive analytics encompasses efforts made to find and mathematically 
describe patterns in historical data for the purpose of making predictions about the future 
(or unknown) data. These patterns may occur naturally, i.e. land contouring caused by 
running water, or may be the result of human action, i.e. positioning of an overwatch site 
to maximize field of view. In this research, mined patterns are generalized to models and 
used to classify the utility of locations for future attacks. The following sections offer a 
discussion of relevant readings and provide insight into published research related to 
these topics. 
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General Knowledge 
The generic term ‘conflict’ covers a wide range of activities commonly grouped 
into warfare, terrorism and criminal activity. Asymmetric warfare is the most prevalent 
source of conflict events in the modern world. Perry and Gordon provide an intelligence-
oriented view in [3] focused on recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. They note the 
importance of understanding enemy intent and highlight substantive differences between 
conventional and asymmetric warfare, particularly with regard to localization of conflict 
tactics and adaptability of combatants. Townsley [4] provides a broader view of 
insurgency and supports with analysis the intuition that insurgent actions are based on 
rational choice and impacted by scarcity. Gutfraind takes a larger and more abstract view 
of terrorism in [5]. His terrorist network models offer insight into structures and 
vulnerabilities. Memon, et al. [6] contains a collection of peer-reviewed papers offering 
various mechanisms for modeling and analyzing terrorism. On a more realistic note, 
Lynn extracts common patterns from successful and unsuccessful insurgencies [7] based 
on the ideas of quantitative and qualitative violence. Of particular interest is the concept 
of qualitative violence where tactics are selected for maximum psychological effect 
instead of actual casualties or damage.  
The problem of improvised explosive devices (IED) is pervasive on the modern 
battlefield. Testimony to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee [8] offers some 
insight in the nature of AW and its impact on U.S. forces with a particular focus on IEDs 
and related asymmetric warfare tactics. The focus on IEDs is advanced by Barker in [9] 
who finds that prevalence and effectiveness of IED events grew significantly between 
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2002 and 2009. His analysis covers the tactics and outcomes of two IED campaigns 
conducted by two different groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan and offered province-
level event detail. Barker also notes the increasing speed of adaptation and information 
sharing on a global scale between insurgent and terrorist groups. Magnuson discusses the 
adaptability of the IED makers in [10]. In [11], Hanson examines the economic decisions 
that underlie the use of IEDs as a tactic and analyzes the impact of countermeasures. 
Notably, Hanson shows that countermeasures do not reduce the total number of IED 
attacks. IED effects and countermeasures are discussed at a high level in [12]. On a more 
tactical level, the IED Trigger Recognition guide [13] offers details about detecting and 
recognizing these devices for soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan.  
Other types of conflict events are encountered in more mundane situations. 
Marijuana cultivation in national parks in the United States of America is an example of 
this type of conflict. For Yosemite National Park, the principle conflict is illicit 
marijuana cultivation. In [14], [15], Mallery examines the tactics, motivations and 
capabilities of drug trafficking organizations (DTO) that cultivate marijuana in national 
parks in California. Many of the choices made by DTOs with regards to marijuana 
cultivation site selection, infiltration and exfiltration routes, and site overwatch are 
similar to the choices made by attackers in asymmetric conflicts. For routine criminal 
activities that involve planning and site selection, like home burglaries, Risk Terrain 
Modeling [16] approaches predictive analysis with the concepts of opportunity theory, 
co-located events, and assessment of the social elements that make the crime possible. 
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An understanding of the tactics employed in asymmetric warfare is important. 
The U.S. Army Ranger Handbook [17] offers a concise compendium of small unit 
tactics and field operations. The U.S. military doctrine addressing counterinsurgency 
operations at higher levels is captured in [18]. 
Feature Extraction 
The selection of a site for a conflict event is the result of a complex, conditional 
decision-making process that includes terrain analysis, availability of necessary 
supporting infrastructure, opponent predictability and constraints imposed by event 
tactics. The extraction of these features from available or collected data is critically 
important to successful predictive analysis. Janlov, et al., discusses mechanisms to build 
situational awareness from these features in [19],  
Geomorphometry is the science of quantitative land-surface analysis [20]. An 
interdisciplinary field, geomorphometry uses a variety of statistical and mathematical 
techniques, as well as algorithms drawn from image processing, to quantify 
characteristics of terrain and its underlying geometric structures. This analysis may take 
places at scales ranging from very small (on the order of sand grains) to very large (on 
the order of mountain ranges). Geomorphometric features are widely used in a variety of 
applications. One of the most common is terrain classification through the use of a 
geometric pattern, defined by Pike as “a set of measurements that describes topographic 
form well enough to distinguish geomorphically different landscapes” in [21], where he 
described as a set of landsurface geomorphometric parameters composed of 17 features 
derived primarily from topographic digital elevation models (DEM). Iwahashi and Pike 
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(IP) offer a simpler pattern in [22] that uses only three features. Stepinski and Bagaria 
extend IP’s scheme in [23] by examining the three features over various window sizes. 
Other similar efforts include [24]–[28]. 
A key requirement of many offensive and defensive conflict tactics is the need 
for intervisibility, or line-of-sight (LOS), between the attacker and the target. Richbourg 
and Olson describe a variety of tactics that require LOS in [29]. Remotely triggered 
IEDs, ambushes, sniping, and even indirect fire all require the attacker to have an ability 
to observe the target at a distance. With this requirement, LOS becomes a useful 
analytical filter. However, computation of LOS to all points within an area, also known 
as viewshed, can be computationally expensive. Nagy [30] provides a basic description 
of viewshed and its utility. Floriani, et al, [31][32] offer an overview of intervisibility 
and a survey of intervisibility algorithms and problems. The Line of Sight Compendium 
[33], assembled by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, details 19 different LOS 
algorithms in use in various military simulations. Franklin examines optimal methods for 
large-scale viewshed analysis in [34] while Stiles [35] examines problems associated 
with the use and interpretation of viewsheds in tactical scenarios. Increased efficiency by 
dividing terrain in regions is the goal of Moet [36]. Geometric considerations, point 
interpolation and other sources of error are addressed by Guth in [37] while Raehtz 
examines the impact of error in DEM elevation estimates in [38]. Guth also addresses 
the impact of viewshed algorithm optimization choices in [39]. Izraelevitz offers a 
potentially lossy but fast viewshed algorithm in [40]. In [41], Washtell proposes, with 
little elaboration, the use of openness and geomorphometry to assess and classify 
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locations for certain purposes. Most LOS and viewshed algorithms, including those 
already mentioned, use the natural terrain surface as a base of calculations. However, in 
urban areas, this ignores the impact on LOS of buildings. Rød, in his exploration of 
visibility dominance in [42], offers ideas on incorporating artificial structures in 
viewshed computations. 
Building on viewshed, and taking into consideration likely conflict tactics, a 
number of features may be constructed. Hengl, et al. [43] offer an excellent introduction 
and overview of standard geomorphometric measures. Terrain classification is addressed 
by Pike in [21], Iwahashi and Pike in [22],  and by Stepinski and Bagaria in [23]. 
Openness, as described by Yokoyama in [44], incorporates terrain classification and 
elevation profile analysis and offers an interpretation of the three dimensional space 
visible from a given location. Guth uses openness to predict viewshed in [45]. In urban 
areas, the architectural concept of isovist may be more appropriate [46][47]. Another 
approach to mathematically defining terrain combines several features into a single 
terrain complexity metric. One example of a terrain complexity metric is proposed by 
Huaxing in [24]. Cumulative viewsheds are used to describe the overall exposure to 
view of a site from multiple locations. Wheatley applies this analysis to understand the 
siting of barrows [48] and Lake, et al. to Mesolithic village sites [49].  
Other mechanisms exist that can be used to create features. Curtin proposes a 
shift from geographic coordinates to linear referencing in [50]. His approach reduces 
analysis by one dimension but fails to consider how sites away from indexed roads may 
contribute to events.  In [51], aggregation techniques are used by Alt to develop binary, 
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count and duration models. Holte [52] notes that simple classification rules can be used 
to perform surprising complex analysis, especially on larger datasets. 
The human mind has an innate ability to recognize subtle patterns and out-of-
place elements. The sixth sense of the pointman who detects an ambush is an iconic 
Hollywood theme that is frequently reported in real life. In the movie “Platoon” [53], the 
pointman Chris failed to notice some off-color vegetation hiding an enemy bunker. Staff 
Sergeant Barnes intervenes and halts the patrol. From the movie script,  
“Chris now starts to see things he didn't see.  Right in front of his nose - there is 
a trench from this bunker to another and another.  There is now in his view a 
complex of bunkers and thatched hootches and lean-tos all blending into the 
forest ...” 
In this scene, Staff Sergeant Barnes halted a patrol based on a feeling of danger 
or sixth sense. After the halt, Chris begins to consciously identify the threat indicators 
subconsciously detected by Staff Sergeant Barnes. Similarly, in [54], a British soldier 
named Kenny Meighan discusses his abilities to detect subtle inconsistencies, describing 
his success as a result of “… subconscious instincts that start to read what’s going on 
…”.  
The placement of conflict events and the detection of these emplacements are 
probably strongly influenced by this sixth sense, intuition or instinct. It is unlikely that 
attackers conduct exhaustive map reconnaissance to select the perfect location for an 
attack. Instead, they identify a general area or stretch of road that provides necessary 
support for the attack and select the actual location based on intuition or its “feel”. 
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Similarly, the pointman does not exhaustively consider every clue within eyesight. 
Instead, he instinctively recognizes terrain that is useful to attackers and unconsciously 
integrates indicators that might signal an attack. In [55], Gladwell discusses this 
intuition, describing it as “thin-slicing”. Thin-slicing allows humans to form a snap 
judgment or immediate, unconscious reaction to a situation without consciously 
understanding or recognizing all of the inputs. Capturing the inputs to this type of 
instinctual decision is impossible, even for the person making it. However, it may be 
possible to summarize terrain by incorporating and transforming measurements based on 
sightlines and intervisibility to quantify feelings of openness and exposure, building on 
the insights of Yokoyama [44] and Guth [45]. 
Predictive Analysis 
Predictive analysis extracts information from data and uses it to predict future 
events. In the analysis of asymmetric conflict in this research, the information extracted 
reflects the tactics chosen by the attackers as revealed by their use of terrain and 
proximity to necessary support like populated areas. Based on features extracted from 
historical events, the development and use of predictive models covers a wide range of 
topics including normalization, dimensionality reduction, feature selection, and 
statistical learning.  
Models 
Detection of patterns in battlefield data is a primary consideration in conflict 
event analysis. Patterns of interest are primarily caused by humans, both combatants and 
non-combatants. The National Research Council writes an overview of this topic in [56]. 
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The book covers all aspects of modeling and simulating military operations including 
military and civilian organizations and individuals, cultural and social frameworks, and 
operations from individual movements to pitched battles between nation states.  
Deitchman [57] provides one of the seminal military papers in this field. His work 
describes the application of the Lanchester models of combat in common conflict 
scenarios covering both conventional and unconventional warfare. Focused only on 
personnel strengths at macro levels, the models are surprising effective at predicting the 
outcome of historical battles. In [58], Schaffer tailors the Lanchester models to address 
the characteristics of insurgencies where small insurgent units combat larger, more 
conventional forces. Although still focused primarily on attrition, Schaffer also 
addresses the impact of special tactics, weapons and morale. He also extends the model 
to specific types of engagement including the skirmish, ambush and siege. In [59], Kress 
examines the impact of intelligence on conflict outcomes. More recently, COIN 2.0 [60], 
described by Henscheid, captures the U.S. Department of Defense’s state-of-the-art 
computational model to support military planning in counterinsurgency scenarios at all 
levels from strategic to tactical. COIN 2.0’s breakdown of insurgent roles is useful in 
understanding how terrain might be used to support or conceal an attack. Bornstein, et al. 
further refine insurgent roles and specific indicators of adversarial intent in [61]. 
SCARE-S2 is used to find high-value targets in Afghanistan [62] using a simple set of 
event descriptors. 
Combatants may reveal their intent and preferences through detectable choices 
they make. Similarly, combatant choices may be reflected in non-combatant activities. 
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An example of this is a classic signature of warfare: the abandoned village. Non-
combatants flee areas where combatants are preparing for conflict. Johnson offers an 
overview of similar human-oriented patterns in [63]. This paper is updated and expanded 
in lecture notes prepared for a Fall 2011 seminar [64] where he offers a review of 
empirical patterns seen across a range of conflicts, both criminal and military. Modeling 
of more mundane and mechanical tasks is addressed by Okuda in [65]. In this paper he 
describes the sliding of a lever by an individual as a series of discrete tasks followed by a 
decision. Portland models the more complex system of an automobile and driver in [66]. 
Using a nested model approach, he ties together individual movements and choices for 
the purpose of predicting future driver behavior. In [67], Barrett models the 
infrastructure and users of the infrastructure in a medium-sized North American town 
and uses it to predict the spread of contagion, routing performance in a vehicle-based ad 
hoc network, and the impact of laws and new technologies on the electricity market. His 
models incorporate a high degree of complexity for a very large number of agents but 
are very computationally expensive to set up and run. Barrett’s approach is expanded in 
[68] where he models the complex systems arising from the interaction of physical, 
biological, technological, informational, and human/societal components. This model 
forms the core of a simulator called Simfrastructure that can handle very large scale, 
detailed simulations.     
In [69], Wilson et al. examine various analytic frameworks that may be used to 
analyze terrorism. Although narrowly focused on domestic terror and strongly slanted 
towards spread of contagion, this collection of papers examines scenarios beyond 
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today’s battlefield. In [70], Sandler examines the impact of proactive counter-measures 
as part of a game-theoretic model. He also discusses the importance of information in 
asymmetric warfare but focuses on interactions between terrorists groups, their 
supporters and nation-states. Bohorquez [71] finds that event size and timing in modern 
insurgent conflicts follow a power law distribution,. His empirical analysis reveals that 
common drivers may underpin a broad swath of modern conflict. An empirically-derived 
model of IED emplacement is developed in [72] in order to support allocation of IED 
clearance assets. Although the model is limited to timing information and simple 
measures of success or failure, it does incorporate historical data that reflect the 
attackers’ choices. Dixon, et al. introduce an agent-based coalescence-fragmentation 
model where individual agents can be people or resources [73]. This approach is applied 
to several variants of modern conflict. Conflict events are not the result of simple 
processes. Fabian [74] presents the problem as a two-stage recourse model that considers 
both feasibility and optimality simultaneously.  
Modeling paradigms from related fields provide some insight. Jakobson offers a 
an overview of situation management in [75] and reasoning about complex, dynamic 
situations in [76]. 
Risk aversion is an important factor to consider in human conflict. Nikolova [77] 
and Swamy [78] examine the impact of risk aversion using combinatorial and stochastic 
optimization. Martinez [79] and Subrahmanian [80] focus on describing and mining 
human behavior using the Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agent (SOMA) . SOMA 
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offers a rules-based approach to predictive modeling of human behavior that has the 
ability to incorporate risk aversion. 
Statistical Learning 
The predictive analysis in this research is founded on analysis of historical events 
to discover patterns. Statistical learning provides a foundation for many pattern 
recognition efforts. Hastie, et al. [81] offer an excellent introduction and elaboration of 
this field. In [82], Abu-Mostafa, et al., offer an overview of learning techniques and 
expose many common errors. Although simplistic in its approach, their book highlights 
subtle problems that lead to erroneous outcomes. Jain offers a short but comprehensive 
review of statistical pattern recognition in [83]. There are many pattern analysis 
mechanisms attempt to exploit spatial and temporal characteristics of the data. In [84] 
and [85], Ng offers a classic spatial data mining algorithm, CLARANS. Compieta takes 
a divide-and-conquer approach with spatio-temporal data in [86] while Kisilevich 
focuses on spatio-temporal clustering in [87].  Other clustering methods may also be 
useful. Globerson [88] formulates clustering as a convex optimization problem that 
attempts to collapse individual classes into single points. With neighborhood 
components analysis (NCA) [89], Goldberger uses a stochastic variant of k-nearest-
neighbors to perform non-parametric clustering. NCA can struggle under high-
dimensionality. Regularized NCA by Yang and Laaksonen [90] performs better at higher 
dimensionalities.   
In this research, we compare and contrast the accuracy of classifiers built using 
support vector machines (SVM), k-nearest neighbors and discriminant analysis. SVMs 
  
25 
 
were originally proposed by Vapnik in [91], [92] and have been used in many 
applications including remote sensing [93], counterfeit banknote recognition [94], and to 
model interstate conflict [95]. Burges offers a well-known introduction to the use of 
SVM in [96]. LIBSVM, a library of SVM tools developed by Chang , provides a hands-
on introduction to construction of SVM classifiers [97] that goes well with a practical 
guide offered by Hsu in [98]. A variety of kernels are used with SVM. One of the most 
common is the Gaussian radial basis function (RBF) which is used in terrain 
classification [99][100], land cover classification [101], traffic accident prediction based 
on date and weather [102], and spatial distribution of pollution [103]. All of these 
applications have significant geographic or spatial features that play an important role in 
classification. Parameterization of the RBF kernel is discussed in [104]–[106]. 
 K-nearest neighbors (kNN) classifies samples based on a majority vote of the 
closest training examples [81] . A non-parametric machine learning algorithm, kNN is a 
simple but robust classifier with a bounded error rate [107]. kNN can be difficult when 
the number of features is large and when the number of training samples is small [108]. 
Random subspaces [109] by Ho manages high dimensionality by using randomly 
selected features to construct the classifier. Golberger, et al. use neighbourhood 
components analysis [89] to reduce dimensionality and learning the distance metric from 
the data itself. 
 In some cases, individual classifiers may be combined. Hastie, et al. [81] and 
Kittler, at al. [110] present  broad views of different approaches to combining classifiers. 
Ting and Witten [111] offer insight into key problems and compare the results of well-
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known ensemble learners. In [112] Fan, et al. compare simple classifier combinations 
and stacked generalization.   
The ability to collect and analyze data sets with many features can lead to the 
curse of dimensionality and negative impacts on pattern recognition and statistical 
learning techniques. Selecting or creating good features is an important step in preparing 
the data for use in a machine learning algorithm. Guyon offers an introduction to feature 
selection in [113]. One interesting assertion made is that high correlation between 
features is not always a problem. Even highly correlated variables may have great 
complementarity. She also notes the importance of feature normalization, especially to 
iterative learners that seek convergence. Stepwise feature selection is a method of 
reducing dimensionality [114]–[116] that iteratively adds individual features, typically 
based on some statistical measure like the F-test. Stepwise feature selection has known 
drawbacks [117] and performs best when the features are normalized [113]. Principle 
component analysis (PCA) is another method of reducing dimensionality through the 
construction of linearly uncorrelated variables from existing, possibly correlated features 
[81]. PCA is sensitive to the scaling of the original features.         
Data normalization is an important component of predictive analysis. In [118], 
van der Berh, et al., offers an overview and comparison of various scaling and 
transformation techniques. He finds that autoscaling and range scaling performed best 
for his data sets, particularly when combined with PCA. Jain notes the impact of outliers 
on common normalization schemes used in biometric systems in [119]. Karvanen 
examines the importance of normalization with samples are collected at different 
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locations by different people potentially using different instruments [120]. The problem 
of differing collection standards is probably prevalent in the collection of the conflict 
event data used in this research. In conflict, tactics change over time. Osgasawara, et al. 
propose and adaptive normalization scheme for handling non-stationary time-series data 
in [121]. Their approach uses moving averages to determine minimum and maximum 
values that can be used for min-max scaling.   
Although the ability to collect data is great, in many cases, there may be few 
historical events to learn from. The early days of a conflict, the first forays into new 
territory, and the emergence of new tactics are all cases where the sample size available 
for training is small. King and Alt examine the impact of identifying rare events in [122]. 
Huang, et al. detect co-location patterns using rare events in [123]. 
Summary of Open Problems 
 A number of open problems must be addressed or improved in order to make 
accurate predictions about future human activities and choices in asymmetric conflict. 
These open problems drive the direction of this research effort. First, it is necessary to 
analyze terrain to extract the features used by the humans as they make their choices. 
This analysis should result in features that summarize terrain the way humans do, taking 
into account terrain utility, visibility and intervisibility, and other required support. 
Summarization must occur at scales and resolutions that are appropriate to both the 
feature being measured and the decision and the decision being made.  Measurements 
associated with risk aversion must be developed. These measurements must be used in 
new features that incorporate risk aversion as a modifier or constraint.  
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Second, features should be incorporated into a model that operates at various 
resolutions in order to capture the conflict event site (within meters), nearby supporting 
terrain (within scores of meters), and its embedding into the local neighborhood (within 
kilometers). This model must be flexible enough to describe unknown tactics occurring 
across a wide variety of terrain types.  
Finally, predictive analysis built on the model must be adaptive, incorporating 
spatial and temporal constraints on subset selection, dynamic normalization and feature 
selection and dynamic parameter and hyper-parameter determination. Normalization 
parameters must be learned from available data and feature selection or transformation 
must take into account geographic and temporal effects on tactics. Hyper-parameters, 
like the order of k for kNN and the shape parameter σ for radial basis functions, must 
also be learned from the data. Since this type of predictive analysis is useful in real-time 
on the battlefield, there is a need for a lightweight version of the predictive analysis 
system that provides best-effort results using constrained computing devices.  
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CHAPTER III 
MODELING OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT EVENTS 
 
Central to this dissertation is the development of a system model that captures 
human decisions and the interactions between attackers and terrain in the siting and 
execution of a conflict event. The model describes the combination of terrain and tactics 
that make a conflict event possible, including characterization of useful terrain and the 
use of terrain by attackers. 
In military terms, tactics cover all aspects of the employment of units in combat. 
This includes the movement and arrangement of the personnel and resources involved 
with respect to terrain and opposing forces [124]. In this research, tactic will be similarly 
defined for asymmetric conflict events. A successful tactic maximizes the probability of 
success by making employment decisions optimized for the local terrain, the capabilities 
of the attackers, the vulnerabilities of the target, and the goals of the conflict event. In 
other words, the siting and execution of an event at a specific geographic location is 
constrained by tactics suited to the local terrain, appropriate for the opposing force, and 
within the abilities of the attacker.  
Each conflict event is unique. However, all conflict events are planned and 
executed by humans. Many of these humans share common training and similar 
experiences. These humans are likely to make similar decisions when faced with similar 
choices. The conflict environs also impose constraints. At a given time and place in a 
particular conflict, attacker access to conflict tools and weaponry is likely to be similar. 
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Terrain constrains tactic choice similarly across the conflict area. Target capabilities and 
vulnerabilities will also tend to constrain tactics, especially as countermeasures emerge 
for classes of conflict events. These shared elements enable predictive analysis of 
conflict events.  
Anatomy of a Conflict Event 
The planning and execution of a conflict event involves a series of choices made 
over a period of time. These decisions are primarily concerned with selecting a location 
that supports execution of some particular tactic. The decisions address three conflict 
event elements. The Emplacement site is the place where the event occurs. For an IED, 
this is the location where the device is concealed. For a direct fire event, the 
Emplacement site is the center of the targeted force. The Monitor location is used for 
overwatch and early warning and will typically have good visibility of terrain along the 
approaches to the Emplacement site. The Control location is used to initiate execution of 
the conflict event and will typically have good visibility of the Emplacement site and 
adjacent terrain.  
For this research, we believe that the planning and execution of a conflict event is 
accomplished in series of steps. First, the conflict event planner selects a particular class 
of event to execute, like IED or direct fire, and a general area that is likely to be well-
suited for the event being planned. Factors involved in the selection of the area probably 
include the availability of targets, known or suspected availability of useful conflict 
event sites, and proximity to necessary support structures like population centers and 
communications networks.  
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At this point in the conflict event planning effort, a class of event has been 
selected. However, availability of specific supporting features in the general area may 
constrain the choice of tactics. Next, a planner travels to the general area and selects a 
specific site. Site selection starts with analysis of potential Emplacement locations. This 
analysis primarily addresses the utility of the terrain at the site for the type of event 
chosen and the general embedding of the site in the local terrain. Useful locations are 
further analyzed for availability of Control and Monitor locations. This utility of these 
locations is primarily a function of their intervisibility with terrain at and adjacent to the 
Emplacement site. Adequate Emplacement sites with adequate Control and Monitor 
locations are identified. One of these sites is selected and the Emplacement occurs. 
Notably, it seems unlikely that the choice of Emplacement site is optimal for a given 
area. We believe that planners select sites that meet all required criteria but do not have 
the ability to exhaustively analyze every possible combination of Emplacement sites and 
Monitor and Control locations across a general area in order to make an optimal choice. 
Once a conflict event location has been selected, the Emplacement site is 
prepared and human actors are placed where needed. Actors at Monitor sites provide 
overwatch and early warning. The conflict event is initiated by the Control actor when a 
suitable target reaches the Emplacement site. 
The MECH Model 
 The MECH model is composed of conflict event features that represent 
Emplacement and Monitor/Control locations. These features capture the outcome of 
complex decisions made in the planning and execution of tactics. The features are 
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collected into tactical patterns at various resolutions: at the Emplacement site, 
immediately adjacent to the Emplacement site; and within the Halo, the annular area 
centered on the Emplacement site that can be used to perform Monitor and Control 
functions. 
Emplacement Modeling 
As previously described, the selection of a site and the execution of a conflict 
event is often the result of a carefully planned process. Emplacement at a site includes 
all activities required to select and prepare the location for the event. It also includes the 
relationship of the site to nearby and surrounding terrain. Let   {          } be a set 
of past conflict event locations. Let   (  )  {           } be a set of   
geomorphometric and other measurable features at the location     . Then the tactical 
pattern    of the Emplacement site    is defined as the vector  
                                                     (  )  [    (  
 (  ))]                     
 (  )                      ( ) 
, where    is a weight coefficient for feature   and   (  
 (  )) is the score of feature   for 
location   . Feature   is at or adjacent to the Emplacement site. 
Monitor/Control Modeling   
Actors play important roles in the execution of conflict events. For example, a 
carefully timed ambush only succeeds if the triggerman can observe his target’s 
movements without being detected as an attacker before the attack is launched. Two 
roles common to many conflict events are the Monitor and the Control. The Monitor 
observes the target at a distance, provides overwatch, and reports to the Control. The 
Control observes the target and directs the execution of the conflict event.  Note that in 
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some cases, a single actor may perform both Monitor and Control functions from one or 
more locations.  
Let   be an annulus, or Halo, with a variable inner boundary that may approach 
zero and a variable outer boundary that may approach the maximum limit of 
intervisibility with      . This maximum limit may be the absolute physical limit of 
aided or unaided human eyesight. More typically, this maximum limit will be related to 
details of the conflict event task being performed. In this dissertation, we assume that an 
actor at a Monitor location must be able to distinguish between targets and non-targets 
and report target activities while observing from the outer bound of  using unaided 
eyesight. We estimate this distance to be approximately 1500 meters and thus define its 
maximum value as 2500 meters for the case of Afghanistan. Define   (  )  
{         } be a set of   Monitor and Control features measured over or extracted 
from terrain within  . Then the tactical pattern    of the area surrounding 
   encompassed by   is defined as the vector 
                                                     (  )  [    (  
 (  ))]                    
 (  )                      ( ) 
, where    is a weight coefficient for feature   and   (  
 (  )) is the score of feature   for 
location   . Feature   is measured over or extracted from terrain within  . 
Once the Emplacement and Monitor/Control models are complete, it is necessary 
to model their interaction in order to accurately characterize their relationship in the 
execution of specific conflict events. The tactical pattern of the conflict event  (  ) , is 
the vector  
                                                    (  )  [  (  )     (  )]                                                          ( ) 
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MECH and Tactics 
Attackers are faced with scarce resources and have a desire to optimize 
outcomes. Thus, an attacker with a specific goal, e.g. targeting opposing forces with an 
IED, will attempt to maximize success by making good choices. This does not mean that 
every choice is optimal. However, in the eyes of the attacker, the attack configuration for 
each specific conflict event will be good enough to succeed given the resources, training 
and time available to the attacker.  
Attackers are assumed to have some level of training and experience. They are 
also assumed to be familiar with the area local to the attack, although the familiarity may 
be cursory or limited. Components of a successful attack, particularly Control and 
Monitor locations, may be reused. Likewise, successful attacks may be replicated on 
distant but similar terrain. Replication may also be a function of training, where 
successful tactics and adaptations are communicated to distant groups [125], [126].  
The concepts of cursory familiarity and attack replication expose MECH’s 
underlying assumptions about attacker methodology and abilities. MECH does not 
assume that attackers use detailed geographic maps or perform exhaustive analysis of 
local terrain prior to the placement of an attack. Instead, as described by Gladwell, they 
rely on experience and instinct. Attack emplacement is done at a place that ‘feels right’ 
or ‘looks right’. This feeling is the result of both conscious and subconscious processing 
of the geometric structure of the local terrain, sight lines to prominent or useful terrain 
features,  proximity to necessary logistical support, similarity to past successful conflict 
event sites, and similarity to a mental model of a ‘good’ site. A location with the right 
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‘feel’ is further assessed for critical attack support structures, like adequate concealment 
for an ambush or acceptable IED Control sites within range of the available command 
detonation wire. A successful attack confirms the ‘feels right’ analysis and solidifies the 
attacker’s intuition. Thus, the general shape and configuration of an attack, a tactical 
pattern captured by Equation 3, may be mapped onto new locations (roughly replicated) 
in order to duplicate previous successes.  
Pattern drift is a side effect of replication. New locations are never exactly the 
same as previous locations. Attack parameters must be shifted to make the old pattern fit 
the new location. When these adjustments are made and a successful attack occurs, the 
pattern grows or shifts. The result is a change in tactics over time.   
Occasionally, a pattern will lose effectiveness. This may occur due to 
countermeasures, like new IED detection equipment, or due to a lack of critical attack 
components, like a particular type of IED detonator. When this happens, an abrupt shift 
in tactics may be seen.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FEATURE EXTRACTION OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT EVENTS 
 
A principle component of MECH-based analytics is extraction of features 
relevant to the siting and execution of a conflict event. These features are drawn from 
three general classes: visibility-related featured based on characteristics of the 
Emplacement site’s viewshed; geomorphometric features based on characteristics of the 
land’s surface; and social/cultural features related to proximity of human population 
centers.  
Visibility-based analysis attempts to use human factors and limitations to 
constrain areas under consideration. For example, if an IED uses a command-detonated 
trigger, then it is likely that the Control site has direct line-of-sight (LOS) to the 
Emplacement site. Potential Control sites that cannot see the Emplacement site are 
probably less useful. Conversely, an ambush that relies on attacker concealment 
probably requires a relatively large area near the Emplacement site that is concealed 
from target view. A potential Emplacement site without nearby concealment is less 
useful in this scenario. Visibility-based analysis also attempts to summarize the 
impression of a location gained by a trained attacker during site assessment. Visible 
areas and inferred hidden areas are assessed and mentally summarized by the attacker at 
various scales related to the planned attack. Local viewshed and related features attempt 
to capture this assessment process.  
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Geomorphometry is the science of quantitative land-surface analysis [43]. For 
MECH, geomorphometric features are drawn from statistical analysis of the ASTER 
Global Digital Elevation Map (is a product of METI and NASA) [127]. Various 
morphologic features describing terrain structure and capturing terrain surface 
information are collected using elevation data with a resolution of 30 meters. The 
features are collected at a variety of windows sizes. 
For both geomorphometric and visibility-related features, analysis at various 
window sizes is necessary. Window size determination is an open problem in 
geomorphometry [128]. Although several automated and semi-automated approaches 
have been advanced (variograms are frequently proposed [129]), the most common 
solution is to manually assign fixed window sizes large enough to contain the features 
and activities being analyzed [130]. For MECH, a total of six window sizes have been 
assigned, based on known or estimated attacker requirements. Table 1 lists and describes 
these window sizes.  
For each of the collected features, we show a boxplot and a smoothed histogram 
in which three different Afghanistan data sets are compared: roads and two classes of 
events: improvised explosive devices (IED) and direct fire (DF). The IED and DF 
datasets are composed of conflict events that occurred in Afghanistan between early 
2011 and mid-2012. See Appendix A.2 for more information. The roads set is composed 
of discrete points selected at 30 meter intervals from paved and improved roads across 
all of Afghanistan. See Appendix A.3 for more information.  
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Table 1. Window sizes used for geomorphometric and visibility-based analysis 
 
Radius (meters) Rationale 
25 
The radius of the area considered immediately adjacent to the 
Emplacement site. Also, estimated to be the maximum range of a 
typical IED blast.  
100 
The radius of the area surrounding the Emplacement site that is 
useful for a near ambush or similar direct fire event. 
350 
The radius of the area surrounding the Emplacement site that is 
useful for a far ambush or similar direct fire event. Also, a typical 
limit of long rifle suppressive fire. 
500 
The radius of an area surrounding the Emplacement site that is 
useful for Control functions, like command wire detonation of an 
IED. (Estimated anecdotally.)  
1000 
The radius of an area surrounding the Emplacement site estimated 
to be most useful for Monitor functions. Also, a typical limit of 
crew-served weapon suppressive fire. (Estimated anecdotally.) 
2500 The maximum sight line considered in this analysis.  
 
 
In the following analysis, boxplots and histograms are used to concisely describe 
the features. For the boxplots, the whiskers extend to the most extreme data points that 
are not considered outliers. Outliers are not displayed. The notches on either side of the 
median can be used to understand similarities between samples. Two samples are 
probably drawn from different populations (significantly different at α=0.05) if their 
intervals (the width of the opening of the notch) do not overlap. In addition to 
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conventional boxplot information, there is an additional symbol in each boxplot 
(diamond, square, and circle) located at the mean of the data.  
The histograms were generated using either 100 bins or bins at 30-meter intervals 
(to coincide with resolution of some of the data). Since the number of samples varies 
greatly between sets, e.g. ~3.4 million road points vs. ~13,000 IED events, the resulting 
bin magnitudes are represented as a percent of the total sample. Thus, the magnitude of a 
bin containing 41,000 road points would be 100*(41k/3.4M). Bins are represented by a 
point at [bin center, magnitude] and adjacent points are joined with a line segment to 
facilitate visual interpretation.  
The following sections detail an illustrative subset of features used in the MECH 
model. For conciseness in the body of this dissertation, other features collected and used 
in MECH can be found in Appendix B.  
Visibility-related Features: Line-of-Sight and Viewshed 
Line-of-sight (LOS) describes the intervisibility between two points: if the points 
are visible to each other, they have LOS. Intervisibility is a common requirement for 
many conflict event activities. The Control actor intending to accurately trigger an IED 
needs intervisibility with the Emplacement site. The sniper needs intervisibility with the 
target in order to fire accurately. The addition of an LOS constraint to geomorphometric 
features allows the interpretation of those features in a new way. In some cases, LOS 
may be interrupted by nearby terrain. In these cases, activities that require LOS cannot 
occur beyond the interruption or break in intervisibility. Thus, terrain beyond the break 
can be excluded from analysis related to activities that require LOS. Multiple LOS may 
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be combined into a viewshed, which may be exhaustive or sparse. Features can be 
collected directly from both types of viewsheds. Viewsheds may also be used as a 
constraint or mask for the collection of other features. Finally, multiple viewsheds may 
be combined and features then collected from the result. 
As presented below, this analysis offers a greedy assessment of viewshed. The 
impact of DEM error, surface irradiance, precipitation, dust, and vegetation are not 
assessed and would tend to degrade or change the estimate of visibility. Also, the 
viewsheds are estimated using elevation data at a resolution of 30 meters. The resolution 
is probably insufficient to capture some significant viewshed details.  
 Line of Sight 
Denote as    a location of interest and let   [         ] be a vector of m 
points evenly distributed along a line extending from    to a distant point       such 
that                    where DEM is a digital elevation map. Let L denote the 
vector of elevations for P. These elevations may be adjusted for observer height, h.. 
  [          ]                   (  )                  (   )                 ( ) 
Then, LOS between    and all points in P is the vector 
                 ( )  [     (         )     (     (            ))]               ( ) 
               
   ( ) is a vector of Boolean values that describes the intervisibility between rx 
and each of the points in P. This is similar to the approach adopted by Izraelevitz in [40]. 
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Viewshed 
A viewshed describes the portion of a geographic area visible from a single 
point.  Viewshed is calculated by determining LOS between a site and a set of 
surrounding points. Viewsheds are a useful way to see terrain through the eyes of an 
attacker. Hidden or revealed terrain and openness or exposure of a site are examples of 
information visible in a viewshed that is difficult to see in a conventional elevation map. 
Figure 4.a offers an elevation map and its associated viewshed (Figure 4.b). The 
location of interest,   , is marked with a yellow asterisk in the center and the viewshed is 
calculated with respect to this location. In the viewshed, locations with LOS to    are 
marked in red. Locations without LOS to    are marked in blue. Locations marked in 
white are at the edge of intervisibility. Interestingly, it is difficult to gain an 
understanding of the viewshed from visual inspection of the elevation map alone.  
* 
(a) (b) 
Longitude Longitude 
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Figure 4. The relationship between elevation and viewshed; a) An elevation map 
and b) its associated viewshed. A yellow asterisk denotes rx. 
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Calculation of a viewshed provides an understanding of the intervisibility of 
   with the surrounding terrain. This understanding contributes to remote assessment of 
the site regarding its vulnerability to certain types of attacks or its potential exposure to 
hostile observers. Any action directed against    that requires intervisibility must 
originate or be triggered from a location within the    viewshed. 
There is a wide variety of viewshed algorithms. A cross section of these 
algorithms can be found in [40], [131], [132]. In this dissertation, a radial sweep 
algorithm similar to [131] is used to determine viewsheds. Two drivers inform this 
choice: optimization and feature extraction. Since radials can be processed 
independently or in batches, a high degree of parallelization may be achieved and the 
parallelization can be tailored to the number of threads or processes available. This 
allows more optimal use of available computing resources. This optimality is important 
because exhaustive viewshed determination is computationally expensive. The second 
driver is feature extraction. Subsets of radials can be used to extract features that 
summarize terrain geometry at various degrees of compression to succinctly capture 
visibility-related characteristics.   
In order to determine viewshed using a radial sampling algorithm, denote the 
location of interest as   . Define radius rad to be the length of the maximum possible 
sightline of interest. Define NS as the number of radials that will be used to determine the 
viewshed. As a rule of thumb, for an exhaustive viewshed where LOS is determined 
between    and every pixel within radius rad, NS should be the number of pixels on a 
circle of radius rad, 
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                                                                    ⌈      ⌉                                                     ( ) 
Note that rad constrains the area considered to be part of the viewshed. There may be 
points at distances greater than rad that have LOS with   . Also note that for some 
features, NS may be set to sample radials much more sparsely. The impact of this choice 
will be explored for some sparse viewshed visibility-related features.  
Let Θ be a vector of size NS consisting of angles, evenly spaced between     ⁄  
and   , where Θ = [            ], and              ⁄ ° . Then,     is a vector of 
points distributed along a radial line extending outward from rx at angle     to a distance 
of rad and the elevations of the points are denoted as     [           ] where    is 
the elevation vector of      and given by 
           [               ]               (  )               (   )         ( ) 
             , 
and    is the coordinates of a point in     defined by (⌈
   
 
        ⌉  ⌈
   
 
   
     ⌉). Then the sampling matrix   of a circular area around    is translated into matrix 
form, where the ith row of   represents elevations for the points in     and the jth 
column of   represents the pixel distance from    given by  
   
 
  .  
 LOS along radial     is described similar to Equation 5: 
   (  )  [     (             )     (     (        (   )  (     )))]           ( ) 
             , where a value of TRUE indicates that the point has LOS with rx. 
 Viewshed is determined by finding    (  ) for all desired radials 
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                                            (  )     (  )                                                          ( ) 
Figure 5.a displays a conventional elevation map. The x-axis and y-axis represent 
longitude and latitude, respectively, and the colors indicate elevation. The asterisk at 
coordinate [0,0] represents   . Figure 5.b is the same elevation map displayed in radial 
form. Each row contains the elevation vector    for a single    . Each column contains 
the NS elevations of points on the circumference of a circle centered on   . In Figure 5.a, 
the black line starting at    and extending outward along an azimuth of approximately 
250° magnetic represents        The black line in Figure 5.b is also       
Viewshed Feature: Visibility Index 
Visibility index describes the total amount of terrain within a specified radius or 
window that is visible from the center of the viewshed. Visibility index provides a scalar 
Figure 5. Conventional and radial elevation maps; a) A conventional elevation 
map; b) the same elevation map, presented in radial format. The black line denotes 
the same radial in both plots. 
 
 
(a) (b) 
* * 
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assessment of the total intervisibility of     and the surrounding terrain and gives an 
indication of the degree of exposure or concealment of the site. Given a conventional 
exhaustive viewshed   (  ), as depicted in Figure 4.b,and a radius w,  
                       (  )  ∑   (  )                 (     (  )   )             (  ) 
In Figure 6, visibility index is calculated from an exhaustive viewshed over a 
radius of 350 meters. Notably, there is a significant degree of overlap between roads and 
all classes of events. Visibility indices for other window sizes are in Appendix B.1. 
Viewshed Feature: Discrete Shape Complexity Index 
The Discrete Shape Complexity Index (SCID) describes the general complexity of 
a viewshed by capturing how dispersed it is. SCID is derived as a perimeter-to-boundary 
ratio. The perimeter P is the actual count of pixels with LOS that are adjacent to pixels 
without LOS. In terms of the exhaustive viewshed, this means that at least one of the 
eight adjacent pixels has no LOS with rx. The boundary is a circumference of the 
smallest circle whose area equals the total count of pixels with LOS to rx.. 
Figure 6. Visibility index at a radius of 350 meters. 
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In Figure 7, points within the viewshed are colored green and red. The red pixels 
denote the perimeter of the actual viewshed. Each red pixel is adjacent to at least one 
pixel that does not have intervisibility with   . The dark blue circle encloses an area 
 equal in size to the total area represented by the red and green pixels. 
SCID is found as 
                      (  )  
 
     
                  √
∑   (  )      
 
            (  )               (  ) 
   ∑ (  (  )            ( ∑ ∑   (  )  
   
     
   
     
)   )              (  )
   
     (  ) 
Figure 7. Viewshed and discrete shape  complexity index. 
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 Note that in Equation 12, if   (  )    has a value of 1 (has LOS with rx) AND at 
least one surrounding pixel does not (no LOS with rx), then the result is a 1.  
 Figure 8 shows SCID calculated across a window with a radius of 350 meters. 
The distribution of road points and events appears to be similar. SCID for other window 
sizes can be found in Appendix B.2. 
Risk Aversion and Escape Adjacency 
 Many types of conflict events rely on concealment, camouflage, and the element 
of surprise. The success of IED attacks frequently depends on the ability of the actors to 
remain hidden until the target is correctly positioned and the attack is launched. 
Similarly, direct fire attacks may last longer or be more effective if the shooters can fire 
from a protected location. Success for both types of events requires the actors to avoid 
risk as much as possible before the attack. Thus, an important element of conflict event 
site selection is the identification of locations around the conflict event that offer cover 
and concealment to a risk averse attacker. In this case, the concept of escape adjacency 
Figure 8. Discrete Shape Complexity Index at a radius of 350 meters. 
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may provide insight into the tolerance of risk by an actor. A location with escape 
adjacency has LOS with rx but is adjacent to a location without LOS to rx. These 
locations lie on the perimeter of the viewshed and are marked in red in Figure 7. When 
situated at an escape adjacent location, an actor can move quickly from visible to hidden 
with regard to rx. Similarly, an actor can position himself at the edge of intervisibility in 
an effort to jointly maximize visibility of the target and concealment from the target. A 
risk averse attacker might prefer locations with escape adjacency. 
 Let VS(rx) be a viewshed, organized as an n x n binary matrix with rx at its center, 
as depicted in Figure 4.b. Then the escape adjacency matrix EA(rx) defined over VS(rx) is   
      (  )  [    (  (  )     )               (( ∑ ∑   (  )  
   
     
   
     
)   )     ]     (  ) 
            (  ) 
 In   (  ), the resulting n x n matrix, escape adjacent pixels are those that (1) 
have LOS with   ; and (2) have at least one neighboring that does not have LOS with   . 
Condition (1) is satisfied when   (  )    has a value of 1, indicating that the location has 
intervisibility with   . Condition (2) is satisfied when the sum of    (  )    and all 
adjacent pixels is less than nine, indicating that at least one of the neighbors does not 
have intervisibility with   . These are the same conditions used in Equation 12. 
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Cumulative Escape Adjacency 
Once escape adjacent locations have been defined for all     , cumulative 
escape adjacency (CEA) can be calculated. CEA is determined by overlaying onto a 
single map the escape adjacent locations for all    along a road or route. 
 Let   [          ] be a route or roadway of interest divided into n discrete 
points at a constant interval. Let    ( ) be a geographically localized two-dimensional 
zero matrix sufficiently large to encompass all terrain within some specified distance of 
every point in R.  Then the cumulative escape adjacency map for the route R,    ( ), is 
the summation of the individual   (  ) maps for each     . 
                                       ( )     ( )     (  )                                                   (  )  
EA( x) 
Figure 9. Cumulative escape adjacency (CEA); a) CEA along route R; b) Escape 
adjacency for a single 𝒓𝒙  𝑹. 
 
 
(a) (b) 
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Figure 9.a shows a cumulative escape adjacency map for an 800-point route.  The 
callout, outlined in red in Figure 9.b, is the escape adjacency map for a single   .  
Interpretation of    ( ) is straightforward. The value of each pixel in the 
   ( ) map is the total number of      for which that pixel is escape adjacent. In 
Figure 9.a, the maximum radial length used to calculate the viewshed was 2500 meters. 
So, a point (or pixel) p with a value of 80 is escape adjacent for 80 points (    ) along 
the route (R), all of which are within 2500 meters of p. 
Once    ( ) has been assembled, cumulative escape adjacency for individual 
points along the road,    (  ), can be determined.    (  ) is found by taking the 
Hadamard product (entrywise product) of   (  ) and    ( ).  
                                                       (  )     ( )    (  )                                               (  ) 
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Figure 10. a) CEA(rx) is the Hadamard product of CEA(R) and EA(rx). 
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   Figure 10 shows how    ( ) and   (  ) are multiplied to get    (  ).  The 
result is a false-color map centered on    showing a set of points that are escape adjacent 
with rx and with other points in R, where the color of a pixel depicts the number of 
     for which that pixel is escape adjacent.In the figure, the escape adjacent points 
colored red can see rx and approximately 200 other points along R. 
Viewshed Feature: Median Cumulative Escape Adjacency 
    (  ) provides a mechanism for describing the visibility and escape adjacency 
for a particular   . This allows an attacker or a target to determine the points that are 
likely to provide good support to a conflict event. Locations with visibility and a high 
CEA value are very useful for monitoring and overwatch. As previously noted, locations 
(pixels) with a value greater than one are escape adjacent both for    as well as for other 
points. Median cumulative escape adjacency provides some indication of how visible    
and other points in R are to surrounding escape adjacent locations and provides and 
ability to roughly assess the degree of conflict event support available to rx. 
Figure 11. Median CEA(rx). 
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                                                        (  )̃        (   (  ))                                           (  ) 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of      (  )̃   It appears that both types of events 
and roads are all drawn from similar distributions. Maximum and minimum 
    (  )̃  can be found in Appendix B.3. 
Optimal Cumulative Escape Adjacency 
   (  ) provides the set of all points that are escape adjacent for some particular 
   and may be escape adjacent for other     . However, perusal of this exhaustive list 
of potential Monitor/Control locations is probably not common for risk averse actors and 
probably not representative of actual human behavior. Instead, a human seeking a good 
Monitor/Control location probably selects a general area with good potential sites and 
then selects the optimal location within or near that general area. This fits with our 
understanding of ”thin-slicing” as proposed by Gladwell [55] where decisions made are 
strongly influenced by intuition, instinct. This intuition or instinct is the outcome of an 
unconscious or subconscious integration of available facts and impressions.  
Thus, in the search for a good location to support a conflict event, attackers may 
follow, consciously or unconsciously, a three-step process: (1) identify a general area 
that appears to meet Monitor/Control criteria; (2) move towards and around the selected 
general area; and (3) choose the locally optimal site at or near the selected general area 
for use as a Monitor/Control location. Optimal Cumulative Escape Adjacency attempts 
to capture the notion that humans are often willing to make some level of effort in order 
to improve their position or outcome. Assuming that a ‘better’ location has greater 
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cumulative escape adjacency, a reduced, more optimal set of    (  ) locations can be 
selected by discarding points that have nearby neighbors with greater escape adjacency. 
Let w be the maximum distance that a human actor is willing to move in order to 
improve a position. Then, 
    (  )    {
   (  )           (  )       (        )
 
                  (  )    (  )  
, where         is a circular window with radius w centered on    (  )   . Each 
location in the resulting reduced set of locations can be considered locally optimal within 
a radius of w with respect to maximum cumulative escape adjacency.  
Viewshed Feature: Route Visibility 
 For the tactics used in many conflict events, simple intervisibility with    is not 
enough. Visibility of the approaches to    is also important and the total extent of the 
visible area needed for a particular tactic varies with terrain and tactics. In the case 
where the target is mobile, an actor at a Control location may need sufficient visible 
extent to estimate vehicle speed accurately in order to trigger the IED or fire a weapon at 
a preselected site. Better roads and faster targets increase the total visibility required. 
Intervisibility over larger extents may also be required for the Control actor to ensure 
that the target is appropriate for the attack being planned. For example, an ambush using 
light shoulder-fired weapons should not engage a heavily armed patrol. In this situation, 
a Control actor might want to see all of the vehicles in a patrol before choosing to initiate 
the attack. Attack scale may also play an important role. A visible stretch of road may be 
required for a large-scale ambush. The Control actor is likely to want to have the entire  
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target patrol within the kill zone before initiation of an attack.  
Let w be the maximum extent of the approaches under consideration. Then 
  
 (  ) is the subset of R within distance w of    . 
                         (  )              (     )                                                 (  ) 
Then the route visibility of the approaches to    for     (  )    is the fraction of total 
points in    (  ) that have intervisibility with     (  )        
     (    (  )   )   
∑ (   (    (  )     
 
 (  ) )   )   
    (  ) 
                  (  )   (  ) 
, and the route visibility for all points in     (  ) is the matrix 
                      (    (  ))   [     (    (  )   )]                   (  )                   (  ) 
Once     (    (  )) has been calculated, then the median route visibility for 
the CEA points surrounding    is the median of all values in      (    (  )) 
                                     (    (  ))
̃        (    (    (  )))                              (  ) 
 Figure 12 shows the importance of route visibility for approaches of 250 meters. 
In the figure, conflict events are significantly more likely to have better median route 
visibility than typical road points. In fact, the boxplot shows that a majority of IED and 
DF sites have approaches that are very exposed or visible (> 50%).  In the histogram, 
note that approximately 30% of all conflict events have greater than 95% route visibility 
for all road points within 250 meters.  
Appendix B.4 shows median route visibility at radii of 100, 500, and 1000 
meters. Appendices B.5 and B.6 show maximum and minimum route visibility at radii of 
100, 250, 500, 1000 meters. 
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Sparse Viewshed 
In some cases, analysis of the exhaustive viewshed fails to capture salient 
features. The noisiness of discrete data may hide general trends over larger areas. Also, 
the use of symmetric windows centered on rx may conceal or wash out interesting 
asymmetric features. In these cases, sparse viewshed provides a mechanism for feature 
extraction that summarizes or constrains key viewshed features at scales appropriate to 
the feature being analyzed.  
Sparse viewshed models terrain in a way that might be similar to the mental 
model constructed by a human assessing terrain. Humans tend to assess terrain by taking 
notice of major features, like hilltops, ridgelines, and running water. A mental model is 
constructed that locates these features in relation to each other. When a specific task 
needs to be accomplished, a human might also notice smaller or more specific features. 
For example, a hiker will notice the slope and roughness of possible routes. Sparse 
Figure 12. Median route visibility at 250 meters. 
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viewshed provides a mechanism to simplistically model the limits of visibility. These 
limits can be used to estimate viewshed and to build viewshed-constrained versions of 
several common geomorphometric features. 
To build a sparse viewshed, calculate viewshed as described in Equations 7-9. 
However, modify Equation 8 to include a stopping critiera, tol, and select an Ns 
appropriate for the feature being collected. Define tol to be the maximum number of 
consecutive points along a radial that may have LOS=0. The end of the radial is set to be 
the last visible point before tol is exceeded. Once tol is exceeded, all more distant points 
are set to zero.  
   (  )  [     (         )     (     (      (   )  (     )))]                (  ) 
                                                 (∑    (    )
 
       
)     
The inclusion of the stopping criteria provides a mechanism to determine the 
length of a mostly uninterrupted sightline along a particular azimuth. In other words, all 
or almost all points between rx and the end of a radial are visible. The first significant 
gap in intervisibility occurs beyond the end of the radial. The tol variable is used to 
specify the width of a gap considered significant. Once the stopping criterion has been 
incorporated, sparse viewshed is calculated as described in Equation 9. The choice of Ns 
is a tunable parameter that varies with the degree of summarization desired.   
Figure 13 shows a sparse viewshed overlaying an exhaustive viewshed. The 
green pixels in the figure are an exhaustive viewshed calculated using a radial sweep 
algorithm with large Ns as described in Equations 7-9. A sparse viewshed is formed 
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using Ns = 8 evenly spaced radials with the ends of the radials being determined as 
described in Equation 22. The tol criterion was set to a value of 2, so the radials stop 
when a gap of three or more pixels is encountered. 
The thin black line joining the ends of the radials denotes the sparse viewshed 
boundary. In the figure, the longest radial is marked with a heavy-dash blue line. A 
heavy-dash line marks a circle whose radius is the longest radial. A solid red line marks 
a circle whose radius is the shortest radial. These two circles form the outer and inner 
boundary of a Halo or annulus. Key elements of conflict events planned by risk-averse 
attackers will occur within this Halo. Elements closer to rx than the red circle are likely 
Short radial / inner halo 
Long radial  /outer halo 
Radial
rx 
FV Boundary 
Figure 13. Example of a sparse viewshed using eight radials. 
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to be exposed to view by the target. Elements further away from rx than the blue circle 
are likely to have poor or no visibility of rx. Thus, analysis of terrain within this Halo 
may provide key insights in attacker tactics and potential use of terrain.  
 Several features can be calculated from sparse viewshed. 
Viewshed Feature: Shortest Radial 
The length of the shortest radial denotes the nearest location along a selected 
radial where there is a significant gap in intervisibility. It is also an estimate of the length 
of the shortest sightline.  For some types of events, the shortest radial may describe the 
closest place to    where attackers can conceal themselves. An interruption in 
intervisibility captured by the shortest radial may also be an indication that nearby 
terrain changes abruptly. 
Figure 14 shows the distribution of the length of the shortest radial when Ns = 16.  
Although all conflict events seem to share a common distribution, they are clearly 
Figure 14. Distribution of shortest radial, for sparse viewshed with Ns = 16. 
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distinct from a majority of road points. The shortest radial for various sizes of Ns (4, 8, 
32, and 64 radials) can be found in Appendices B.7. 
Viewshed Feature: Longest Radial 
The length of the longest radial is the length of the longest uninterrupted or 
mostly uninterrupted sightline.  For some types of conflict events, the longest radial may 
describe the direction in which Monitor actors may possibly be found. A long radial may 
often highlight linear features that lie along a radial, like a river valley or ridge, or long 
gentle slopes, where intervisibility is not interrupted. Also, long radials tend to indicate 
that the terrain along that radial tends to be relatively smooth.  
Figure 15 shows the distribution of the longest radial. It appears that conflict 
events and roads share a common distribution. The longest radial for various sizes of Ns 
(4, 8, 32, and 64 radials) can be found in Appendices B.8. 
 
 
Figure 15. Distribution of longest radial, for sparse viewshed with Ns = 16. 
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Viewshed Feature: Local Openness 
Local openness quantifies the general lay of the land as described by the radials of a 
sparse viewshed. Defined as the mean of the slopes of the radials, upward openness 
provides some insight into the general shape of the terrain. Smaller values are found on 
flatter terrain, which tends to be more open, while larger values are found in more 
rugged terrain. 
Let    (      (  )) be the absolute value of the slope between    and the end of 
radial i. Then local openness for a sparse viewshed is calculated as 
                                       (  )  
 
  
∑   (      (  ))                                  (  ) 
Figure 16 uses eight radials to depict a sparse viewshed in three dimensions. The 
colored triangles estimate the terrain’s surface between adjacent radials. The gray area 
Figure 16. Sparse viewshed portrayed in three dimensions. 
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underneath represents the planimetric area described by the radials. Local openness for 
this eight-radial sparse viewshed is the average of the absolute values of the slopes of the 
radials. 
Figure 17 depicts local openness calculated using a sparse viewshed with 16 
radials. Interestingly, conflict event sites tend to be more open than most road sites with 
IED sites distributed across the smallest range of openness. Local openness for various 
sizes of Ns (4, 8, 32, and 64 radials) can be found in Appendices B.9. 
Geomorphometric Features 
There is a wide variety of geomorphometric parameters that describe the 
underlying morphographic structure of terrain. For a baseline, we use the three part 
geometric pattern proposed by Iwahashi and Pike in [22] based in part on the work of 
Horn [133] . The pattern, consisting of slope gradient, texture and local convexity, is 
designed to capture key differentiating features of different landscapes. Other 
geomorphometric features are also collected. 
  Figure 17. Distribution of local openness, for sparse viewshed with Ns = 16. 
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 Three important facts should be noted regarding the collection of 
geomorphometric features in this research. First, the resolution of the elevation data is 
fixed and limited to approximately 30 meters. Since terrain features are strongly scale 
dependent, this resolution may be insufficient to capture larger features and vice versa. 
Second, the geomorphometric features selected are representative and commonly found 
in the literature. However, they may not be optimal for this resolution or terrain type. 
Finally, some parameterization, especially for window sizes, is strongly based on 
anecdotal estimation of the distances required for certain asymmetric warfare activities. 
These estimates are likely to change if field-based analysis becomes available. 
Feature: Slope 
Slope is defined as the change in elevation per meter of distance along the path of 
steepest ascent or descent. It is calculated using a 3-pixel x 3-pixel (3x3) analysis 
window centered on the elevation map pixel containing the location of interest,   .  
Matlab provides slope as an output of the gradientm function and calculates it as: 
Figure 18. Distribution of slope. 
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Figure 18 compares the distributions of slope for roads, IED, and DF. Notably, 
events tend to be on flatter sites than most roads. This is similar to the observations from 
the local openness feature. Additionally, conflict events and roads appear to be from 
different populations, based on the width and positioning of the boxplot notches. 
Feature: Texture 
Texture is defined by Iwahashi and Pike as the total number of pits and peaks 
within a ten pixel radius of a point [22]. A 3-pixel x 3-pixel (3x3) median filter is used to 
smooth the original digital elevation model (DEM). The output of the filter is a 
smoothed DEM that is subtracted from the original DEM and examined for magnitude. 
Magnitudes greater than zero indicate peaks and magnitudes less than zero indicate pits.  
                                      (   )                                                     (  ) 
                        (  )  ∑    
  
           (      )                                   (  ) 
Figure 19. Distribution of texture, as defined by Iwahashi and Pike. 
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For context, in the case of Afghanistan, where the publically available DEMs 
have a resolution of approximately 30 meters, individual textures are calculated over a 
circular area encompassing approximately 280,000 meters2. Figure 19 compares the 
distributions of texture for roads, IED, and DF events. While all three classes follow a 
similar distribution, conflict events tend to have greater texture than roads. The boxplots 
indicate that all three classes are probably drawn from different populations. 
Feature: Local Convexity 
The convexity of individual map pixels is found by calculating the surface 
curvature of a 3x3 DEM subgrid using a Laplacian filter. Matlab calculates convexity, 
Conv, using a convolution kernel K, 
                                            [
                  
                   
                  
]                                           (  ) 
                  ∑ ∑   
 
   
 
   
(           ) (   )                               (  ) 
Figure 20. Distribution of local convexity, as defined by Iwahashi and Pike. 
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Since local convexity, as defined by Iwahashi and Pike, only counts pixels with 
positive values, all values less than or equal to zero can be set to zero. 
                                                                                                                                     (  ) 
Then, local convexity is defined as the percentage of convex upward (positive) 
pixels within a ten pixel radius of a point [22]. 
                    (  )  
   
  
∑    
  
          (      )                     (  ) 
, where    is the number of pixels within a ten pixel radius of (i,j). 
  As shown in Figure 20, for all types of conflict events, the distribution of local 
convexity varies little and the range of convexity values is relatively narrow.  
Feature: Elevation Range 
Elevation range is the difference between the highest and lowest elevation in a 
window [43]. For this analysis, we examine the difference at a radius of 350 meters. 
Note that in Equations 31 and 22,   (  )    is a matrix of elevations within rad meters 
of    . 
              (  )                  (        )                                 (  ) 
                                       (  )       ( (  )   ))     ( (  )   )                      (  ) 
Figure 21 shows that the elevation range is markedly different between roads and 
conflict events using a window size of 350 meters. At this window size, roads have a 
larger range of values while conflict events are seen on terrain with smaller ranges. This 
small range of values may indicate that attackers prefer flatter or smoother ground in the 
vicinity of an attack site. 
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Graphs showing elevation range at window radii of 50, 100, 500 and 1000 meters 
can be found in Appendix B.10. 
Feature: Roughness 
 Roughness uses the standard deviation of elevation across a window to estimate 
the texture of a surface. Large standard deviations are an indication of a more undulating 
or rougher surface. Determine  (  )    as in Equation 31. Then the standard deviation 
of elevation across  (  )    is 
                                                                (  )     ( (  )   )                                            (  ) 
, where   is the standard deviation function. 
Figure 21 compares the distribution of roughness across the three classes for a 
window size of 350 meters. The classes of events tend to be on smoother ground than 
roads. Notably, the distribution of roughness closely resembles the distribution of 
elevation range. Appendix B.11 contains figures for roughness across other window 
sizes. 
Figure 21. Distribution of elevation range at a radius of 350 meters. 
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Social/Cultural Features 
Some features are not directly linked to geomorphometry or viewshed. These 
features, often related to social or cultural factors, capture aspects of site selection not 
related to the land itself. Proximity to populated areas is explored below. 
Social/Cultural Feature: Proximity to Populated Areas 
In some cases, attackers may require access to populated areas. Access may be 
for logistical reasons, e.g. attackers need access to communications, lodging, etc., or for 
cover and concealment, e.g. attackers may be able to hide within the local populace. 
Figure 23 shows the distribution of the distance from conflict event sites to the 
nearest population center with more than 1000 inhabitants. Notably, conflict events tend 
to be much closer to inhabited areas than points along roads with a median value of 
approximately 1 km. Appendix B.13 shows the distributions for distances to populated 
areas ranging in size from 1 to 1 million inhabitants.   
 
Figure 22. Distribution of roughness over a radius of 350 meters. 
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Other Features 
 Several other features are presented in Appendix B. These features are similar to 
those already presented here and are included in the appendix for completeness: 
- Sparse Viewshed Mean Radial Length is presented in Appendix B.12. 
- Sparse Viewshed Planimetric Area is presented in Appendix B.14. 
- Sparse Viewshed Rugosity is presented in Appendix B.15. 
- Sparse Viewshed Shape Complexity is presented in Appendix B.16. 
Comparison of Features across Classes 
 In the previous sections, a total of 20 different features were collected. Some of 
the features were collected at various geographic window sizes or at various resolutions. 
The resulting feature set consists of 77 measurements. Table 2 summarizes the results of 
multiple Kruskal-Wallis tests to determine if the observations for distinct classes (roads, 
IED and DF) come from different populations. 
Figure 23. Distribution of distance to nearest populated area with greater than 
1000 inhabitants. 
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 The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test is a non-parametric statistical test designed to 
assess if the measurements for two or more classes come from the same population. It 
tests the null hypothesis —that all measurements  are drawn from the same population— 
by comparing the medians for each class. As a non-parametric test, KW makes no 
assumptions about distributions of the measurements or residuals. The test only assumes 
that all measurements are independent and that they are all drawn from the same 
continuous distribution. The output of the KW test is the p-value for the null hypothesis. 
Small p-values call into question the null hypothesis and indicate that, in the 
measurements used, at least one class median is significantly different from the others. 
 Table 2 provides the output of multiple KW tests. For each of the 77 
measurements in the two-column table, three different KW tests were run comparing (1) 
roads with IED events, (2) roads with DF events, and (3) IED events with DF events. 
The p-values are captured in the table and significant values (p <= 0.05) are highlighted 
in yellow. As shown, roads and events (of any type) are very likely to have been drawn 
from different populations. These results hold for IED versus roads in 73 of 77 features. 
DF versus roads shows similar results. Interestingly, IED and DF events appear to come 
from the same population for 55 of 77 measures. For IED and DF events, the 22 
measures assessed by the KW test to come from different classes actually include 11 
measures of route visibility and five measures of shape complexity. In other words, IED 
and DF events are assessed to be from different populations in only eight of 20 features. 
Appendix C contains tables summarizing key statistics for datasets used in this 
research (mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum). 
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Table 2. Kruskal-Wallis test results 
Feature Rds : IED Rds: DF IED : DF  Feature Rds : IED Rds: DF IED : DF 
Elevation 1.11E-13 1.32E-12 0.003928  Local open (16) 9.07E-239 3.29E-147 0.1321 
Slope 5.43E-255 3.05E-122 1.08E-06  Planimet area (16) 6.31E-18 1.55E-14 0.8096 
Convexity (IW) 0.5576 0.06056 0.04094  Rugosity (16) 5.23E-18 6.57E-11 0.5024 
Texture (IW) 2.96E-108 4.44E-56 0.005387  Shape cmplx (16) 2.45E-20 1.63E-06 0.009604 
Elev. Rng (50) 1.13E-201 2.94E-146 0.7953  Short radial (32) 1.12E-08 1.52E-07 0.8531 
Elev. Rng (100) 8.10E-239 8.89E-150 0.0926  Long radial (32) 1.65E-20 1.02E-15 0.9818 
Elev. Rng (350) 5.935e-315 4.60E-188 0.1276  Mean radial (32) 2.86E-19 1.04E-16 0.6169 
Elev. Rng (500) 4.397e-322 1.88E-198 0.4111  Local open (32) 2.49E-240 2.44E-147 0.1145 
Elev. Rng (1000) 1.808e-316 5.96E-192 0.5589  Planimet area (32) 1.38E-18 1.64E-16 0.5914 
Roughness (50) 9.85E-196 1.53E-143 0.6819  Rugosity (32) 1.23E-21 6.36E-11 0.1907 
Roughness (100) 1.07E-223 5.28E-144 0.2267  Shape cmplx (32) 3.12E-14 0.001562 0.00719 
Roughness (350) 8.66E-300 1.43E-179 0.1431  Short radial (64) 7.34E-10 7.76E-09 0.7676 
Roughness (500) 0.00E+00 1.14E-191 0.5112  Long radial (64) 2.74E-21 5.90E-18 0.7203 
Roughness (1000) 0.00E+00 2.12E-196 0.7572  Mean radial (64) 1.40E-19 9.99E-17 0.6435 
Vis Idx(100_350) 1.54E-05 4.80E-08 0.1539  Local open (64) 8.24E-241 3.98E-148 0.1272 
Vis Index (350) 9.44E-06 3.38E-08 0.1591  Planimet area (64) 6.62E-19 8.63E-17 0.5935 
Vis Index (500) 0.0001491 1.93E-08 0.07718  Rugosity (64) 5.19E-18 2.69E-14 0.9133 
Vis Index (1000) 0.1004 2.67E-06 0.02136  Shape cmplx (64) 3.88E-11 0.00224 0.03802 
SCID (100_350) 0.01643 1.11E-05 0.06298  Dist. to ppl (1) 0 5.17E-246 0.6226 
SCI D (350) 9.44E-06 3.38E-08 0.1591  Dist. to ppl (1k) 0 1.61E-293 0.4416 
SCI D (500) 0.0001491 1.93E-08 0.07718  Dist. to ppl (10k) 3.62E-182 6.51E-163 0.5654 
SCID (1000) 0.1004 2.67E-06 0.02136  Dist. to ppl (50k) 1.39E-246 1.16E-179 0.05796 
Short radial (4) 1.47E-05 1.78E-05 0.6582  Dist. to ppl (100k) 1.61E-23 1.58E-39 2.73E-08 
Long radial (4) 1.18E-07 7.73E-07 0.7779  CEA min 2.23E-79 1.17E-74 0.2858 
Mean radial (4) 1.07E-09 2.67E-10 0.3949  CEA max 3.25E-168 2.18E-116 0.07424 
Local open (4) 2.03E-237 1.02E-147 0.1425  CEA med 1.92E-248 4.56E-189 0.945 
Planimet area (4) 1.65E-09 5.09E-10 0.4079  Rte Vis. (min 1k) 3.26E-127 4.17E-06 5.95E-26 
Rugosity (4) 4.60E-07 0.0004824 0.4863  Rte Vis. (max 1k) 0.0009066 0.7642 0.03552 
Shape cmplx (4) 7.81E-25 1.86E-10 0.03742  Rte Vis. (med 1k) 0.3002 9.45E-09 0.000248 
Short radial (8) 7.21E-07 2.55E-07 0.5359  Rte Vis. (min 500) 1.04E-192 3.68E-17 3.47E-27 
Long radial (8) 8.77E-13 1.46E-09 0.8917  Rte Vis. (max 500) 5.61E-25 4.75E-09 0.01279 
Mean radial (8) 2.04E-15 2.87E-12 0.8934  Rte Vis. (med 500) 7.91E-11 0.98 2.87E-05 
Local open (8) 2.55E-241 9.74E-149 0.1198  Rte Vis. (min 250) 1.16E-190 1.54E-23 5.01E-20 
Planimet. area (8) 4.49E-14 1.09E-11 0.8191  Rte Vis. (max 250) 6.38E-54 3.41E-22 0.00094 
Rugosity (8) 2.86E-10 3.06E-09 0.7138  Rte Vis. (med 250) 3.61E-41 1.21E-08 2.81E-05 
Shape cmplx (8) 2.02E-20 1.08E-09 0.1107  Rte Vis. (min 100) 0.004383 1.49E-30 1.56E-11 
Short radial (16) 1.28E-07 0.000156 0.5149  Rte Vis. (max 100) 1.61E-15 5.41E-06 0.06075 
Long radial (16) 3.78E-19 6.75E-13 0.6864  Rte Vis. (med 100) 8.42E-40 0.05053 1.30E-10 
Mean radial (16) 1.22E-18 1.20E-14 0.8745      
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Summary 
A total of 20 features were collected at various resolutions or using various 
geographic windows. These 20 features produced a total of 77 distinct measures. The 
following measures can be used to describe the Emplacement site: 
- Elevation, slope, convexity, texture, elevation range at 50 meters, roughness 
at 50 meters, local openness (all resolutions), distance to populated areas, and 
route visibility at 100 meters. 
Monitor/control sites can be described using: 
- Elevation range and roughness at radii greater than 50 meters, visibility 
index,  discrete shape complexity, long radial, short radial, mean radial, 
planimetric area, rugosity, sparse viewshed shape complexity, cumulative 
escape adjacency and route visibility at radii greater than 100 meters. 
As seen by visual inspection of the boxplots, several of the measures are clearly 
different for different classes. Table 2 offers one way to quantify this difference and 
support the intuition gained from the visual inspection. Given this difference, it is 
probably possible to use these features for predictive analysis. 
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CHAPTER V 
PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT EVENTS 
 
Predictive analysis uses a variety of techniques to analyze historical data for the 
purpose of making predictions about the future or about unvisited locations. In this 
chapter we propose algorithms to populate and use the MECH model.  The purpose of 
this study is to design an accurate and robust classification algorithm that learns from 
available data under realistic constraints. 
In the development of the algorithm, subset selection and principal component 
analysis are compared as mechanism to reduce dimensionality. Classification is 
performed on the resulting reduced model using supervised parametric and non-
parametric techniques including support vector machines, discriminant analysis and 
nearest neighbor classifiers. Performance of these classifiers is compared in various 
situations including:  
- under geographic constraints,  
- under temporal constraints, and 
- under combined geographic and temporal constraints 
Constraint performance is assessed using classification error and examined as a 
function of sample size and sample density. Using the best-performing constraints as 
determined in the analysis described above, learners are proposed and performance is 
analyzed. 
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The MECH Classification Algorithm 
 Conflict events are rare. When overlaid on a tokenized road map of Afghanistan, 
conflict events only occupy 0.8% of the total number of points comprising the roads.  
Conflict events are notably different than average road points. Route visibility (Figure 
12), shortest radial (Figure 14), local openness (Figure 17), elevation range (Figure 21), 
and distance to populated areas (Figure 23) are all features where the distribution of 
conflict events and road points are clearly different. Knowing that this difference exists, 
we are able to design an effective classification algorithm that adaptively learns from the 
subset of MECH features most relevant for the area and time under consideration.  
 The MECH classification algorithm adapts to available data in several ways. 
First, normalization factors are dynamically determined from local data. This ensures 
that scaling is determined from the data set and appropriate for the terrain and tactics 
described by the data. Next, relevant features are determined from the same local data. 
Thus, the set of features identified as relevant varies with tactics, terrain, and time. 
Finally, parameterization of the model is derived from local data. Thus, each time the 
model is used for predictive analysis, it is uniquely tuned to historical events, terrain, and 
the tactics in use in the local area.   
As previously noted in Chapter III, the MECH model is comprised of two tactical 
patterns: one composed of Emplacement features,   (  ), and one composed of 
Monitor/Control features,   (  ). Together, these features form the tactical pattern of the 
conflict event  (  )   [  (  )     (  )]. 
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 This pattern forms the core of the MECH classification algorithm. A constrained 
set of points are identified that include both conflict event and non-conflict event sites. 
Features are collected from these sites and normalized. These normalized features are 
examined for relevance. The resulting reduced set is used to develop classification rules. 
Table 3 summarizes the MECH Classification Algorithm and provides an outline for the 
sections that follow. 
 
 
Table 3. The MECH Classification Algorithm 
Objective 
Classify Points Along Roads 
 
Algorithm 
Step 1: Select a dataset. 
Given a set of locations collected from conflict events and road points, select the 
conflict events and road points to include in the training set 
(i) Apply geographic constraints 
(ii) Apply temporal constraints 
If there are enough events in the resulting constrained sample  
(iii) Divide the data into training and test sets 
(iv) Collect Emplacement and Monitor/Control (E and M/C) features 
 
Step 2: Prepare the data 
(v) Normalize the training set 
(vi) Normalize the test set using scaling factors from the training set 
 
Step 3: Train and assess the model  
(vii) Select relevant features 
(viii) Determine model parameters and/or hyperparameters 
(ix) Learn the classification rules for the training set 
(x) Estimate classification accuracy 
 
Step 4: Classify 
(xi) Apply the classification rules 
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Assessment and Experiment Construction 
In the following analyses, classification is performed using support vector 
machine (SVM), discriminant analysis (DA), and k-nearest neighbor (KNN) algorithms. 
Various filters or constraints are applied and the resulting datasets are classified using 
five-way cross-validation. Three classes of data are used.   
Two historical event classes are formed by IED events within 100 meters of a 
known road (IED100) and direct fire events within 100 meters of a known road (DF100). 
Collectively, these two sets comprise EVS100, the set of all events within 100 meters of a 
road. Roads are tokenized into discrete points at an interval of 30 meters, which 
coincides approximately with the elevation map resolution. Points along the road that are 
at least 250 meters from any conflict event (RD250) are used as the non-event class. 
Many of the figures displayed are based on ST, a dataset consisting of 250 events drawn 
randomly from IED100 and 250 events drawn randomly from DF100. The dates and 
locations of the ST events provide a consistent set of geographic and temporal 
coordinates that are used to test and compare algorithms.  Figure 24 shows the temporal 
and geographic distribution of ST.  
The RD250 dataset was chosen to minimize suspected problems with the conflict 
event data. First, it is not clear that the location of the conflict event is selected using 
consistent criteria. For example, the actual location of an exploded or discovered IED is 
very clear from physical observation. Blast marks, craters or the actual device can be 
seen and the location measured accurately. However, the reported location is not always 
so accurate. It may be the actual site of the explosion, an estimate of the location made 
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Figure 24. Distribution of random sample of historical events, ST, used for 
analysis and parameter discovery of the MECH classification algorithm; a) 
geographic distribution of ST locations and roads; b) temporal distribution of ST 
compared to the temporal distribution of EVS100. 
 
b) 
a) 
ST 
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from a distance, or the location of the person reporting the event. In the case of a military 
patrol, a person reporting the event may be a hundred or more meters away, since patrols 
typically maintain 25-meter or greater spacing between vehicles. The location chosen to 
represent a direct fire event is similarly unclear. The reported location may be the first 
vehicle in the patrol, the first vehicle to come under fire, the vehicle of the person 
reporting the incident, or an estimated ‘center’ of the kill zone or ambush site. The 250-
meter-radius exclusionary zone around known conflict event sites provides a buffer that 
attempts to mitigate these problems. 
It is important to note another significant issue with the RD250 dataset. IED100 and 
DF100 contain single classes of data: locations and dates where known conflict events 
occurred. The RD250 dataset, although labeled as a single class, actually contains at least 
three classes: 
1. Locations that are not useful for conflict events and will never be used; 
2. Locations that are useful for a conflict event but have not been used yet; and 
3. Locations that have already been used for a conflict event but this event occurred 
before or after the time period covered with this data. 
Thus, when RD250 is used as the non-event class in a two-class classification 
algorithm, it is likely that some misclassified non-events are actually members of (2) or 
(3). One impact of this issue is that the overall misclassification rate may not be a good 
indicator of performance. Instead, it is necessary to examine both the overall 
misclassification rate as well as the individual misclassification rates of each class. 
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The restricted conflict event sets used for learning are a reflection of an 
incomplete road dataset. This is evidenced by the fact that many conflict event sites are 
located away from known roads. Appendix A.3 illustrates this problem. The IED100 and 
DF100 datasets were chosen to ensure that the features collected from conflict event 
locations used for training were comparable to features collected from points known to 
lie along roads. The inclusionary radius of 100 meters ensures that conflict event points 
used for training lie sufficiently close to known roads that all features may be collected. 
This criterion is particularly applicable to features based on visibility and cumulative 
escape adjacency. 
A total of 77 distinct measures derived form 20 features at various resolutions or 
window sizes were cataloged for each road point and conflict event location. Seven 
additional descriptors capture the location, time, and index of each event. The data are 
organized into matrices where a row represents a single location (road) or location and 
date (event) and a column is a distinct measure, coordinate, or index. Thus, a single row 
in the data consists of  
   [                                                             ] 
These observations are split into Emplacement and Monitor/Control sets. Table 4 
lists the features in each set. For analysis and prediction, combinations of the first seven 
indices are used for selection and filtering.  
Classification outcomes are presented using two measures. Percent error is the 
percent of all classifications that are not correct. Cast in terms of the conventional 
confusion matrix, percent error is  
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Table 4. Emplacement and Monitor/Control features 
Emplacement Features 
Elevation Elevation range at 50 meters 
Slope Roughness at 50 meters 
Convexity Local openness (all resolutions) 
Texture Distance to populated areas (all sizes) 
Route visibility at 100 meters  
  
Monitor/Control Features 
Elevation range at radii > 50 meters Visibility index (all window sizes) 
Roughness at radii > at 50 meters Discrete shape complexity (all window 
sizes) 
Short radial (all resolutions) Sparse VS shape complexity (all 
resolutions) 
Long radial (all resolutions) Planimetric area (all resolutions) 
Mean radial (all resolutions) Rugosity (all resolutions) 
Maximum cumulative escape 
adjacency 
Maximum route visibility at radii > 100 
mtrs 
Minimum cumulative escape 
adjacency 
Minimum route visibility at radii > 100 
meters 
Median cumulative escape 
adjacency 
Median route visibility at radii > 100 meters 
 
 
 
                   
                            
                        
 
A second measure is event classification error, which is the percent of misclassified 
events. Commonly described as precision, it is found as 
                                
              
            
 
Set Selection and Normalization 
 Attackers may vary their attacks with geography and over time. Attacks may 
vary with geography for a number of reasons including the shape and structure of terrain, 
availability of critical tactical elements like overwatch sites, proximity to attacker safe 
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zones, and political and tribal boundaries. Over time, attacks may vary due to 
deployment of countermeasures, availability of war materials, experience level of the 
attackers, and sophistication of the target.  
 Geographic and temporal windows attempt to mitigate the effects of this change 
over distance and time. Geographic windows constrain the set of observations being 
used to more localized and presumably more similar terrain. The use of geographic 
windows is based on the assumption that nearby terrain is more likely to be used in the 
same way for a conflict event (similar tactics, similar geometry, similar choices made 
because the same people are involved), than terrain that is more distant. Temporal 
windows are based on a similar assumption: events that are temporally proximate are 
more likely to resemble each other than events that are temporally more distant, due to 
availability of war materials, current shared training, deployment of countermeasures, 
seasonal weather, and other influences that tend to vary with time. 
 Fixed geographic windows can be used to exclude observations that are 
physically distant from a specified center point. The selection criterion, geographic 
distance from a selected coordinate, is used to exclude observations from the set that are 
beyond a specified radius. Let loc be a location and let radius be a geographic distance 
that will be used as constraining radius. Then, 
                                                       (          )                            (  ) 
                                                       (         )                             (  ) 
In the datasets used in this research, the number of non-event observations (road 
points not known to be used for conflict events) is always much larger than the number 
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of events when using fixed geographic windows. In order to create training and test sets 
with balanced classes, a subsample of roads points of the same size as event_obs is 
randomly selected without replacement  
                                    [                      (           )]                        (  ) 
                
 Cross-validation is used to select training and test subsets randomly from sample. 
In the following sections, three-way cross validation is used. 
Fixed temporal windows can be used to exclude observations that are distant in 
time from a specified date. The selection criterion, timespan in days before and after the 
specified date, is used to exclude observations from the set that are older or newer than a 
selected date range. Let date be a calendar date that falls within the date range of 
available data and let span1 and  span2 describe the timespans in days used to constrain 
the training and test sets, respectively. The training set includes events that occur on or 
before date up to a timespan of span1 days and the test set includes events that occur up 
to span2 days after date. Note that the timespan function returns negative values for dates 
that occur before date. Then, 
                                               (           )                 (  ) 
                                                 (           )                    (  ) 
Because there is no geographic constraint, a subsample of roads points of the 
same size as trn_event_obs is randomly selected without replacement from all roads.  
                                     [                          (       )]                   (  ) 
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A subsample of road points is selected similarly for the test sample. 
Combined constraints produce training and tests sets that satisfy two conditions: 
geographic and temporal. The training set produced by these constraints contains roads 
and events that are within radius of a specified loc. Training events are further 
constrained to be within a specified timespan before or on date. Let loc and date 
describe the geographic location and date of some event and let radius, span1 and span2 
describe the geographic window radius, training timespan and test timespan. Then the 
training sample is found by  
                                                  (          )                                 (  ) 
                                             (              )         (  ) 
                                                     (         )                               (  ) 
                                [                          (           )]                (  ) 
                    
The test set is found similarly, using span2 as the timespan. 
Although the use of geographic and temporal constraints produces sets of events 
and terrain that are probably more homogeneous, a side effect is that the training and test 
sets are temporally disjoint. In some parts of the year, this means that the test events will 
occur in a completely different season from the training events. Minimizing this seasonal 
difference should be considered when span1 and span2 are chosen. A related problem is 
that smaller windows tend to produce smaller data sets. For some machine learning 
algorithms, small training sets may be difficult to use or may produce unreliable results. 
Figure 25 shows the number of events found using geographic, temporal and combined 
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constraints. In the figure, the red crosses denote the number of events found using the 
500 locations and dates in ST. Within each window (geographic, temporal or combined), 
the crosses are dithered slightly to facilitate visual assessment of the distribution of 
values. The blue circle denotes the mean number of events in the window. As might be 
expected, the number of events tends to decrease as the window size decreases. In the 
case of combined constraints, the smallest combinations produce few usable sets. 
Data Normalization 
Once constraints have been applied, the resulting datasets need to be prepared for 
use with in machine learning techniques. The raw data must be centered and scaled so 
that the resulting features share a common mean at or near zero and approximately equal 
ranges. Three normalization methods were explored: z-score and two min-max schemes. 
 Z-score is probably the most widely used normalization technique. Calculated 
using mean for location and standard deviation for scale, the z-score for a single feature 
or measure s is found by 
                                                                 
  
    ( )
 ( )
                                                        (  ) 
 The use of z-score is not optimal in every case. The normalized output for 
different features may have different numeric ranges. Also, z-score normalization is 
sensitive to outliers due to the use of the feature mean and standard deviation. Z-score 
implicitly assumes that the distribution of s is Gaussian. For features with distributions 
other than Gaussian, mean and standard deviation may not be reasonable for location 
and scale. Also, the original distribution is not necessarily preserved. 
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Min-max is another widely used normalization technique. In min-max, the 
feature mean provides the location information while the difference between maximum 
and minimum feature values provides the scale. Min-max normalization for a single 
feature s is found by 
c) 
a) b) 
Figure 25. Number of events found using various constraints; a) geographic; b) 
temporal; c) combined geographic and temporal. 
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    ( )
   ( )     ( )
                                                      (  ) 
 As with z-score, min-max normalization is very sensitive to outliers. However, 
min-max scaling does preserve a scaled and center version of the original distribution. 
 Both z-score and min-max are sensitive to outliers due to their reliance on the 
mean and standard deviation. An alternate version of min-max, referred to here as 3-
sigma avoids this problem by using the median of the feature as its location, instead of 
the mean. Standard deviation is calculated using the subset of s between the first and 
ninth deciles (10th and 90th percentiles). The standard deviation and median are used to 
set the min and max feature values to +/- 3*standard deviation. This ensures that most of 
the data (80%) lie within the range [0, 1] with outliers assigned values above and below 
these bounds. In this normalization technique, the denominator (         
 (       ))  (          (       )) reduces to    ( ). Therefore, 3-sigma 
normalization is found by 
                   
  
         ( )
   (   )
                                                        (  ) 
A criticism of 3-sigma is that the use of standard deviation still causes an implicit 
assumption of normally distributed data. Also, as shown in Figures 12 and 17, exclusion 
of the first or tenth decile may remove a significant fraction of events from inclusion in 
the principal scaling parameter, s’’, especially when all data is used to develop location 
and scale parameters. Finally, location and scale parameters may exhibit greater variance 
when small samples are further reduced by discarding the first and tenth deciles. 
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 Normalization schemes typically operate on all data, in an unsupervised manner. 
However, as noted in [134], local scaling based on the selection of observations from a 
‘neighborhood’ can enhance class separation and improve classification performance. A 
procedure used in applications as varied as detecting audio similarity [135] and clinical  
c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 26. Comparison of normalization schemes; a) z-score; b) min=max; c) 3-
sigma; d) comparison of means and distribution across all schemes using 3NN. 
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 trials of new drugs [120], selection of a homogenous data sample for determination of 
the location and scale parameters is an effective way to improve classification 
performance. For this research we examine the impact of using individual classes to 
calculate location and scale parameters.     
Figure 26 examines the impact of normalization on classification accuracy using 
the 3-nearest neighbors (kNN, k=3) classification algorithm on data that is constrained  
both geographically and temporally. Three different sample subsets were used to 
produce the location and scale parameters that were then used to normalize the entire 
dataset: Class 1 (location and scale from IED events), Class 2 (location and scale from 
roads) and all data (location and scale from all data). While the average classification 
error varies between 31-36% across all normalization schemes, Figure 26.d shows that 
the best performance in every normalization scheme is found when Class 1 is used to 
produce the location and scale parameters. Figure 26.a-c reinforces this idea, showing 
that best classification accuracy is found when the location and scale factors are 
calculated using the event data (Class 1). 
Although 3-sigma slightly outperforms z-score, for the remainder of this 
dissertation we use z-score for normalization. This choice is driven by two factors. First, 
we accept that sample sizes are likely to be small when combined geographic and 
temporal filters are used. This is potentially a problem with 3-sigma.  Also, the small 
performance gain, less than 1%, fails to compel a change from the more widely known 
and commonly used z-score. Class 1 (events, either IED or DF) will be used to produce 
the location and scale factors.  
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Feature Selection and Dimensionality Reduction 
 In order to predict accurately, it is probably important to select features that are 
relevant and useful for supporting classification decisions. In this research we examine 
the utility of two different mechanisms for achieving this goal, stepwise feature selection  
and principal component analysis. Stepwise feature selection produces an optimal or 
near-optimal subset of features that increases classification accuracy. The subset 
produced is typically smaller that the set of all features. Principal component analysis 
converts a set of possibly correlated features or measures into a set of linearly 
uncorrelated variables organized by variance. The subset of PCA-produced variables 
accounting for most of the data variance is typically smaller than the set of all features.  
  
Figure 27. Number of features selected by stepwise feature selection using various 
penter thresholds; a) a smaller dataset with 78 observations; b) a larger dataset 
with 267 observations. 
 
 
a) b) 
  
89 
 
Stepwise Feature Selection 
 Stepwise feature selection (SF) is a supervised method for selecting a subset of 
features from a larger dataset [136]. With a goal of finding an optimal or near-optimal 
set of features to support accurate classification of data, SF uses linear regression to 
evaluate combinations of features in order to increase classification accuracy. A result of 
stepwise feature selection is a model that provides ‘big picture’ view of feature relevance 
and excludes elements that do not contribute significantly [81]. 
 As used in this research, stepwise feature selection begins with an empty model 
with no features included. Individual features are added to, and potentially removed 
from, the model in sequential steps based on the significance, or p-value of the two-
tailed Student’s t-test, 
       ( ̂)  
√
 
   
∑ (    ̂ )
  
   
√∑ (    ̅)
  
   
                
 ̂
  ( ̂)
                    (       )      (  )  
, where x is the same, single feature across all observations and  ̅ is the feature’s mean. Y 
is the real class and  ̂ is the predicted class.   ( ̂) is the standard error of the feature’s 
estimated regression coefficient. CDF is the cumulative distribution function of the 
Student’s t-distribution. A small p-value rejects the hypothesis that the feature would 
have a coefficient of zero if added to the model. At each step, using Matlab’s stepwisefit 
function [137], all features not in the model are evaluated. The feature with the smallest 
p-value is added to the model provided it is greater than a threshold. This threshold is 
governed by the penter parameter which is set to a default of 0.05 in this research. After 
the feature has been added, all features currently in the model are reevaluated and any 
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feature with a p-value greater than premove, set to a default of 0.10 in this research, are 
removed. SF continues until no remaining features produce a p-value less than penter 
and no features in the model have a p-value greater than premove. 
Figure 27 examines the impact of the value of the penter parameter on the size of 
the final model. Three different penter values were used in SF to select features. The 
premove parameter was set to 0.1 for all runs. In the figure, smaller values for penter 
caused the selection of much smaller models. However, the selection of very small 
penter values selected models with few features that did a poor job of classification 
(shown as high RSS in the figure). 
Figure 28. A histogram shows the distribution of the number of features selected 
from geotemporally constrained training sets using stepwise feature selection with 
penter = 0.05 and premove = 0.10. 
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 Figure 28 examines the number of features selected by FS from training sets 
using locations and dates from ST. For each event in ST, a training set was chosen using 
a geographic constraint of 100 km and a temporal constraint of 120 days. SF was used 
on each training set to select features with a penter parameter of 0.05 and a premove 
parameter of 0.1. The number of features selected across all events in ST tended to be  
b) 
a) 
Figure 29. Principal component analysis; a) PCA loadings (coefficients) for a first 
principal component for a randomly selected IED event; b) Pareto graph of the 
variance explained by principal components. 
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fairly small. From a total of 77 features, FS tended to select between 2 and 12 features 
for inclusion in the model. In no case was more than 20 features selected.   
 SF was selected for use in this research because it has been a common and useful 
choice in feature selection and dimensionality reduction for years [113], [138], [139]. 
However, there are potential problems associated with its use including underestimation 
of p-values and exacerbation of collinearity problems. A less objective but more 
damning accusation is that SF encourages thoughtless or blind application of an 
algorithmic approach that might not be suited to the data or that might be outperformed 
by an expert familiar with the problem [117].    
Principal Component Analysis 
 Principal component analysis (PCA) is an unsupervised method of converting a 
set of possibly correlated features into set of linearly uncorrelated variables. The 
orthogonal transformation used by PCA produces variables called principal components 
that are guaranteed to be independent when the original features are normally distributed 
and independent [140], [141], [142]. A simple, non-parametric method of producing 
relevant, independent variables, PCA provides a lower-dimensional representation of a 
higher-dimensional dataset where the first principal component accounts for as much of 
the variability in the data as possible. Each successive principal component accounts for 
as much of the remaining variability as possible. 
 In order to produce the principal components, centered data x with m features is 
used to calculate the m x m covariance matrix Σ, 
                                                (         )                                               (  ) 
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, where      and      are individual features (columns) across all observations in x. The 
covariance matrix is used to determine the eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The 
eigenvectors are sorted in order of decreasing eigenvalue, an ordering that produces a 
matrix of principal component coefficients or loadings. The loadings and x are 
multiplied to produce the score or final data set.   
Figure 29 examines the results of using PCA on a single training set. The 
magnitude of the coefficients selected by PCA for the first principal component can be 
seen in Figure 29.a. In the figure, PCA chooses coefficients ranging from -0.21 to 0.41. 
(An interesting aside is the pattern seen inside the dashed red box. This pattern is an 
artifact of the order in which features were added to the dataset. Seven features collected 
at the same resolution were added as a group and a total of five different resolutions 
were used. PCA assigned very similar coefficients to each of the five groups of seven 
a) b) 
Figure 30. Number of principal components found in geotemporally constrained 
training sets using PCA; a) histogram showing distribution of the number of 
principal components required to account for 90% of variance in the dataset; b) 
The size of the training set impacts the number of features selected. 
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features.) Figure 29.b examines the amount of variance explained by the principal 
components. In the figure, the first principal component accounts for over 30% of all 
variance in the dataset. Successive principal components account for increasingly 
smaller amounts of variance. For this particular dataset, the first 14 principal 
components account for a total of approximately 90% of the variance in the data 
 Figure 30 examines the number of principal components found PCA in training 
sets using locations and dates from ST. For each event in ST, a training set was chosen 
using a geographic constraint of 100 km and a temporal constraint of 120 days. In Figure 
30.a, the number of principal components required to account for 90% of variance in the 
dataset tended to range between 6 and 18. In all cases, less than 20 principal components 
were required to account for 90% of the variance in the dataset. Figure 30.b notes the 
relationship between the size of the training set and the number of features selected. In 
general, as the size of the training set increased, the number of features selected also 
increases. 
 PCA makes a number of assumptions that impact its performance and the utility 
of the loadings produced. First, PCA assumes that interesting differences or dynamics 
are indicated by large variances and that small variances represent noise or uninteresting 
differences. This may not be true in many cases. PCA also assumes that mean and 
variance are sufficient statistics to describe or capture a probability distribution. In fact, 
these statistics only describe a Gaussian distribution. If the data have some other 
distribution, PCA may fail to capture important patterns. This effect is probably greater 
in smaller datasets. A final assumption mentioned here is that PCA creates variables 
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from weighted linear combinations of features. In many cases, significant relationships 
or patterns in the data may have nonlinear characteristics that PCA masks or erases. 
Classification Using Machine Learning Algorithms 
 Once a constrained set of data has been identified and, if desired, features have 
been selected, machine learning is used to develop a classifier. The classifier is trained 
on a portion of the data and tested on the remainder. The outcome of the test is used to 
estimate the learner’s ability to used limited training data to build a general model that 
accurately predicts group membership (event vs. non-event) in previously unseen test 
data. In this research we examine the usefulness of three machines learning algorithms:  
- support vector machines using linear and radial basis function kernels 
- linear and quadratic discriminant analysis 
- k-nearest neighbors with a Euclidean distance function  
Support Vector Machines 
A support vector machine (SVM) is a non-parametric, supervised learning 
method used in this research to perform binary classification. As initially proposed by 
Vapnik and then revised by Cortes and Vapnik [91], [92], SVM maps training data as 
points in space and uses an optimal hyperplane to separate by the largest possible margin 
the classes found in the data. New observations are mapped into the same space and 
assigned a class based on their location with respect to the hyperplane.   
SVM is implemented in this research as a two-norm soft margin classifier [81]. 
The optimal hyperplane separating the data is defined as 
                                          (  
     )                                                              (  )  
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, where    {    } is the class label; xi is a single observation from the training data; β 
is a weight vector; and      is a slack variable that compensates for non-separable 
data. This optimal hyperplane is found by minimizing β, 
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 Two kernels are used in this research, linear and Gaussian radial basis function 
(RBF). The linear kernel is a simple dot product, often chosen when the data is believed 
to be linearly separable or as a basis of comparison with other kernels, 
                                                       (     )                                                         (  ) 
The Gaussian radial basis function is another commonly used kernel function  
                                                  (     )    
  
‖     ‖
 
                                                (  ) 
In this function, ‖     ‖
 
 is the squared Euclidean distance between    and   . The σ 
parameter, also referred to as the shape or spread parameter, controls the shape of the 
RBF kernel. Smaller values of σ correspond to a flatter or wider basis function while 
larger values produce a steeper or narrower basis function [105][106]. The shape 
parameter is associated with the fit of the model to the training set. If σ is set to zero, 
every training instance becomes a support vector and over-fitting occurs. The training set 
is perfectly predicted but the test set may have high classification error. On the other 
hand, if σ is set to ∞, all training and test instances are collapsed into a single class.    
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Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis is a parametric, supervised learning method used in this 
research to perform binary classification. Discriminant analysis finds a linear 
combination of features that separates two classes by explicitly modeling differences 
between the classes of data. In this research, linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and 
quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA) are used. 
In LDA, the decision boundary is determined by the covariance of the class 
distributions and the positions of the class centroids. As described in [81], the linear 
discriminant function for class k is 
                                       ( )   
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The parameters of the Gaussian distribution for class k are estimated as 
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Note that the linear discriminant function shares a common covariance matrix for all 
classes (Equation  55). Given Equation 52, then the decision boundary with two classes, 
K=[1,2], can be described as 
                                                                   ( )       ( )                                                     (  ) 
and the LDA rule classifies to class 1 when 
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In QDA, the decision boundary is determined by the individual covariance of 
each class and positions of class centroids. Noting that the covariance matrix is different 
for each class (Equation 58-59), the quadratic discriminant function for class k is 
                      ( )   
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The decision boundary is described as in Equation 56. 
k-Nearest Neighbors 
The k-nearest neighbor algorithm (kNN) is a non-parametric method of 
classifying a sample or observation with an unknown classification. A new observation 
is assigned to the same class as the majority of its nearest neighbors. Perhaps the 
simplest of all classification algorithms, kNN makes no assumptions about prior or 
posterior distributions and requires only the selection of a distance metric and a single 
hyperparameter, k, which fixes the number of nearest neighbors used to determine class 
[103].  
In kNN, the distance metric describes a measure of similarity or difference 
between two samples. A commonly used, intuitive metric is Euclidean distance, where 
the difference or distance between two samples is length of the shortest line that would 
connect them. It is calculated using the Pythagorean formula, 
                                           (     )  √∑ (         )
  
   
                                      (  ) 
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, where x is a matrix containing n samples, each with m features and xi,k is the kth feature 
of the ith sample in x. Ghosh notes in [143] that Euclidean distance performed best in a 
majority of datasets tested. Euclidean distance is the metric used in this research.  
 A second important choice is the order of k the number of nearest neighbors used 
to assign a class to a new observation or sample. Typical values of k range from a 
minimum of 1 to maximums of    ⁄  and    ⁄   [144], and     ⁄  [143]. All of these 
sources note that an empirically selected value of k somewhere between these extremes 
is likely to have the best classification accuracy.  
 kNN is known to have two significant problems. First, at high dimensionality the 
distance between pairs of points tends to converge. This problem is exacerbated when 
features are highly correlated or noisy. Second, kNN performs best when the number of 
samples is large. When the training set is small, or when one class in the training set is 
significantly smaller than the other, the classification accuracy of kNN decreases. 
Experimental Overview 
 In the following sections, we step though the MECH Classification algorithm 
sequentially, building and supporting the case for the final solution that incorporates a 
range of dynamic elements. In the initial analysis of the impact of geographic, temporal 
and geotemporal constraints, an experiment is constructed that uses common, shared 
default parameters. This ensures that any differences noted can be attributed to changes 
in constraints and not to parameter selection or algorithmic optimizations. The settings 
for the default experiment are: 
- Geographic windows (in km): 125, 100, 75, 50, 25, 10   
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- Temporal training windows (in days): 150, 120, 90, 60, 30, 15  
- Temporal test window (in days): 60 
- PCA: all principal components are used 
- Stepwise Feature Selection: all weighted features are used 
- SVM with linear kernel: box constraint=1 
- SVM with RBF kernel: box constraint=1, RBF shape parameter=1 
- kNN: k = 1, 3 
A variety of optimizations are explored including: 
- Dimensionality reduction 
o PCA: using cumulative variance to determine the number of principal 
components 
o STP: using p-values to constrain the size of the final feature set 
- Parameter estimation 
o SVM: dynamic selection of box constraint and RBF shape parameter 
o kNN: dynamic selection of k 
- Set selection using dynamic geographic and temporal constraints 
- Unbalanced classes 
- Feature selection using experts and the MECH Model 
- Combinations of classifiers 
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The Impact of Fixed Geographic and Temporal Constraints 
Selection of the training set is one of the most important steps in machine 
learning. A well-chosen training set coupled with an appropriate learning algorithm will 
produce useful classification rules that accurately assign new data to the correct class. 
For MECH, two factors constrain the range of events that should be included in the 
training set. These constraints are geographic, where the nature of terrain drives the 
choice of tactics and or attack configuration, and temporal, where seasonal variations, 
material availability and human factors cause change over time.  
Geographic Constraints 
Geography and associated human factors have an undeniable impact on conflict 
event tactics. Tactics suitable for use on flat ground are ill-suited for use in mountainous 
terrain. For example, ambush hide sites near the road may not be available flat terrain 
while control sites with good visibility may not be available in mountainous terrain. 
Thus, the morphographic structure of terrain forces or constrains choices related to 
conflict event siting and execution. Since terrain tends to change slowly, intuition 
suggests that locations that are closer to each other are likely to be geographically 
similar and to offer similar support for certain tactics or attack configurations. 
Geography also has social and cultural influences. The population in rural 
Afghanistan in often organized into groups or clans. These groups share training, tactics 
and weaponry. They work under a single leader or leadership group and may have 
common or shared access to war materials like explosives. The boundaries of territories 
under the control of these groups are often formed by rivers, mountains, and other 
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dominating geographic elements. Thus, for a geographic region, bounded by natural 
features and dominated by a particular group, it seems possible that the type and 
configuration of conflict events will be more homogeneous than events from distant  
regions. 
Figure 31 shows that conflict events that occurred in different terrain are 
described by distinct patterns. In the figure, Class 1 is an Iwahashi and Pike terrain 
classification [22] that describes steeper, very convex steep ground. Class 14 describes 
terrain that is flatter, and less convex. The figures were produced by first normalizing 
and performing PCA on all 77 features of the conflict events that occurred in Class 1 
terrain. The normalization factors and PCA loadings were then used to transform the 
events that occurred in Class 14 terrain. Each event was plotted using the first two 
principal components.  
  
Figure 31. Conflict events in different types of terrain produce distinct patterns; a) 
IED events; b) direct fire events. 
 
 
a) b) 
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a) b) 
Figure 32. Conflict events from distant locations produce distinct patterns; a) IED 
events; b) direct fire events; c) IED events vs. roads near 32:62; d) IED events vs. 
roads near 34:70; e) DF events vs. roads near 32:62; f) DF events vs. roads near 
34:70.  
 
c) d) 
e) f) 
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In the figure, it is clear that events occurring in flatter terrain are easily 
distinguished from events in rougher, steeper terrain. It is also interesting to note that the 
data for events in steeper terrain tend to be more dispersed while the data for events in 
rougher, steeper terrain tend to be more clustered.  
Figure 32 shows that events geographically distant from each other are also 
described by different patterns. In the figure, IED and DF events near point [32.5N, 
062.5E] are normalized and then transformed using PCA. The resulting normalization 
factors and PCA loadings are used to transform IED and DF events that occurred near 
[34.5N 070.5E]. Each event was plotted using the first two principal components. The 
two center points are approximately 775 km apart. In Figure 32.a, IED events that 
occurred near [32.5N, 062.5E] form a relatively tight cluster. The IED events that 
occurred near [34.5N 070.5E] overlap with the first cluster but show much greater 
dispersion. The DF events in Figure 32.b show a distribution like IED events but have 
significantly less overlap. 
 One key item to note about Figures 31 and 32 is that the points shown, while 
described as events, are actually points on the ground where an event occurred. Thus, 
both figures are open to alternate interpretation. It could be argued that Figure 31 simply 
shows that different types of terrain are described differently and that Figure 32 shows 
that two distant terrain points tend to be different. However, as shown in Figures 32.c-d, 
the cluster of IED events occupies an area much smaller than roads in the same area, 
indicating that IED events occupy a specific and constrained subset of roads in a given 
area.  This supports the notion that site selection is occurring and that only a certain  
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 33. The impact of window size on classification accuracy for IED and direct 
fire events using geographic windows ranging from 10-125 km; a) IED SVM; b) 
DF SVM; c) IED DA; d) DF DA; e) IED kNN; f) DF kNN. 
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subset of relatively homogeneous locations are useful for events within a given area. The 
results are similar for DF events, as shown in Figures 32.e-f. 
Figure 33 examines the impact of geographic radius on classification accuracy 
for IED and DF events. For each event in ST and for various radii, when the total number 
of IED or DF events within the window exceeds 10, three dimensionality reduction 
schemes, PCA, STP and NDR are performed on normalized data and then combined 
with SVM (using linear and RBF kernels), discriminant analysis (linear and quadratic) 
and kNN (1-NN and 3-NN) to estimate the classification error, which is calculated as the 
mean of the percent error. Three way cross-validation is used and error bars indicate a 
95% confidence interval. (The lines connecting data points are provided to increase 
readability of the figure.) 
 Three observations emerge from visual inspection of the graphs in Figure 33. 
First, window radius seems to have little impact on classification accuracy using kNN 
and discriminant analysis. So, larger training sets collected over a larger geographic area 
do not necessarily provide better classification. The outlier is SVM using a linear kernel, 
where smaller radii produce better classification accuracy. Second, DF classification 
accuracy seems to be consistently higher than IED classification accuracy. The reasons 
for this are unclear but anecdotal information suggests that direct fire attack sites may be 
selected to allow intersecting lines of weapons fire from multiple locations. This may 
constrain the range of sites that are useful for this type of event. Finally, using only 
geographic filters, the average classification error approaches 30% for most 
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combinations of classification algorithm and dimensionality reduction method. This 
approximate error holds across both event types. 
 The accuracies of discriminant analysis in Figure 33.c and 33.d are misleading 
because they are skewed by sample size. Only larger training sets result in a 
classification solution because discriminant analysis fails using smaller training sets. 
This is due to the fact that classification using DA involves a matrix inversion requiring 
that the matrix being inverted have full rank. For this to occur, the number of linearly 
independent columns must be greater than or equal to the number of observations. If this 
requirement is not met, then the discriminant analysis covariance estimates will not have 
full rank and, thus, cannot be inverted (without resorting to use of a pseudo-inverse). In 
the experiment that produced the graphs in Figure 33, discriminant analysis is only used 
when this full rank criteria is met. For this reason, in cases where discriminant analysis 
seems to classify with much more accuracy than SVM or kNN, it is important to note 
that discriminant analysis results exclude all cases where the number of training samples 
is smaller than the number of features or variables.  
Figure 34 examines the impact of sample size on classification accuracy across 
all geographic window sizes. The figure was generated by plotting the number of events 
available for training against the classification error obtained using three classification 
methods: SVM, DA and kNN, and three dimensionality reduction mechanisms: no 
reduction, PCA and stepwise feature selection. In the figure, sample size and variance 
are inversely related with smaller sets displaying much higher variance. For DA and 
kNN, there is a tendency to converge on an average classification error of approximately 
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 34. The impact of sample size on classification accuracy under geographic 
constraints; a) IED SVM; b) DF SVM; c) IED DA; d) DF DA; e) IED kNN; f) DF 
kNN.  
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30%. In the case of SVM, which appears to underperform the other classification 
methods, the variance remains high across all sample sizes. As before, DA classification 
accuracy data is only available for datasets where the sample size is relatively large. 
Interestingly, for all classification methods, dimensionality reduction schemes show 
similar performance, especially with smaller samples.  
  Another way to examine the impact of sample size on classification accuracy is 
event density. In Figure 35, event density is calculated as the number of events per 
kilometer of roads in the window. Unlike sample size, event density appears to have an 
impact on classification accuracy with some improvement seen at higher densities. 
Unfortunately, the number of higher density datasets is small. Interestingly, across all 
combinations of learning algorithm and dimensionality reduction, average classification 
error for IED events first increases as sample density increases to approximately 0.5, 
before beginning to decrease. This is not true for DF events. As previously noted, sample 
size and dimensionality reduction scheme  skews DA performance.  
Analysis of geographic constraints provides interesting insights into historical 
event data. The most salient insight is probably that sample size and window radius 
appear to have little effect on classification error, except when using SVM. On one hand, 
this is a positive outcome because classification based on training with smaller sets and 
over smaller windows is likely to be as accurate as results from much larger sets. Thus, 
small datasets are probably sufficient to train the classifier. On the other hand, the lack 
of degradation of classification accuracy over distance may indicate that the effect of 
geography on tactics is less important or measurable than other factors that do not vary  
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Figure 35. The impact of sample density on classification accuracy under 
geographic constraints; a) IED SVM; b) DF SVM; c) IED QDA; d) DF QDA; e) 
IED kNN; f) DF kNN. 
 
c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
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directly with geography. It may also be that geographic windows alone do not 
sufficiently constrain the training set to produce homogeneous training instances. Across 
all learning algorithms, the trend displayed by SVM, fewer errors as the window radius 
decreases, is probably the most promising direction to investigate further. 
Temporal Constraints 
 Tactics change over time for a variety of reasons. Some changes are temporary or 
seasonal —tactics that require digging are difficult to accomplish when the ground is 
frozen in the winter— and some are permanent, for example tailored countermeasures 
may render some attacks obsolete. While truly temporary or transitory changes may be 
caused by random or unmeasured effects, seasonal patterns are relatively predictable. An 
example, in the case of Afghanistan, is that higher elevations tend to have fewer events 
in the winter. This is probably due to a combination of factors. First, the cold makes 
outdoor operations difficult. Any attack that requires extensive exposure to the elements 
is going to be difficult or even dangerous for the attacker. Also, once snow starts falling, 
many roads become impassible. Targets are unable to reach the higher elevations and 
thus, are not available to be attacked. Similar patterns also arise from religious and 
cultural practices. Some weekly variations may be attributed to attendance at religious 
events where large groups of people cluster for defined periods of time. On an annual 
scale, many Afghans observe the religious practice of Ramadan. During this time, some 
activities are prohibited or restricted. This may impact the nature and timing of some 
conflict events. 
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Other more dynamic temporal patterns may exist. One example is related to 
availability of war materials. When the highways are passable, war materials often flow 
freely into conflict areas. However, if this flow is stopped or decreased, attackers may be 
forced to use substitutes, which constrains or changes the range of attacks available to 
the attacker. The cat-and-mouse game of measure/countermeasure is another example of 
a process that generates shifting patterns 
Over time, targets increasingly thwart repeated or similar attacks through the use 
of countermeasures. Attackers modify their target selection and attack emplacement 
efforts to nullify the countermeasures. This results in a shift of attack patterns over time. 
Thus, adaptation to countermeasures drives changes in tactics. Whether abrupt or 
incremental, attackers shift and modify their patterns seeking successful attack vectors 
using available tactics. Successful attacks also drive pattern change. An example of this 
is replication of successful attacks. When an attacker is successful, the configuration 
Figure 36. Comparison of conflict events over two different three-month periods in 
2011 and 2012; a) IED events; b) direct fire events. 
 
 
a) b) 
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used in the attack may be attempted elsewhere. Since terrain varies, the attack 
configuration chosen at the new location may be similar but not identical to the previous, 
successful attack. If the attack is again successful, the range of suitable configurations 
grows and the number of possible attack sites expands. 
Regardless of the reason, it is clear that tactics shift over time. Figure 36 
compares tactics over two three-month periods in 2011 and 2012. In the figure, all 
features for IED and DF events occurring during the period March-May 2011 are 
normalized and then transformed using PCA. The resulting normalization factors and 
PCA loadings are used to transform all features of IED and DF events that occurred 
during the same months in 2012. For both direct fire and IED attacks, it is clear that the 
patterns detected in 2011 are substantially different than the patterns from 2012. 
Figure 37 displays a general pattern shift over time. In the figure, all features of 
IED and DF events that occurred during February, 2011 are normalized and then 
transformed using PCA. The resulting normalization factors and PCA loadings are used 
to transform all features of IED and DF events that occurred at monthly intervals 
between March 2011 and August 2012. In the plot, the y-axis is the mean value of the 
first (and most significant) principal component for all events that occurred in that 
month. The x-axis is the date. Consecutive points of the same class are joined with a line 
to facilitate visual interpretation. As shown in the plot, the value of the first principal 
component shows significant and consistent drift over the 19 months covered in the data. 
Interestingly, the drift is in the same direction and roughly the same magnitude for both 
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IED and DF events. This may indicate that both types of attacks rely on common or 
similar terrain features and attack site configurations. 
(The gaps in October 2011 and March 2012 are caused by missing data. See 
Appendix A.2 for more detail.) 
  Figure 38 examines the impact of temporal constraints on classification accuracy 
for IED and DF events. For each event in ST and for various durations, when the total 
number of IED or DF events within the temporal window exceeds 10, three 
dimensionality reduction schemes, PCA, STP and NDR are performed on normalized 
data and then combined with SVM (using linear and RBF kernels), discriminant analysis 
(linear and quadratic) and kNN (1-NN and 3-NN) to estimate the classification error, 
which is calculated as the mean of the percent error. The duration of the test set is 
Figure 37. IED and DF patterns shift over time. 
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universally constrained to 60 days. Three way cross-validation is used and error bars 
indicate a 95% confidence interval. (The lines connecting data points are provided to 
increase readability of the figure.) As shown in Figure 38, training window span or 
duration has an impact on classification accuracy. For DA and kNN, smaller temporal 
windows tend to have larger average errors with all combinations of classification 
scheme and dimensionality reduction generally trending together. For SVM, on the other 
hand, smaller windows tend to have lower classification error for linear kernels and 
higher error for RBF kernels. It is particularly interesting to note that smaller temporal 
windows have lower average error for SVM with a linear kernel. Across all 
combinations of classification algorithm and dimensionality reduction, the best average 
error rates achieved are around 30% for both IED and DF events. 
As shown in Figure 38, the size of the temporal window used to produce the 
training set has some impact on classification accuracy. The size of the sample itself also 
appears to have varying when temporal windows are used. Figure 39 examines the 
impact of sample size on classification accuracy across all temporal window sizes. In the 
case of SVM with a linear kernel, small samples tend to produce the lowest average 
classification errors at sample sizes of around 200 events. The error rate increases with 
the sample size beyond this point. SVM with an RBF kernel performs poorly across all 
sample sizes. kNN tends to show little variation with the error rate remaining 
approximately flat across all sizes while DA shows an initial decrease in error up to 
sample sizes of 200 and generally unchanged performance after that.  
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Figure 38. The impact of the size of temporal windows on classification accuracy; 
a) IED SVM; b) DF SVM; c) IED DA; d) DF DA; e) IED kNN; f) DF kNN. 
 
 
c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
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Unlike sample size, sample density appears to have little impact on classification 
accuracy, as shown in Figure 40.  In the figure, classification error tends to remain flat 
and approximately constant across all densities. The exception is DA at very low 
densities, but this is due to DA’s previously noted problems with small samples.  
Analysis of temporal constraints provides interesting insights into historical event 
data. The most salient insights are probably that sample size and window radius appear 
to have some effect on classification error. Since density appears to have little impact, 
the dominant effect is probably sample size. An approach to sample selection that seeks 
the smallest window containing some minimum sample size might improve 
classification accuracy. As before, SVM is the best performer at when using smaller 
windows, smaller sample sizes and lower density.  
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Figure 39. The impact of sample size on classification accuracy under temporal 
constraints; a) IED SVM; b) DF SVM; c) IED DA; d) DF DA; e) IED kNN; f) DF 
kNN. 
c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
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Figure 40. The impact of event density on classification accuracy under temporal 
constraints; a) IED SVM; b) DF SVM; c) IED DA; d) DF DA; e) IED kNN; f) DF 
kNN. 
c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
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Combined Constraints 
Independently, both geographic and temporal constraints can be used to produce 
classification error rates in the vicinity of 30%. With sample sizes around 200, whether 
geographically or temporally selected, error rates of less than 30% are achievable. 
Combined geographic and temporal constraints offer a way to select training sets with 
the potential to produce lower error rates. 
Combined constraints satisfy our intuition regarding human activities and our 
understanding of the measure/countermeasure cycle in modern warfare. Geographic 
constraints make it more likely that the attackers have something in common like group 
membership, shared training, access to the same war materials, or similar terrain in 
which to operate. Temporal constraints make it more likely that the same tactics are in 
use, the same or similar war materials are available to attackers, and the same 
countermeasures are shared by targets. When the two types of constraints are combined, 
the resulting datasets are probably likely to be more homogeneous and probably more 
likely to share a common and more regionally focused set of tactics. 
Figure 41 examines the impact of combined geographic and temporal constraints 
on classification accuracy for IED events. (The plots for DF events are similar and can 
be found in Appendix D.)  
For each event in ST and for various durations, when the total number of IED 
events within the combined geographic and temporal training windows b exceeds 10, 
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Figure 41. The impact of combined geographic and temporal windows on 
classification accuracy of IED events; a) IED SVM; b) IED DA; c) IED kNN. 
 
 
b) 
a) 
c) 
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three dimensionality reduction schemes, PCA, STP and NDR, are combined with SVM 
(using linear and RBF kernels), discriminant analysis (linear and quadratic) and kNN (1-
NN and 3-NN) to estimate the classification error, which is calculated as the mean of the 
percent error. The duration of the test set is universally constrained to 60 days. Three-
way cross-validation is used and error bars indicate a 95% confidence interval. In the 
figure, the x-axis is the < geographic window : temporal window > combination used to 
selecting the training set for the machine learning algorithm. Note that the plots are 
grouped by geographic constraint, i.e. 100 km, with a break in the connecting line 
signifying the jump to the next geographic group. (The lines connecting data points are 
provided to increase readability of the figure.)  
 In Figure 41, classification accuracy is between 30-40% for both SVM and kNN 
with SVM performing slightly better. As before, SVM with linear kernels perform 
significantly better than SVM with RBF kernels. Note that these are still using the 
default parameters for the SVM box constraint and RBF scaling factor. Both SVM and 
kNN show fairly constant accuracy within each geographic constraint group with an 
upwards trend in error of approximately 3-5% as the temporal window shrinks. The 
increase in classification error is more significant for DA and it continues to have 
problems with small datasets. This is reflected in the missing error values for 
classification attempts using NDR and PCA. 
 Figure 42 shows the impact of sample size on classification accuracy under 
geographic and temporal constraints. In general, classification accuracy improves as the 
sample size increases. SVM shows the best performance at sample size around 200  
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 42. The impact of sample size on classification accuracy under combined 
geographic and temporal constraints; a) IED SVM; b) DF SVM; c) IED DA; d) DF 
DA; e) IED kNN; f) DF kNN. 
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while kNN has its best performance at the largest sizes. DA’s classification accuracy is 
similar to that of SVM and kNN for large samples. Small samples continue to be 
problematic for DA. 
Feature Selection and Dimensionality Reduction 
 In the previous experiments involving geographic, temporal and geotemporal 
constraints, default settings were used for PCA and stepwise feature selection. In the 
case of PCA, all principal components were used, regardless of their contribution. 
Similarly, for stepwise feature selection, all weighted features were used. However, it 
may be possible to reduce error by reducing dimensionality. With PCA, one method of 
reducing dimensionality is by assessing the amount of variance accounted for in the 
reduced model. The number of principal components in the final model is controlled by 
limiting the total cumulative variance explained by these components. For stepwise 
feature selection, dimensionality may be managed by varying the p-value threshold 
(penter parameter). Smaller p-values lead to smaller models 
Figure 43 examines the impact of varying cumulative variance (for PCA) and the 
penter parameter (for STP). For conciseness, only three combinations of learning 
algorithm and dimensionality reduction are applied to the IED data and shown here. 
Both PCA and STP are combined with SVM using a linear kernel, LDA, and kNN with 
k=1. For each combination, the error rate produced by cumulative variances between  
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 43. The impact of varying cumulative variance and penter parameters on 
IED classification; a) PCA with SVM linear kernel; b) STP with SVM linear 
kernel; c) PCA with LDA; d) STP with LDA; e) PCA with kNN (k=1); f) STP 
with kNN (k=1). 
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0.75 (75%) and 0.99 (99%) and penter parameters between 0.25 and 0.01 are shown. A 
complete set of plots for both IED and DF data is available in Appendix D.        
 For PCA, changing the cumulative variance appears to have little effect using 
SVM, LDA or kNN. For all three of these learners, a cumulative variance of 95% 
showed consistently good performance across the entire range of sample sizes. For kNN, 
a cumulative variance of 0.99 performed best but this performance was not shared by 
SVM and LDA.   
 For STP, a penter parameter of 0.01 consistently produces the lowest error rates 
at small sample sizes but performs less well at large sample sizes. However, a penter 
value of 0.05 performs well across the entire range of samples sizes. Error rate 
differences as high as 5% were seen, with larger penter values tending to produce higher 
error rates, especially at smaller sample sizes.  
 Figure 44 displays the number of features or principal components in the final 
model after dimensionality reduction is performed. In the case of PCA, the largest model 
results from including or accounting for the largest amount of variance in the data. A 
significant increase in model size occurs between 95% and 99% cumulative variance. 
For STP, the largest models are produced with the largest or most relaxed penter value 
and the size of the final model changes roughly uniformly as penter is varied. One 
interesting note is that the sample size appears to have little impact on the size of the 
final model. For PCA, smaller samples tend to produce slightly smaller models. For 
STP, there seems to be little effect.  
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 Based on the results shown in figures 43 and 44, a cumulative variance of 95% 
will be used for the experiments in this research that involve PCA. A penter value of 
0.05 will be used for experiments that involve STP. Interestingly, these values are the 
defaults in Matlab’s stepwisefit function. 
For a given tactic or type of attack, some features are more relevant and tend to 
be selected more often by stepwise feature selection. Figure 45 shows the selection rate 
of features used in the experiment that generated the data in Figure 43. Of the 77 
features, only 13 are selected more than ten percent of the time. An additional 20 
features are selected between 5-10% of the time. The two most frequently selected 
features are elevation (1) and proximity to a human population center of any size (58). 
b) 
a) 
Figure 44. Model size after dimensionality reduction; a) PCA; b) STP. 
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Figure 45. Features selected using stepwise selection for dimensionality reduction. 
The inset lists the features by name and highlights the largest contributors: light 
gray boxes are selected in 5-10% of all classification attempts, light peach boxes 
are selected in > 10% of all classification attempts.  
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Two observations emerge. First, the features contributing to the classification of 
IED and DF events are almost always selected at roughly the same rate. This may mean 
that both types of events can be treated as a single class Also, the 33 features most 
frequently selected by STP fall into a few categories. Fourteen of the features are related 
to cumulative escape adjacency (CEA) (denoted as ‘cea’ in the Figure 45 inset) and a 
visibility metric related to CEA. Five of the features are related to the distance from 
human population centers. Radial-based shape complexity and radial-based rugosity 
both appear at four different resolutions. 
Figure 46 examines the impact on classification accuracy for IED events when 
using PCA and stepwise feature selection to reduce the dimensionality of datasets 
selected using combined geographic and temporal constraints. (The plots for DF events 
are similar and can be found in Appendix D.) For each event in ST and for various 
durations, when the total number of IED events within the combined geographic and 
temporal windows exceeds 10, normalized data is used with three dimensionality 
reduction schemes, PCA, STP and NDR, and combined with SVM (using linear and 
RBF kernels), discriminant analysis (linear, quadratic) and kNN (1-NN, 3-NN) to 
estimate the classification error, which is calculated as the mean of the percent error. The 
duration of the test set is constrained to 60 days. Three-way cross-validation is used and 
error bars indicate a 95% confidence interval. In the figure, the x-axis is the <geographic 
window : temporal window> used for training the machine learning algorithm. Note that 
the plots are grouped by geographic constraint, i.e. 100 km, with a break in the  
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b) 
a) 
c) 
Figure 46. The impact of dimensionality reduction using PCA (cumulative 
variance <= 95%) and STP (penter <= 0.05) on classification accuracy of IED 
events when using combined geographic and temporal windows; a) IED SVM; b) 
IED DA; c) IED kNN. 
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connecting line signifying the jump to the next geographic group. (The lines connecting 
data points are provided to increase readability of the figure.)  
 In Figure 46, classification accuracy is around 30% for both SVM and kNN. As 
before, SVM with linear kernels performs significantly better than SVM with RBF 
kernels. Note that these are still using the default parameters for the SVM box constraint 
and RBF scaling factor. Both SVM and kNN show fairly constant accuracy within each 
geographic constraint group with an upwards trend in error of approximately 3-5% as the 
temporal window shrinks. The increase in classification error is similar for DA. This is 
because dimensionality reduction contributes to overall improved performance for DA. 
With reduced dimensionality, more of the datasets have full rank and can be successfully 
inverted. DA still fails on most small data sets.  
 Figure 47 shows the impact of sample size on classification accuracy under 
geographic and temporal constraints when the cumulative variance of the PCA 
components is constrained to be ≤ 95% of total variance and the maximum p-value of 
the stepwise-selected features is constrained to 0.05. Across all classification methods, 
larger sample sizes tend to produce lower error rates with the lowest rates around 25%. 
DF tends to have consistently lower error rates that IED, although the difference is not 
great. It is interesting to note that stepwise feature selection consistently outperforms 
PCA across all classification methods. 
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 47. The impact of sample size on classification accuracy under combined 
geographic and temporal constraints when the cumulative variance of the PCA 
components ≤ 95% and the maximum p-value of the stepwise-selected features ≤ 
0.05. a) IED SVM; b) DF SVM; c) IED DA; d) DF DA; e) IED kNN; f) DF kNN. 
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Parameter and Hyperparameter Estimation 
 The previous section showed that geotemporal constraints and dimensionality 
reduction combine to produce error rates on the order of 25% with large sample sizes. 
Stepwise feature selection produced the lowest average error rates in Figure 46 across all 
combinations of dimensionality reduction and classification method examined here. 
However, the parameters and hyper-parameters  used were set to default values. In 
particular, both the SVM box constraint and the SVM RBF kernel shape parameter were 
set to value of 1. For kNN, the number of nearest neighbors was fixed to values of 1 and 
3. Dynamic estimation of these parameters may improve classification accuracy. 
Dynamic Estimation of k for kNN 
 The order of k in kNN has a strong influence on classification error. In [81], the 
authors cite two examples that demonstrate this effect. In the first example, setting k=25 
produced a misclassification rate of approximately 15% while k=1 produced a 
misclassification rate of approximately 25%. On a different data set of the same size and 
same approximate distribution of classes, the opposite was found with the lowest 
misclassification rate at k=1. In both cases, proper selection of k reduced the 
misclassification rate significantly. In [144], Enas and Choi note a number a factors 
influencing the choice of k. For both balanced and unbalanced datasets ranging in size 
from 50 to 354 samples, they note that optimal vales of k tend to decrease as the 
population correlation structures become more dissimilar. Optimal values of k fluctuate 
with sample size and show a generally improved classification performance as the size 
of the dataset grows. 
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 A variety of methods have been employed to empirically estimate k from 
available data.  Enas and Choi explore an estimation scheme optimized for small to 
moderate samples sizes that empirically selects the best performing k selected from the 
range      ⁄            , where n is the size of the dataset. They find that the best 
results are found at i = [2, 3]. Hall, et al. [145] empirically select an optimal k by finding 
the some k that produces the lowest error rate and then adjusting for sample size and 
dataset dimensionality. In [146], the value of k is affected by the size of the smallest 
class in the dataset. Ghosh [143] proposes a spatially adaptive selection scheme where k 
lies in the range [   √ ]. The size of the sample is n and C is a constant, set to 2 in 
Ghosh’s research.  √  is constrained to be no larger than the size of the smallest class. 
Common to all of these methods is an iterative step where the classification accuracies 
for different values of k are compared. The smallest misclassification rate is used to 
determine k.  
In this research, we bound the upper value of k to be  √ , and further constrain 
this upper bound to be no larger than the size of the smallest class. Its optimal value is 
determined by exhaustively testing all odd k in the range [   √ ]. Figure 48 examines 
the impact of dynamically selecting k on the classification of IED events. A similar 
figure for DF events is available in Appendix D. In Figure 48.a, the dynamic selection of 
k decreases the misclassification rate to approximately 25%. The misclassification rate 
climbs as the window gets smaller, likely a reflection of smaller sample size. Stepwise 
feature selection slightly outperforms the other dimensionality reduction schemes. 
Figure 48.b examines the impact of the order of k on classification accuracy. The solid 
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b) 
a) 
c) 
d) 
Figure 48. The impact of dynamically varying the order of k on the classification 
of IED events using kNN; a) Classification accuracy under combined geographic 
and temporal constraints using varying k; b) Classification accuracy at various 
values of k; c) Mean order of k at various window sizes; d) Mean order of k at 
various sample sizes. 
 
  
136 
 
lines are a second-order polynomial fit to the available data for each classification 
method. As k increases, the classification rate improves slightly. Once again, this is 
likely to be a reflection of sample size. Figure 48.c shows how the order of k changes 
with window size. In the figure, the median value of k is presented for each geotemporal 
window. Interestingly, optimal values of k tend to be small. Figure 48.d examines the 
impact of sample size on the order of k. Each point is the average of all classification 
attempts at that sample size, regardless of window. The results are line with the results 
reported by Ghosh regarding the upper bound and choice of C, with most k at or below 
 √  and all k below  √ . 
Dynamic Estimation of SVM Hyperparameters 
Up to this point, SVM has been implemented using one or two fixed 
hyperparameters. The box constraint, also described as the cost parameter [81], penalty 
factor [147][104] and regularization parameter [97], was set to a default, fixed value of 1 
for SVM using both linear and RBF kernels. For SVM using an RBF kernel, the shape 
parameter for the radial basis function was also set to a default, fixed value of 1. 
However, these fixed values are not appropriate for every data set and optimal values 
may vary with the dataset or even the specific learning. 
Box Constraint Selection 
To select the box constraint for SVM using a linear kernel, we implement an 
exponential search in the range    C = 2i for i=[-5 5], in 0.25 increments. This approach 
is implemented as a two-step process employing a coarse grid using increments of 1 and 
a fine grid with increments of 0.25 for optimization. The selected C produces the lowest  
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classification error using SVM with a linear kernel and three-way cross-validation. 
Figure 49 examines the impact of the size of the box constraint C on 
classification accuracy when using SVM with a linear kernel. By selecting a more 
optimal C than the default of 1, classification error approaching 23% can be achieved for 
IED events, as noted in Figure 49.a. Figure 49.b shows that the order of C has little 
impact on classification accuracy. Figures 49.c shows that C varies little for NDR and 
PCA with respect to window size. For STP, the trend is to decrease as the window 
shrinks. A similar outcome can be seen in figure 49.d, where the order of C is fairly 
constant for NDR and PCA. The order of C using STP tends to increases with increasing 
sample size. Note that Figure 49.c has no log(C) values greater than 0 while Figure 49.d 
has log(C) values greater than zero. This is an impact of sample size. Larger windows 
tend to produce larger sample, but not always. Some of the samples are smaller and tend 
to produce smaller values of C. The results for DF events can be found in Appendix D. 
Radial Basis Function Box Constraint and Shape Parameter Selection 
A variety of methods have been proposed to select the RBF shape parameter, σ, 
including a grid search [97], Quasi-Newton optimization [147], and transformations of 
interclass distances [104]. In this research, we examine the classification accuracy 
obtained by selecting σ using two methods: grid search across a set of fixed values and 
direct estimation based on class separability in the kernel space as proposed by [106]. 
The grid search method uses exponential growing sequences for the box 
constraint, C, and linear search between fixed bounds for σ, as demonstrated in [98]. The 
range of σ is constrained to σ=[0.25 30], bounds that were empirically determined from 
  
138 
 
 
b) 
a) 
c) 
d) 
Figure 49. The impact of dynamically varying the box constraint C on the 
classification of IED events using SVM with a linear kernel; a) Classification 
accuracy under combined geographic and temporal constraints using varying C; 
b) Classification accuracy at various values of C; c) Mean order of C at various 
window sizes; d) Mean order of C at various sample sizes. 
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analysis of the data. The grid search was implemented as a two-step process using a 
coarse grid first and then refining the results using a fine grid. The outcome of the grid 
search for a given set of samples is the [C,σ] pair that produces the lowest classification 
error.    
It is also possible to estimate σ based on class separability in the kernel space. 
Proposed by Liu and Zuo in [106], the value of σ is a function of between-class and 
within-class separability, tuned to maximize between-class separability. The authors note 
that in Gaussian RBF kernel space, the norm of any instance is equal to one: 
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Based on the property described in Equation 61, the similarity measures noted in 
Equations 62 and 63, the within-class mean distance W’, and the between-class mean 
distance B’, Liu and Zuo propose an estimate of σ defined as 
                                                          ̂  √
     
     (    ⁄ )
                                                      (  )  
 Figure 50 notes the impact of varying C and σ on classification of IED events 
across a variety of geotemporal windows. In the figure, the cumulative variance of the  
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b) 
a) 
c) 
Figure 50. The impact of dynamically varying the box constraint C and the RBF 
shape parameter σ on the classification of IED events using SVM with an RBF 
kernel; a) Classification accuracy under combined geographic and temporal 
constraints using varying C and σ; b) Mean order of C at various window sizes;     
c) Mean order of σ at various window sizes. 
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PCA components is constrained to be ≤ 95% of total variance and the maximum p-value 
of the stepwise-selected features is constrained to 0.05. Results found using hyper-
parameters generated using grid searched are marked with a ‘G’ in the legend. Results 
found using an estimated σ are marked in the legend with an ‘E’. At each window size, 
geographic and temporal filters were applied to the dataset. Three-way cross-validation 
was used on the resulting subset to produce the data used in the Figure 50.a. Figures 50.b 
and Figure 50.c plot the change in mean hyper-parameter across geotemporal windows.    
As shown in Figure 50.a, grid search outperforms σ estimation at every window 
size (labeled as NDR G and PCA G). Interestingly, the best classification performance is 
seen in the smallest geographic windows, using NDR and PCA, with error rates 
approaching 20%. Figure 50.b shows that typical mean values of C tend to be small. 
Mean values of σ tend to show little change with geographic window in Figure 50.c. The 
results for DF events are similar and can be found in Appendix D. 
 Figure 51 examines the impact and relationships of C and σ on classification 
error and the relationship between the C and σ. Figure 51.a and Figure 51.b examine the 
impact of the order of σ of classification error using grid search and estimation, 
respectively. In both cases, the error rate seems to be roughly constant across all values 
of σ. Figure 51.c and 51.d examine C in a similar manner. As with σ, there seems to be 
little change in classification error rate across all values C for both grid search and 
estimation. 
 Figure 51.e and 51.f examine the relationship between C and σ. In Figure 51.e, 
there is a positive relationship, where increasing values of C tend to be associated with 
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 51. Varying σ and C for IED events, a) Impact of the order of σ found using 
grid search on classification error; b) Impact of the order of σ found using 
estimation on classification error; c) Impact of the order of C found using grid 
search on classification error; d) Impact of the order of C found using estimation 
on classification error; e) Relationship between C and σ found using grid search; f) 
Relationship between C and σ found using estimation. 
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increasing values of σ until a general leveling out at values of σ exceeding 20. The trend 
is somewhat similar in Figure 51.f for C and σ found using estimation, albeit with a less 
positive trend early and a decrease after values of σ exceeding 20. The results for DF 
events are similar and can be found in Appendix D. 
 Figure 52 examines the impact of sample size on the order of σ and C. For both 
grid search and estimation, the values of C tend to increase with sample size. On the 
other hand, values of σ climb slightly when grid search is used and remain roughly 
constant when estimation is used. The results for DF events are similar and can be found 
in Appendix D. 
Summary of Parameter and Hyperparameter Estimation 
 Parameter and hyperparameter selection is an effective way to improve 
classification accuracy for both SVM and kNN. In the case of SVM, an RBF kernel with 
hyperparameters selected by grid search produced classification errors on the order to 
20%. The lowest error occurred at the smallest windows and the smallest sample sizes, 
indicating that this combination may be the best overall in cases where the conflict event 
data is sparse. kNN also showed improvement by dynamically estimating k. 
Classification error of approximately 25% was consistent across all window sizes using 
this method. 
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A Cost Function for Estimating the Impact of Misclassification  
 Although overall error is an important metric for assessing the suitability of 
classification algorithms, it is not the only consideration. The cost of wrongly classifying 
a site is an important factor that varies between event and non-event classes. Another 
related, important consideration is potential mislabeling in the non-event training data. 
c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 52. For IED events, a) Impact of sample size on the order of C found using 
grid search; b) Impact of sample size on the order of C found using estimation; c) 
Impact of sample size on the order of σ found using grid search; d) Impact of 
sample size on the order of σ found using estimation.  
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To a soldier relying on an algorithm like MECH to predict hazardous terrain, a 
misclassified non-event site –a point on the road mistakenly labeled as an event site– is a 
nuisance. Frequent misclassifications of this type train the soldier to ignore the warning 
but otherwise fail to do harm. On the other hand, a misclassified event site may 
inadvertently portray a lethal situation as innocuous. In this case, a location that has 
utility for placement of an IED or direct fire attack is not correctly classified, potentially 
leading that soldier to proceed with less caution in a very hazardous situation. Thus, a 
misclassified event site has a much higher cost, potentially in human lives, than a 
misclassified non-event site.  
 Incorrectly classified non-event locations also have a cost, although not as 
severe. While misclassified events are always wrong, a “misclassified” non-event site 
might actually be classified correctly. This is because the true classification of a non-
event site may vary from its classification in the dataset used in this research. The non-
event class in the current dataset is composed of locations along roads in Afghanistan 
that are at least 250 meters from any known (to this research) IED or DF events. 
However, since the pool of known conflict events only covers 19 months in 2011-2012, 
it can be argued that the non-event class is actually a mix of three subclasses: 
- non-event locations that will never be useful for a conflict event;  
- locations that are useful for a conflict event but have not been used yet; and  
- locations that have been used for a conflict event on a date outside this dataset.  
Two of these three “non-event” subclasses should actually be labeled as “event” class. 
Effectively, this means that some fraction of the non-event class is actually mislabeled. 
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Given that a misclassified event is a definite error with potentially lethal 
consequences while the impact of a misclassified non-event is typically annoying and 
may actually be correct, it becomes important to develop a metric that weights the 
contribution of each type of misclassification. Equation 65 offers a weighted cost metric 
that weights and combines event and non-event errors: 
             (
                   
      
)
 
  (
                     
         
)        (  ) 
In common terms this can also be described as 
        (    (           ))
   (                             ) 
In the equation, the percent of misclassified events is squared and then added to a 
weighted measure that consists of the percent of misclassified non-events scaled by a 
constant C. Note that the error measures are calculated independently for each class. The 
squared term causes       to grow exponentially as event error increases. The growth 
of       attributed to non-event error increases linearly.  
The constant C defines the slope of the line describing non-event error and 
describes the x-axis value where this line and the curve describing event error intersect. 
For error values greater than C, misclassified events will contribute more to       than 
misclassified non-events. Thus, C can be used to tune the sensitivity of the weighting 
algorithm to increased error. Low values of C cause the algorithm to weight event error 
more heavily than non-event error.  
Figure 53.a examines the impact of the choice of C on the growth of      . In 
the figure, the event error term follows an exponential curve while the non-event error 
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term is linear, with the slope determined by C. Figures 53.b-d display the outcome of the 
weighting algorithm for event and non-event error values between 1% and 100% with C 
 equal to 10, 15 and 20, respectively. Contour lines are added ease visual interpretation. 
Given the potential human impact of mislabeling an event site, in the following 
analysis we set C to a value of 10. As shown in Figure 53.a, this means that the value of 
the non-event error component will tend to climb slowly as error increases. For      ,  
Figure 53. Weighted cost incorporates both event and non-event error. a) 
Comparison of choices for C; b) Costw when C = 10; c) Costw when C = 15; d) Costw 
when C = 20. 
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Figure 54. Weighted cost from learning machines using default parameters; a) IED 
SVM with geographic constraints; b) IED SVM with temporal constraints; c) IED 
DA with geographic constraints; d) IED DA with temporal constraints; e) IED 
kNN with geographic constraints; f) IED kNN with temporal constraints. 
c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
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this emphasizes the contribution of event error and limits the impact of non-event error. 
The range of possible       values for C = 10 is shown in Figure 53.b.  
Figure 54 shows the weighted cost for the IED event class as classified by SVM, 
DA and kNN using default parameters with separate geographic and temporal 
constraints. The x-axis in each plot is the geographic or temporal window size. The y-
axis is the weighted cost      . A constant scale is used across all plots in order to 
facilitate visual comparisons. 
 The behavior of different classification methods varies. The SVM classifiers 
using default parameters tend to perform poorly at large windows and large sample sizes 
where almost all of the       comes from the event class. Within the SVM classifiers, 
the RBF kernels using default parameters tend to perform worst and the linear kernels 
show improved accuracy at smaller windows, both geographic and temporal. The DA 
classifiers, on the other hand, perform best at larger window sizes but tend to do slightly 
worse in the smaller windows. It is worth noting that DA with default parameters 
outperforms SVM at almost every window size. However, DA is unable to handle the 
small samples found using the smaller windows.  kNN maintains a roughly constant 
error ratio across all window sizes.  
The results for DF events are similar and can be found in Appendix D. 
 Figure 55 examines the weighted cost for the IED event class as classified by 
SVM, DA and kNN using optimized parameters with combined geographic and 
temporal constraints. The x-axis in each plot is the geotemporal window size. The y-axis 
is weighted cost. In the figure, weighted cost climbs as the geotemporal windows shrink.   
  
150 
 
SVM using NDR and PCA with parameters found by grid search performs best. DA and 
kNN show similar trends with the best overall performance coming from kNN. DA 
performs particularly poor at small window sizes. Overall, SVM using geotemporal 
Figure 55. Weighted cost from learning machines using optimal parameters on 
IED event data; a) SVM using an RBF kernel with geotemporal constraints; b) 
DA with geotemporal constraints; c) kNN with geotemporal constraints. 
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windows offers the best performance although the improvement over DA and kNN using  
separate geographic and temporal windows is relatively small.  
The results for DF events are similar and can be found in Appendix D. 
 In summary, the cost of        is a weighted cost metric that is produced by an 
algorithm that variably weighting event and non-event errors. Figures 54 and 55 show 
how       with a C parameter of 10 can be used to identify the best-performing 
combinations of learning algorithm, parameter optimizations and window types and 
sizes. As evidenced here, geotemporal windows seem to offer the best classification 
performance across all classifiers. Among classifiers, DA tends to perform poorly and 
classification accuracy decreases with the sample size. SVM slightly outperforms kNN 
and both classifiers seem to perform relatively well, even at small sample sizes. 
In the following sections,       will be used to assess the performance of 
several experiments. These experiments include dynamic geographic constraints, 
unbalanced classes, a fresh look at subset selection, and combinations of classifiers.  
Dynamic Geographic Constraints 
 The best performing algorithms at this point are:  
- SVM RBF kernel using PCA with hyperparameters estimated by grid search; and  
- kNN using PCA with k estimated dynamically.  
The training data used by these classifiers is normalized with location and scaling factors 
estimated from the data itself. Both classifiers use hyperparameters determined 
dynamically from the training set. However, up to this point, fixed geographic and 
temporal windows have been used to constrain the data used for training and testing the  
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Figure 56. Classification error using fixed sample sizes and dynamic geographic 
constraints; a) IED classification error; b) DF classification error; c) IED 
weighted cost; d) DF weighted cost; e) impact of geographic radius on 
classification error for IED; f) impact of geographic radius on DFclassification 
error.  
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classifiers. The fixed geographic windows, in particular, may cause increased 
classification error because they fail to consider the distribution of events within the 
window. In many cases, there may be enough events to support the classifier’s training 
within a geographic radius that is smaller than the fixed window. Since road points are 
selected from the entire window, it is likely that some of these road points are selected 
randomly from locations that are far away from any event. With larger windows, this 
may mean that road points are being selected from terrain that is very different than the 
terrain surrounding the events in the window. It may also mean that the fraction of total 
road points selected is smaller than necessary. 
Given the performance of these two classifiers at relatively small window sizes, 
it seems possible that dynamic assignment of geographic radius may improve 
classification accuracy. In the following figures, the size of the event class is constrained 
to a set of fixed values: n = [15 30 45 60 75 90]. The closest n events to a selected center 
are selected and the distance from the center to the most distant member of n is used as 
the geographic constraint. Road points are selected using this geographic constraint. 
Figure 56 examines the impact of using a constant sample size to constrain the 
geographic window. In the experiment, the training sets were produced by first 
temporally constraining the data to a fixed window of 120 days before each ST event. 
From this temporally constrained set, the 15-90 events geographically nearest to the 
center (ST location) were selected. The distance of the most distant event from the center 
(ST location) was used as the radius of the geographic window and non-event points 
(RD250) were selected from within this window. The test set was constructed by 
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temporally constraining events to a fixed window of 60 days after each ST event and 
geographically constraining events to the same radius used to select training data. Non-
events points for the test were also selected using the same geographic constraint as the 
training set. Note that no cross-validation was used. Figure 56.a shows that the 
classification error rate using IED events approaches 20 % when using SVM, regardless 
of sample size. DF events produce even lower error rates in Figure 56.b. The weighted 
cost is shown in Figure 56.c and Figure 56.d. For both IED and DF events, particularly 
in the case of SVM, weighted cost decreases as sample size increases. For SVM, and to a 
lesser extent kNN, the decrease tends to level out around a sample size of 60. Across all 
plots in Figure 56, the best classification performance is produced by SVM. This 
performance advantage seems to be particularly high at the smallest geographic radii 
(Figure 56.e-f). 
The consistent performance of SVM at small samples sizes using a dynamic 
geographic constraint is an interesting outcome. The results shown here are generally 
better and definitely more consistent than those seen using fixed windows.  
The Impact of Unbalanced Classes 
 So far, all of the experiments shown in the research have used balanced classes. 
In other words, the number of events and the number of non-events were equal in the 
training and test sets. However, when large geographic and temporal constraints are 
used, the number of non-event points tends to outnumber events by a factor of 10,000 or 
more. Similarly, the number of non-events points selected may be very small in relation 
to the total number of non-event points found in the window. In comparison, ALL events 
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found in the window end up in either the training or set sets. In this case, it can be argued 
that the selection of balanced classes causes the event class to be over-represented in the 
training and test sets. To compensate, it is possible to intentionally create unbalanced 
training and test sets. However, this violates an often un-noticed assumption for many 
classifiers that the classes are equally represented. The resulting problems, often 
described as between-class imbalance, tends to grow worse as the imbalance gets more 
pronounced, potentially impacting the way in which k is chosen for kNN [146] or 
requiring sophisticated sampling methods to compensate  [148].  
 Figure 57 examines the impact of unbalanced classes on predictive analysis using 
SVM and kNN. In the experiment, for each point in ST, the nearest 60 events are chosen 
for the training sample as described in the previous section. Six different sets of non-
event points are chosen ranging in size from 60 to 360, in 60-point increments. The 
resulting event:non-event ratios go from 1:1 to 1:6. Six samples are produced from each 
entry in ST and used for training and testing with SVM and kNN.  Note that no cross-
validation was used. 
 In Figure 56.a and Figure 56.b, accuracy apparently improves, with classification 
error trending as low as 10% for both IED and DF events. However, this low error rate 
hides a serious problem: the misclassification rate of events increases greatly as the class 
imbalance grows. Figure 56.c and 56.d illustrate the problem and show that, at the 
largest imbalance, weighted cost is approximately six times larger than with balanced 
classes due to the large number of misclassified events. The lowest weighted cost occur  
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when the classes are balanced. Similar findings are reported by Wei, et al in [149]. 
Revisiting Feature Selection: Experts and Resource-constrained Environments 
 The best classifiers examined in this research produce mean classification errors 
on the order of 20% using a combination of dynamic techniques to choose training sets, 
normalize data, select features and classify. These classifiers rely only on information 
contained in the training sets to make classification decisions. Automated feature 
c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 57. The impact of unbalanced classes; a) IED classification error; b) DF 
classification error; c) IED event classification error ratio; d) DF event 
classification error ratio. 
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selection using PCA and STP has been used extensively throughout this research. 
However, other approaches exist including feature selection by experts and feature 
selection for computationally constrained environments. 
Feature Selection Using Human and Automated Experts  
 Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a generation of military 
personnel trained to detect and react to attacks. Many of these soldiers, sailors and 
Marines have convoyed and patrolled extensively in Afghanistan and developed a “sixth 
sense” or intuition about attack sites. Two of these experts, an Army Ranger, GP, and an 
Army Special Forces soldier, TN, were asked to identify features and distances that 
described a likely conflict event site. In their responses, both experts emphasized the 
importance of field of view for the attackers. TN focused on the importance of 
communications (no current feature captures this information), cover, concealment and 
escape adjacency for attackers. He also discussed the importance of terrain that restricts 
target movement, (possibly captured when a very short radial is found). GP focused on 
the characteristics of terrain required by attackers to support different types of attack. 
Their responses were used to select features from the existing set of 77. SG (the author 
of this dissertation) is also a former soldier and selected a feature set as well: 
- TN: Short, long and median radial, local openness, planimetric area, rugosity, 
sparse viewshed shape complexity, maximum and median cumulative escape 
adjacency, maximum and median route visibility at 100 meters 
- GP: Short, long and median radial, local openness, planimetric area, rugosity, 
sparse viewshed shape complexity, elevation, slope convexity, texture, roughness 
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at 350 m., discrete shape complexity at 1000 m., distance to populated area with 
at least one person 
- SG: Short, long and median radial, local openness, planimetric area, rugosity, 
sparse viewshed shape complexity, slope convexity, texture, elevation range at 
350 meters, distance to populated area with at least 1000 people, max and median 
route visibility at 100 m., max cumulative escape adjacency at 250 meters 
Next, an automated subset selection method or blind expert uses feature correlation 
as a discriminator. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to calculate the 
dependence between event features and non-event features, 
                                                      
          (   )
    
                                                        (  ) 
, where X and Y are an event feature and a non-event feature, respectively, and σ is the 
standard deviation of the feature.  Equation 66 was used to build a correlation matrix, M, 
for the 77 features used in this research,  
                                                                                                             (  ) 
The sum of the absolute value of each column of M is inspected. The ten features with 
the lowest cumulative correlations are selected. 
 The experiment to test these different subset selection methods used fixed sets of 
60 events and 60 non-events chosen using:  
- fixed temporal training and test windows of 120 and 60 days, respectively; 
- dynamic geographic windows, with a radii equal to the distance from the most 
distant event to the ST location.  
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- No cross-validation 
For each event in ST, the resulting training and test sets were used to compare the 
classification accuracies the three experts (GP, TN, SG), the blind expert (COR), and the 
more conventional feature selection approaches of NDR, STP and PCA. 
  
c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 58. Alternate methods for subset selection; a) IED classification error; b) 
DF classification error; c) IED event classification error ratio; d) DF event 
classification error ratio; e) IED overall error vs  event classification ratio; f) DF 
overall error vs  event classification ratio. 
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  Table 5. Event classification error, from experts (% of total sample).    
 IED  
(%). 
DF  
(%). 
 SVM kNN SVM kNN 
NDR 9.7 10.1 8.9 9.5 
PCA 9.7 10.0 9.1 9.5 
STP 10.2 11.4 9.1 10.1 
TN 14.3 16.3 14.4 15.8 
GP 10.3 10.8 9.7 10.5 
SG 10.0 11.5 9.2 10.3 
Cor 12.8 14.6 13.3 14.2 
 
 
 
Figure 58 shows the results of the experiment where experts select the best 
features. Across the board, SVM produces lower overall classification error rates for 
both IED and DF. The same is true for weighted cost, although the difference SVM and 
kNN tends to be less pronounced. With the exception of two experts, all of the methods 
shown are at or below a weighted cost of 1000.  Table 5 shows the actual event 
classification error rate, or the percent of the total sample that consists of misclassified 
events. As shown in the table, the best result for IED classification is SVM NDR and 
PCA where 9.7% of the total sample consists of misclassified events. 
Feature Selection for Resource-constrained Computing Environments  
 Military personnel tend to operate in environments with severe and strict 
constraints on the size, weight and power (SWAP) of computing and communications 
devices. Computing devices suitable for battlefield use must be small and light enough 
to easily transport but rugged enough to handle combat stresses. Power is shared by 
communications, computing and surveillance, and power provisioning contributes 
  
161 
 
substantially to the overall load carried by the soldier. Thus, efficient use of computing 
and communications resources is critical.  
 Two common approaches to solving this problem include pre-computation of 
features and offloading computing to other devices. However, these solutions only shift 
the burden and may not actually solve any problem. For example, for many terrain-based 
features, it is possible to exhaustively compute the feature at small intervals across an 
entire battlefield. However, the information must be stored and retrieved. The computing 
device must have either large amounts of storage or frequent access to communications, 
both of which increase the power use and potentially increase the complexity of the 
computing device. Offloading computations incurs a similar communications cost. A 
difficult-to-predict, but nevertheless real, related problem is that modern battles are also 
fought in the electromagnetic spectrum. In today’s warfare, communications may be 
intentionally disrupted or targeted and will not always be available. 
 Given these known power and communications constraints, the computational 
cost of feature collection is an important consideration. This cost varies and cost-
informed feature collection can reduce power and enable effective computation on 
resource-constrained devices. In some cases, elevation for example, the feature is 
collected through a simple lookup. Features like elevation range and roughness involve 
operations on an n x n matrix but the size of the matrix is constrained and known 
beforehand, and the operations themselves are relatively simple. At the other extreme are 
features based on discrete viewshed, which requires a large number of relatively costly 
operations. Discrete shape complexity index is an example of this type of feature. 
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Cumulative escape adjacency-based features, built from combinations of many 
viewsheds, are even more costly. Thus, the actual features collected are an important 
consideration for computationally constrained computing. 
 Given the constraints on SWAP and the nature of the modern battlefield, we 
assume that:  
- communications may be unavailable; 
- power is constrained; and 
- computing power and storage is limited. 
Thus, solutions considered should involve only local, relatively inexpensive calculations 
on locally available data. In this research, we examine the impact of feature selection on 
computing requirements under these constraints and assess the tradeoff between 
accuracy and computing requirements. A total of seven feature sets are considered and 
compared with the now familiar solutions of NDR, PCA and STP. 
 The first five features sets, Rad4 through Rad64, are built using seven features 
collected from sparse viewshed: short radial, long radial, mean radial, local openness, 
planimetric area, rugosity and shape complexity. Five different features sets are created 
by collecting these seven features at five different resolutions: 4, 8, 16, 32, and 64 
radials.  
 The sixth feature set, Local, is built using 9 features that can be calculated by 
loading a single n x n matrix of elevations and one feature that requires a table lookup 
and distance measurement: elevation range, roughness, Rad64 and distance to nearest 
populated area with >1000 people.  
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The seventh feature set, Expnd,  is constructed similarly using 15 features, 
augmenting the Local set with three geomorphometric features commonly used to 
classify terrain -slope, convexity, and texture- and the distance to nearest populated areas 
with  >1, and  >10000 people.      
 Figure 59 examines the classification error produced by the seven resource-
constrained feature sets and compares it to NDR, PCA and STP. In the figures, Rad*  
c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 59. Computationally inexpensive subsets; a) IED classification error; b) 
DF classification error; c) IED weighted cost; d) DF weighted cost. 
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Table 6. Event classification error, from resource-aware feature selection (% of 
total sample). 
 IED  
(%). 
DF  
(%). 
 SVM kNN SVM kNN 
NDR 10.0 9.8 8.8 9.6 
PCA 10.0 10.2 8.9 9.6 
STP 10.0 11.0 9.5 10.0 
Rad4 17.6 18.7 18.5 18.0 
Rad8 17.0 18.8 18.6 18.7 
Rad16 17.4 18.8 18.4 18.2 
Rad32 16.9 18.2 18.7 18.6 
Rad64 16.7 18.3 18.9 18.8 
Local 10.7 12.5 11.1 13.1 
Expnd 10.2 11.3 10.1 10.8 
 
 
 
features sets tend to perform poorly with high error and weighted cost. Local performs 
better than Rad* but still fails to reach the accuracies of NDR, PCA and STP. 
Interestingly, Expnd performs fairly well with only 17 features and no additional feature 
selection. Although overall error is 2-3 percent higher than than NDR and PCA, the 
weighted cost for Expnd is not much larger than these other feature selection algorithms. 
This seems to indicate that it may be possible to perform the classification task using a 
reduced set of selected, computationally inexpensive features without incurring a high 
penalty. 
Table 6 shows the actual event classification error rate, or the percent of the total 
sample that consists of misclassified events. As shown in the table, the best result for 
IED classification is SVM NDR and PCA where 10% of the total sample consists of 
misclassified events. Expnd is close with an event classification error rate of only 10.2%. 
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Combining Classifiers 
The best individual classifiers used in this research produce classification errors 
near 20%. Both SVM and kNN perform well although SVM does better with small 
training sets. For both SVM and kNN there seems to be a tradeoff: decreased overall 
classification error comes at the cost of increased event classification error. Since a 
misclassified event site has a large real-world cost —an IED explodes or an ambush is 
not anticipated— we prefer to find classifiers that reduce misclassified events while 
keeping total classification error as small as possible. Ensemble-based classifiers offer a 
 potential way to achieve this goal. 
Ensemble-based classifiers build predictive models by combining the output of 
multiple classifiers [150]. In this research we examine the effectiveness of ensemble 
classifiers using a majority vote rule, a cost-sensitive rule, and stacking. The ensembles 
are constructed using a variety of common and mixed base classifiers with both 
overlapping and disjoint feature sets. 
 Hastie [81] notes that a good ensemble requires a collection of base classifiers 
that cover the input and output space and  are sufficiently different from one another. 
While he does not define ‘sufficiently different’, other authors propose strategies using 
disjoint feature subsets to ensure this difference [151], [152]. The MECH model offers a 
clear way to produce these disjoint sets: the set of Emplacement features and the set of 
Monitor/Control features. As a reminder, Emplacement features describe the event site 
itself and the area immediately adjacent to it. These features include geomorphometric 
measures of the terrain and LOS-based assessments of local terrain. Monitor/Control 
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features attempt to capture the embedding of the Event site into the surrounding terrain 
through line-of-sight analysis and large-scale geomorphometric measures.  
 Ensemble-based classifiers make classification decisions by combining the 
output of multiple individual classifiers according to some rule or algorithm. In this 
research we examine three cases: majority vote rule, cost-sensitive rule, and stacking 
using SVM and kNN algorithms. The majority vote rule assigns a class label by simply 
counting the number of ‘votes’ for each class from individual classifiers. Ensemble-
based classifier C is composed of the output of multiple individual classifiers. Let ci be 
the output of an individual classifier containing n classifications and let cij be its j-th 
output. Then, the classification output of ensemble-based classifier C is assigned by a 
majority vote of its individual classifiers,  
            {
       ∑ (           )
 
 ∑ (           )
 
      ∑ (           )
 
 ∑ (           )
 
                   (  ) 
 The cost-sensitive rule takes into account the real-world cost of a 
misclassification and prefers to misclassify non-events. If any member of the ensemble 
classifies a location as an event, then the ensemble classifies it as an event,  
                  {
              ∑ (           )
 
  
              ∑ (           )
 
  
                                      (  ) 
Note that when the ensemble consists of two classifiers, both of these rules produce the 
same result. 
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 Voting algorithms simply combine the output of existing classification outcomes 
according to some rule. Stacking, on the other hand, takes the same combinations of 
classification outcomes and uses them as input to a classification algorithm. Instead of 
simply counting outcomes, stacking combines the output of multiple base classifiers to 
form a new dataset. This new dataset, composed of binary classification algorithm 
results, is used to train a new classifier. In this research, several different base classifier 
combinations, or stacks, are used with SVM and kNN.  
Ensembles Constructed of Single Algorithm Base Classifiers 
 Figure 60 examines the classification error using SVM and kNN of three 
ensembles using two different rules. In each ensemble, all classifiers use a common, 
single algorithm, either SVM or kNN. The outcome of the ensembles is compared to 
several individual classifiers, including: 
- NDR, PCA and STP; 
- Emp: a classifier that uses the Emplacement features from Table 4; and  
- MC: a classifier that uses the Monitor/Control features from Table 4. 
The ensembles include: 
- NPS: the classification outcomes of  {NDR, PCA, STP}; 
- All: the classification outcomes of {NDR, PCA, STP, Emp and MC}; and  
- EMC: the classification outcomes of {Emp and MC}. 
For the three ensemble classifiers, majority vote and cost-sensitive vote rules are used. 
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-  
 Figures 60.a and 60.b examine the classification accuracy of the ensembles. 
Although AllM performs slightly better than others, the difference is not pronounced. 
Figures 60.c and 60.d, however, do show a significant improvement in the weighted cost 
by the ensembles. All of the ensembles using the cost-sensitive rule show significant 
decrease in event classification error. Note that EMCM and EMCC show the same 
c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 60. The classification accuracy of single base classifier ensembles; a) IED 
classification error; b) DF classification error; c) IED weighted cost; d) DF 
weighted cost. 
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performance because the two rules, majority and cost-sensitive, produce the same results 
when there are only two ensemble members.   
Table 7 shows the actual event classification error rate. As shown in the table, 
combining classifiers can significantly reduce misclassified events. Although the best 
result for IED classification is AllC at 2.1%, a close second is the MECH model-based 
EMC at 3.8%. 
 
 
Table 7. Event classification error, from single algorithm base classifiers (% of total 
sample). 
 IED  
(%). 
DF  
(%). 
 SVM kNN SVM kNN 
NDR 9.6 9.5 9.2 9.2 
PCA 9.9 9.5 9.1 9.3 
STP 10.1 11.1 9.1 10.1 
Emp 9.0 9.1 8.5 8.2 
MC 13.0 14.3 12.9 14.4 
NPSM 9.1 8.8 8.7 8.6 
AllM 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.3 
EMCM 3.8 3.7 4.5 3.9 
NPSC 4.6 3.7 4.6 4.1 
AllC 2.1 1.6 2.5 1.9 
EMCC 3.8 3.7 4.5 3.9 
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Ensembles Constructed of Mixed Algorithm Base Classifiers 
 The experiment shown in Figure 60 only addressed ensembles composed of 
outcomes using the same base classifier, KNN or SVM. However, ensembles composed 
of mixed algorithm base classifiers offer some improvement by increasing diversity 
[150]. Figure 61 shows the results of using ensembles with mixed algorithm base 
classifiers. In the figure, seven ensembles are examined: 
- SK3: [ SVM-NDR, SVM-PCA, SVM-STP, kNN-NDR, kNN-PCA kNN-STP]; 
- SK-All: [SVM-NDR, SVM-PCA, SVM-STP, SVM-Emp, SVM-MC, kNN-NDR, 
kNN-PCA, kNN-STP, kNN-Emp, kNN-MC];       
- SK-EMC: [SVM-Emp, SVM-MC, kNN-Emp, kNN-MC]; 
- SE-KEMC: [SVM-Emp, kNN-Emp, kNN-MC]; 
- SEMC-KE: [SVM-Emp, SVM-MC, kNN-Emp]; 
- SN-KS: [SVM-NDR, kNN-STP]; 
- SN-KSEMC: [SVM-NDR, kNN-STP, kNN-Emp, kNN-MC]. 
In Figure 61, the overall error rates show a slight improvement in some cases. 
However, the weighted cost remains on par with the best rates seen in Figure 60. The 
range of weighted cost values is relatively small, with most ensembles found between 
500 and 600. The best overall classifiers for IED events by weighted cost are probably 
SK-EMCM and SN-KSEMCM. The two ensembles have error rates near 20% and 
weighted cost around 510. 
 Table 8 shows that all of the mixed algorithm base classifiers perform 
fairly well. Of particular note is the performance of the mixed classifiers SE-KEMC and  
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SEMC-KE. Both of these MECH model-based classifiers perform well using both 
majority and cost-sensitive rules. This performance supports the MECH model concept 
of dividing analysis into two spaces: features collected from the conflict event 
Emplacement site and features collected from the conflict event Monitor/control area 
surrounding the Emplacement site. 
    
c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 61. The classification accuracy of mixed base classifier ensembles; a) IED 
classification error; b) DF classification error; c) IED event classification error 
ratio; d) DF event classification error ratio; e) IED overall error vs  event 
classification ratio; f) DF overall error vs  event classification ratio. 
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Table 8. Event classification error, from mixed algorithm base classifiers (% of 
total sample). 
 IED  
(%) 
DF  
(%) 
 Majority Cost-sensitive Majority Cost-
sensitive 
SK-3 6.8 2.4 6.9 2.7 
SK-All 6.9 0.8 6.7 1.1 
SK-EMC 4.8 1.7 5.2 2.1 
SE-KEMC 3.7 2.5 4.0 2.7 
SEMC-KE 3.6 2.4 3.9 2.9 
SN-KS 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 
SN-KSEMC 6.0 2.1 6.1 2.5 
 
 
Stacking  
 The final experiment in this category examines the impact of stacking on 
classification error. Stacking, or stacked generalization, uses an ensemble to train a 
learning algorithm. The ensemble is created by combining the classification decisions of 
two or more individual classifiers into a new dataset. In this dataset, each feature is 
actually the outcome of an individual classifier that was trained on original data. This 
new, composite dataset is used to train a new classifier, which then makes a final 
classification decision or prediction. In this experiment, various combinations of base 
classifiers are used to create 13 different stacks. The stacks include the ensembles used 
in Figures 60-61.Each different stack is used to train and test SVM and kNN classifiers. 
Figure 62 examines the impact of stacking. In the figure, the 13 ensembles are 
listed on the x-axis. The first six ensembles use subscripts to describe the algorithm used  
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by the original base classifiers. So, the NPSSVM ensemble is composed of three 
classification outcomes produced by using SVM on original data with dimensionality 
reduction schemes of NDR, PCA, and STP. In the figure, the overall classification error 
is reduced across all ensembles, especially for outcomes predicted using SVM. The 
improvement is particularly pronounced for SK-ALL using SVM, which has an overall 
error rate for IEDs of around 8.5 % and an event classification rate of 4.1%.  
 
Figure 62. The classification accuracy of stacking; a) IED classification error; b) 
DF classification error; c) IED weighted cost; d) DF weighted cost. 
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a) 
d) 
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Table 9. Event classification error, from stacking using SVM and kNN (% of total 
sample). 
 IED  
(%). 
DF  
(%). 
 SVM kNN SVM kNN 
NPS-SVM 8.1 7.0 7.5 7.1 
All-SVM 5.9 6.5 5.8 6.6 
EMC-SVM 8.7 4.7 8.5 5.5 
NPS-kNN 9.0 6.8 8.4 6.7 
All-kNN 6.6 6.0 6.2 6.2 
EMC-kNN 9.9 5.4 9.1 5.5 
SK-3 5.9 6.4 5.6 6.4 
SK-All 4.1 6.3 3.8 6.5 
SK-EMC 7.2 5.3 6.8 5.6 
SE-KEMC 8.0 5.5 7.5 5.8 
SEMC-KE 8.0 5.5 7.6 6.0 
SN-KS 8.7 5.4 8.1 5.3 
SN-KSEMC 5.2 5.9 4.9 6.0 
 
 
 Table 9 shows that stacking does not perform as well as single algorithm and 
mixed algorithm base classifiers when event classification error is the primary concern. 
However, as shown in Figure 62, SK-AllSVM performs better than any other 
classification scheme when total error or weighted cost are used to make the decision. 
The best performance comes with a relatively high computational cost: a dataset 
consisting of 60 events and 60 non-events is classified five times with SVM and five 
time with kNN. The ten sets of classification outcomes are used to create a new feature 
set that is then classified using SVM. The decision to use this relatively heavy-weight 
process will depend on the computational resources and time available to the user.  
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Analysis of Event Classification Errors 
 The previous sections identify several classifiers that produce relatively low 
overall classification error while maintaining low event classification error. However, 
event classification error for the best classifiers is still on the order of 3-10% of the total 
sample. The following analysis examines event classification error using seven 
classifiers and examines their performance with regards to potentially strong influencing 
factors like terrain type, time, date and distance from populated areas. The seven 
classifiers are:  
- Individual classifiers: SVM-NDA, SVM PCA, SVM-STP; 
- MECH-based ensembles using a single base classifier: SVM-EMC, kNN-EMC;  
- MECH-based ensembles using mixed base classifiers: SE-KEMC, SEMC-KE. 
For the analysis, a dataset was assembled that contains the test outcomes 
individual test set samples for each of the seven classifiers using the 500 events in ST as 
seeds. The 500 test sets in the dataset collectively contain 22926 sampled IED events 
(DF: 21616). These events are sampled from a set of 2865 unique IED events (DF: 
2216), so the average event appears multiple times. Individual IED event counts range 
from 1 to 28 (DF: 29) with a mean of 8.0 (DF: 9.8). 
Some IED events are easier to correctly classify than others. In the dataset, a total 
of 808 unique events (representing 4745 samples) are always classified correctly by all 
seven classifiers (DF: 630, 5338). This analysis can expanded to include events that are 
always correctly classified by a majority of the seven classifiers. In this case, 1725 
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unique events (representing 12197 samples) are always correctly classified by four or 
more of the seven classifiers (DF: 1267, 12056). 
Misclassified events can be examined similarly. A total of 22 events 
(representing 31 samples) are always misclassified by all seven classifiers (DF: 11, 20). 
Similarly, 53 events (representing 96 samples) are always misclassified by at least four 
of the seven classifiers (DF: 27, 74). 
In the analysis that follows, we focus on events that are misclassified by a 
majority of the seven classifiers (four or more); and misclassified a majority of times 
that they appear. So, for example, a unique event that appears in 11 test sets will be 
included in this analysis if it is misclassified in at least 6 (of 11) samples by at least four 
(of 7) classifiers. Based on these criteria, the analysis will include 387 unique events 
(representing 1226 samples). These are compared to events that are classified correctly 
in a majority of samples by a majority of classifiers. Comparisons are global across the 
dataset 
Figure 63 examines the effect of terrain type on the classification of events. In 
the figure, three histogram bars are associated with each terrain type. The first bar 
represents majority misclassified and majority correctly classified events in a stack, 
denoted by red and green segments, respectively. The middle bar represents all events, in 
yellow. The last bar for each terrain type represents the RD250 dataset (points along roads 
that are at least 250 meters from a known event) in blue.  The x-axis is labeled with the 
terrain types, from 1 to 16, as proposed by Iwahashi and Pike in [22]. The magnitude of  
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each bar is calculated as a percent of the total for that class. Thus, a blue bar with a 
magnitude of 8 indicates that 8% of all RD250 points are of that particular terrain type. 
In both figures, it is clear that the distribution of terrain types is not uniform in 
Afghanistan. Notably, terrain types 6, 10 and 14 —described in [22] as having lower 
gradient, coarse texture and high convexity— appear to dominate with most of the 
remaining points spread between types 1-4. This distribution is even more pronounced 
for events. In fact, the three most common terrain types include 56% of all RD250 points, 
over 70% of all misclassified events (IED and DF), over 79% of all correctly classified 
events. Terrain types 1 and 3, especially prominent for roads, are described as high 
gradient, coarse texture and high convexity.   
Figure 63. Analysis of misclassified events, by terrain type; a) IED events; b) DF 
events. 
 
 
a) b) 
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Figure 63.a shows the impact of terrain type on IED event classification. While 
misclassified events appear at several terrain types, they do not appear to be 
disproportionately represented in any particular terrain type. DF events show similar 
trends in Figure 62.b. 
Figure 64 examines the impact of date or time of year on classification error 
using the commonly correct and common misclassified events as described above. These 
figures were constructed using counts collected over one-month windows. (The gaps are 
a reflection of an incomplete dataset. See Appendix A.2 for details.) Figure 64.a and 
64.b examine the distribution of events and event error across the 19 months covered by 
the dataset, for IED and DF respectively. Each pair of bars represents the mean event 
counts of the individual classifiers (left, green/red) and the mean event counts of the 
ensemble classifiers (right, green/yellow) for a single month. For each bar, the green 
portion at the bottom is the count of correctly classified events. The top of the bar, in red 
or yellow, is the count of misclassified events. The numbers above each pair, labeled ‘I’ 
and ‘E’ are the percent of misclassified events for Individual classifiers and Ensemble 
classifiers respectively.  
One interesting trend is the decrease in event classification error between May 
and August during both 2011 and 2012.  While the reasons behind this trend are unclear, 
it may be that this is a reflection of the real-world learning that happens in the war zone 
in Afghanistan. Over the winter, both attackers and targets face periods of reduced 
mobility. This provides attackers time to develop new tactics which are then 
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 implemented in the spring as the temperatures go up. Targets are unable to develop 
counter-measures until the new tactics are seen. However, as the attacks ramp up and 
counter-measures are developed and disseminated, the number of successful attacks 
decreases. If this is true, then similar results might be expected from machine learning 
algorithms. Early in the season, there are fewer attacks and these may be a combination 
of old and new tactics. As the season progresses, more of the same tactics are seen and 
a) 
b) 
Figure 64. Event classification errors by date; a) IED event classification errors 
by date and classifier type; b) DF event classification errors by date and classifier 
type. 
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the classifier ability to correctly classify them increases. This remains true until new 
tactics emerge.  
Figure 65 examines the impact of time of day on classification error. The ratio of 
misclassified event to total events is explored in Figures 64.a and 64.b, for IED and DF 
events respectively. These figures were constructed using a one hour jumping window.  
For IED events shown in Figure 65.a, there are general smaller errors seen late at 
night and early in the morning. While the reasons are unclear, this is possibly related to 
darkness. In the dark, it is more difficult for the attacker to see the target, so the range of 
sites available for an IED attack may be constrained.   
Figure 65.b shows an opposite trend for direct fire attacks between the hours of 
2300 and 0300, more easily seen in the numbers across the top of the figure. The event 
misclassification rate is much higher, almost doubled, for DF events that occur in this 
window. Although the numbers of events are relatively small, they still number in the 
hundreds, so a few bad entries in the dataset shouldn’t have too large an effect.  While 
the reason for this increase is unclear, it may be related to how the data is collected and 
logged. When a direct fire attack happens during daylight, it is normally possible to 
determine an approximate location for the shooter based on incoming trajectory, smoke 
and other factors related to shooting. However, at night it may be impossible to 
accurately estimate the actual location of the attack. This may lead to increased reporting 
errors at night.  
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Distance to populated areas appears to have a little effect on correct classification 
of IED events, as shown in Figure 66. In the figure, the distance from populated areas to 
misclassified and correctly classified events is presented. Figure 66.a and 65.b examine 
the distance from populated areas with greater than 1000 people using a bin size, or 
increment, of 250 meters. The distribution of misclassified and correctly classified 
events is generally similar. One possibly significant difference is seen at distances 
greater than 6 km, where almost all (of the few) events are misclassified. 
c) 
d) 
Figure 65. Event classification errors by time of day; a) IED event classification 
errors by time of day and classifier type; b) DF event classification errors by time 
of day and classifier type. 
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b) 
a) 
c) 
d) 
Figure 66. IED event classification errors by distance from populated areas; a) 
error count by distance from populated areas with >1000 people; b) error percent 
by distance from populated areas with >1000 people; c) error count by distance 
from populated areas with >50,000 people; d) error percent by distance from 
populated areas with >50,000 people. 
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Figures 66.c and 66.d offer a similar analysis for distances to populated areas 
with more than 50,000 people. As before, no obvious differences between misclassified 
and correctly classified events are obvious.  A similar figure for DF events at the same 
distances can be found in Appendix D.  
Summary of Analysis of Event Classification Errors 
 In the previous section, the performance of seven different classifiers was 
examined to determine if event classification error varied with regard to several different 
potentially strong influences. In each of the four cases —terrain type, time, date and 
distance from populated areas— no strong differences emerged from the comparison of  
misclassified and correctly classified events. In general, these two groups, misclassified 
and correctly classified events, tended to vary together over the domain of the 
influencing factor.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this work, we investigated and developed an underlying framework supporting 
predictive analysis of asymmetric conflict events. With the real world environment of 
modern day Afghanistan as a backdrop, we developed a model tailored to asymmetric 
conflict and populated it with conventional geomorphometric features as well as novel 
viewshed-based features that assess risk aversion and other human factors. Predictive 
analysis using these features produced classification error approaching 8%, even when 
trained with noisy data collected in unknown conditions. Due to the high cost of conflict 
event misclassification, a possible IED explosion or undetected ambush, the predictive 
analysis classifiers were assessed using a weighted cost metric that penalized event 
classification error. 
MECH, the underlying asymmetric conflict model, was developed using two 
primary components: a model of the asymmetric warfare attack Emplacement site and a 
model of the Monitor and Control sites supporting the attack. A Halo constructed using 
the longest and shortest lines of sight geographically constrained the total area 
considered useful for Monitor and Control functions. This constraint informed the 
collection of features and defined the area to be analyzed. The resulting consolidated 
MECH model defined the attack site and its environs with a focus on geomorphometric 
and visibility-related features and human factors that support the execution of an 
asymmetric conflict event. 
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In order to populate the MECH model, conventional geomorphometric features 
were combined with a new set of features that attempt to capture the human factors of 
risk aversion and visibility of the event site. By identifying geographic locations within 
the Halo that simultaneously met two constraints, intervisibility with the target and 
adjacency to escape routes, these new features supported assessment of risk aversion and 
allowed the algorithmic quantification of locations with high utility for Monitor and 
Control activities. The resulting identification of optimal escape-adjacent points 
provided the basis for additional features assessing the visibility of approaches to an 
Emplacement site from highly useful and escape-adjacent Monitor and Control sites. A 
subset of these features, called route visibility in this research, have proven to be highly 
useful in the classification of conflict events.    
Since humans involved in asymmetric conflict are unlikely to have the tools or 
training required to perform exhaustive terrain analysis supporting conflict event site 
selection, new features were proposed that use line-of-sight constraints and summarize 
key terrain descriptors a goal of measuring the ‘feel’ of a location. Features were 
developed that assess line of sight and openness of the terrain, describe the general shape 
and complexity of the viewshed, and summarize its texture or roughness. These features, 
constructed by analyzing a limited number of radials centered on the Emplacement site, 
provide computationally inexpensive insight into the general utility of terrain for a 
conflict event. 
Given the MECH model populated with potentially relevant features, learning 
algorithms were trained with a goal of correctly classifying points along roads into two 
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classes: Events and Non-Events. The topics of data normalization and feature selection 
were explored and choices were made tailored to this specific data set. Machine learning 
algorithms including Support Vector Machines with various kernels, k-Nearest 
Neighbors, and both Linear and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis were employed under 
a variety of geographic and temporal constraints, both fixed and dynamic, and under 
various subset selection rules, including balanced and unbalanced classes. Feature 
selection by experts was examined and found to be inferior to machine learning 
approaches. Learning algorithm refinement was performed using dynamic parameter and 
hyperparameter estimation for both kNN and SVM. Further improvement was 
discovered through the use of ensembles.  
In the end, the best performing unconstrained classifier used SVM with dynamic 
parameter estimation to train on a stack consisting of ten mixed base-classifiers 
configured as a stack. In four of the individual classifiers that made up the stack, features 
were divided using the MECH model as a guide and normalized using event class 
moments determined dynamically from the training set. The order of k was dynamically 
selected for kNN using the training set. Both the RBF shape parameter σ and the box 
constraint, C, are dynamically estimated for SVM from the training set using a two-stage 
grid search. This classification construct produced overall classification error of less than 
10%. More importantly, event misclassification was reduced to less than 5% of all 
events in the sample for both IED and DF. 
Always keeping in mind that the end user of this research is likely to be a soldier 
on a modern battlefield, light-weight classification solutions were also explored. Various 
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solutions, designed to be used in resource-constrained environments, were examined, 
with a primary focus on the use of single classifiers and computationally cheap features. 
The best results were obtained using SVM on a reduced, fixed set of 17 features. With 
an overall classification error around 24% and event misclassification of 10.2% of all 
events in the sample, the resource-constrained version provided surprisingly good 
results.  
Experimental results derived from real-world asymmetric conflict data in 
Afghanistan show that the MECH model and the features developed in this research are 
useful in the predictive analysis of asymmetric conflict events. The proposed modeling 
technique and classification solutions provide a concrete foundation for the development 
of practical tools and applications supporting situational awareness in asymmetric 
conflict environments.  
In the course of this research a variety of constraining choices were made. 
Further exploration of these choices may result in better features or more accurate 
classification. One of the most interesting choices dealt with time. 
The importance of time emerges is visible in several ways. First, a training set 
duration of 120 days was selected. This was paired with a test set duration of 60 days. 
Thus, the scale of both the training and test sets were fixed. In the case of the training 
set, this length of time is closely correlated with seasonal weather. Future work might 
consider alternate and potentially more dynamic ways of selecting a temporal constraint. 
Also, seasonal trends are probably important. In fact, it is likely that cold weather and 
hot weather drive key decisions regarding tactics. The impact of seasonal weather may 
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also play a key factor. Thus, correlating tactical patterns across seasons might be a useful 
way to select more homogeneous training sets. Finally, time of day is not currently a 
consideration for viewshed calculations. However, surface irradiance, heat convection, 
wind, and localized weather patterns may all depend on or correlate with time of day or 
position of the sun. Anisotropic surface considerations, particularly with respect to 
irradiance and shadows, are not currently considered. It is likely that real viewsheds are 
significantly smaller, particularly at longer ranges, when these factors are considered.  
Geomorphometric choices are another area where potential improvements exist. 
These improvements are probably related to algorithmic choices, scale, and error 
management. In the area of geomorphometry, this research chose to implement 
algorithms commonly mentioned in academic papers or discussed in textbooks. For 
example, surface roughness is described as a simple standard deviation from mean 
elevation. However, for most of the features captured here, other algorithms exist that 
may quantify the land surface in ways that more accurately capture its structure or 
utility. Scale is also important. For many features, the scale was arbitrarily fixed to area 
within some specified radius of a fixed point. However, it is likely that some features 
will benefit from smaller, larger or dynamic scales. The resolution of the elevation data 
was an important constraint in this area. Built on a 30-meter grid, any feature smaller 
than one pixel was probably invisible or diluted by the DEM spacing. Finally, DEM 
error is probably an important contributor to the noise found in some of the features. 
Error correction strategies should probably be an important part of any feature that uses 
elevation data. 
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APPENDIX A 
The following sections describe the data used for this project. 
Appendix A.1 Global Digital Elevation Model 
Elevation maps were obtained from the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission 
and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) Global Digital Elevation Model Version 2 [127]. 
Dated October 2011, these maps offer digital elevations with a horizontal resolution of 
approximately 30 meters (1/3 arc second). The data uses the WGS84 geoid and is stored 
in GeoTIFF format in 1° x 1° tiles. The ASTER L1B data were obtained through the 
online Data Pool at the NASA Land Processes Distributed Active Archive Center (LP 
DAAC), USGS/Earth Resources Observation and Science (EROS) Center, Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota (https://lpdaac.usgs.gov/get_data) . 
The absolute vertical error for this product is estimated to be ±17 meters. 
However, the relative error (between adjacent pixels) is much smaller. At the distances 
used for MECH analysis, on the order of 3 km, it is unlikely that this error is 
problematic. 
A more serious problem is the resolution. Each pixel in these elevation maps 
covers a ~30x~30 meter square. There are probably features of interest that are small 
enough to hide within the large pixels. We believe that a more appropriate resolution is 
on the order of 5 meters. 
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Appendix A.2 Asymmetric Warfare Events 
Asymmetric warfare events were obtained from the ISAF-NATO Civilian 
Integration Team. The events are provided as a service to contractors and non-
governmental agencies that operate or may operate in Afghanistan. An 
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO extract of the Afghanistan SIGACTS database, this dataset 
consists of a variety of events including IEDs, direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire 
and more. The data is provided with at least one week delay and occasional outages and 
missing data occur.  
The dataset used for this analysis includes 33,140 events that occurred between 
February 01, 2011 and August 23, 2012. Of these, 13,295 were classified as IED and 
16610 were classified as direct fire. 
Table 10 shows the dates covered by the current dataset. 
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Table 10. Date coverage of asymmetric warfare events in the ISAF-NATO Civilian 
Integration Team Unclassified Dataset. 
2011 2012 
D
ay
 o
f 
th
e 
m
on
th
 
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
29  29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
30  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30  30 30 30 30 30 30 
31  31  31  31 31  31  31 31  31  31  31 31 
   
    Data not available from the CIT website. 
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The following figures offer an overview of the geographic distribution of IED 
and direct fire events in Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 67. IED attacks in Afghanistan, February 2011 - August 2012. 
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Figure 69 shows the distribution of events by date and type using a 7-day sliding 
window. All of the events show the same general trends. Note that the trend to zero in 
August 2012 is an edge effect based on availability of data. The dips in Sep-Oct 2011 
and Feb-Mar 2012 are also due to missing data. 
 
 
 
Figure 68. Direct fire attacks in Afghanistan, February 2011 - August 2012. 
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Collocated Events 
Some locations also lend themselves to multiple events, sometimes of the same 
type and sometimes not. In the following analysis, collocated events are defined as 
successive events that occur within 250 meters and 1.5 hours of each other. The 
threshold of 250 meters was selected to account for typical patrol configurations, where 
vehicles are separated by 25 meters or more. The time window was selected based on 
anecdotal information about typical patrol behavior following an attack. A total of 894 
initiating events meet these criteria.  
 
Figure 69. Distribution of events by date, using a 7-day sliding window. 
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  Table 11. Collocated events 
Initiating Event Following Event Count 
IED IED 319 
IED Direct fire 63 
Direct fire IED 42 
Direct fire Direct fire 470 
 
 
Dataset Problems 
A principle problem with this conflict event dataset is data quality. In particular, the 
exact coordinates of events seem to be collected in a variety of ways and using a variety 
of datums. No information is provided to assess or normalize these inputs. Thus, the 
dataset is likely to contain locations that are erroneous due to estimation errors, datum 
translation errors, and simple manual data entry error. 
Another problem is the lack of descriptor specificity. All IED events are 
classified with the same descriptor. Thus, command-detonated and victim-detonated 
devices are labeled with the same descriptor. Similarly, all direct fire events share the 
same label. So, a company-sized ambush and an individual sniper attack are marked as 
being part of the same class.  
A final problem is the lack of consistency in the measurements. For an ambush, 
the specified location is likely to be the geographic coordinate of the person reporting 
the event when it started. Depending on the size of the convoy or patrol, this location 
could be tens to hundreds of meters from the actual place where the attack actually 
occurred. If the patrol was moving during the attack, the location may be estimated or 
may be the place where the patrol stopped. Similar problems exist for IED events. 
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Appendix A.3 Afghanistan Roads 
Road data is collected and maintained by the Afghanistan Information 
Management Service (http://www.aims.org.af) and distributed by mapcruzin.com at 
http://www.mapcruzin.com/afghanistan-shapefiles/roads.zip. Three types of roads are 
identified, including all weather primary, all weather secondary and tracks.   
 The roads are stored as polyline objects in a shapefile. In order to use the roads 
for this project, each road segment was split into discrete points at 30 meter intervals 
(the resolution of the elevation maps). A total of 3,306,680 discrete points were 
produced in this way. 
 Principle problems with this dataset include its age and apparent incompleteness. 
As far as can be determined, this map of roads was produced in the early 2000’s using 
data from Russian and U.S. maps published in the 1980’s. The age of the data suggests 
that some current roads may be missing from the map, particularly after post-war 
reconstruction efforts by the U.S. and others. Figure 70 illustrates the problem. A red 
square draws attention to a number of IED events that seemed to occur away from roads. 
Visual analysis of Google Earth imagery reveals the presence of a road and a number of 
villages along a watercourse. It seems likely that this road did not exist or was not 
surveyed when the Russian and U.S. maps were originally created. 
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Appendix A.4 Population 
Population estimates were scraped from the site 
http://www.fallingrain.com/world/AF/.  For each known, fixed, and named populated 
place (village, town, city) the total population within 7 km is estimated. Figure 71 gives 
an idea of the population distribution in Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 70. Example of area where IED events occurred away from known roads. 
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The source of the raw population data is unknown.  Therefore, the validity of the 
estimated populations is unknown. Additionally, as a largely rural and tribal society, 
Afghan participation in a national census is likely to be less than complete. Informally, 
the fallingrain.com estimates for the area surrounding the center of Kabul, Kandahar and 
Mazar-i-sharif appear to be roughly consistent with Wikipedia estimates for population 
for the same towns. 
  
Figure 71. Estimated population at locations throughout Afghanistan. 
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL FEATURES 
This appendix contains additional features. For the most part, these features are 
similar to those already presented in the body of the dissertation and differ only in 
window size, radius, or number of radials. They are included here for completeness. 
Appendix B.1 Visibility Index  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 72. Visibility Index inside a halo with an inner radius of 100 meters and an 
outer radius of 350 meters. 
Figure 73. Visibility Index at a radius of 500 meters. 
  
220 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B.2  Discrete Shape Complexity Index 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 74, Visibility Index at a radius of 1000 meters. 
 
Figure 75. Discrete Shape Complexity Index in a halo with an inner radius of 100 
meters and an outer radius of 350 meters. 
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Figure 76. Discrete Shape Complexity Index at a radius of 500 meters. 
Figure 77. Discrete Shape Complexity Index at a radius of 1000 meters. 
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Appendix B.3 Cumulative Escape Adjacency for a Single Point 
 
  
Figure 79. Maximum CEA(rx). 
 
Figure 78. Minimum CEA(rx). 
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Appendix B.4  Median Route Visibility 
 
  
Figure 80. Median route visibility at 100 meters. 
Figure 81. Median route visibility at 500 meters. 
Figure 82. Median route visibility at 1000 meters. 
  
224 
 
Appendix B.5  Minimum Route Visibility 
 
  
Figure 83. Minimum route visibility at 100 meters. 
Figure 84. Minimum route visibility at 250 meters. 
Figure 85. Minimum route visibility at 500 meters. 
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Appendix B.6  Maximum Route Visibility 
 
Appendix B.6  Maximum Route Visibility 
 
  
Figure 86. Minimum route visibility at 1000 meters. 
Figure 87. Maximum route visibility at 100 meters. 
Figure 88. Maximum route visibility at 250 meters. 
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Appendix B.7  Sparse Viewshed Shortest Radial  
 
 
 
  
Figure 89. Maximum route visibility at 500 meters. 
Figure 90. Maximum route visibility at 1000 meters. 
Figure 91. Sparse viewshed shortest radial (Ns  = 4). 
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Figure 92. Sparse viewshed shortest radial (Ns  = 8). 
Figure 93. Sparse viewshed shortest radial (Ns  = 32). 
Figure 94. Sparse viewshed shortest radial (Ns  = 64). 
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Appendix B.8 Sparse Viewshed Longest Radial 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 95. Sparse viewshed longest radial (Ns  = 4). 
Figure 96. Sparse viewshed longest radial (Ns  = 8). 
Figure 97. Sparse viewshed longest radial (Ns  = 32). 
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Appendix B.9  Sparse Viewshed Local Openness 
 
  
Figure 98. Sparse viewshed longest radial (Ns = 64). 
Figure 99. Sparse viewshed local openness (Ns = 4). 
Figure 100. Sparse viewshed local openness (Ns = 8). 
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Appendix B.10 Elevation Range 
 
 
 
  
Figure 101. Sparse viewshed local openness (Ns  = 32). 
Figure 102. Sparse viewshed local openness (Ns  = 64). 
Figure 103. Elevation range at a radius of 50 meters. 
  
231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 104. Elevation range at a radius of 100 meters. 
 
Figure 105. Elevation range at a radius of 500 meters. 
 
Figure 106. Elevation range at a radius of 1000 meters. 
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Appendix B.11 Roughness (Standard Deviation of Elevation) 
  
Figure 107. Roughness at a radius of 50 meters. 
Figure 108. Roughness at a radius of 100 meters. 
Figure 109. Roughness at a radius of 500 meters. 
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Appendix B.12 Sparse Viewshed Mean Radial 
  
Figure 110. Roughness at a radius of 1000 meters. 
Figure 111. Sparse viewshed mean radial (Ns = 4). 
Figure 112. Sparse viewshed mean radial (Ns  = 8). 
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Figure 113. Sparse viewshed mean radial (Ns = 16). 
Figure 114. Sparse viewshed mean radial (Ns  = 32). 
Figure 115. Sparse viewshed mean radial (Ns  = 64). 
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Appendix B.13  Distance to Population Centers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 116. Distance to nearest population center with more than 1 person. 
Figure 117. Distance to nearest population center with more than 10,000 people. 
Figure 118. Distance to nearest population center with more than 50,000 people. 
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Appendix B.14 Sparse Viewshed Planimetric Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 119. Distance to nearest population center with more than 100,000 people. 
Figure 120. sparse viewshed planimetric area (Ns = 4). 
Figure 121. Sparse viewshed planimetric area (Ns = 8). 
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Figure 122. Sparse viewshed planimetric area (Ns = 16). 
Figure 123. Sparse viewshed planimetric area (Ns = 32). 
Figure 124. Sparse viewshed planimetric area (Ns = 64). 
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Appendix B.15 Sparse Viewshed Rugosity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 125. Sparse viewshed rugosity (Ns = 4). 
Figure 126. Sparse viewshed rugosity (Ns  = 8). 
Figure 127. Sparse viewshed rugosity (Ns  = 16).  
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Appendix B.16  Sparse Viewshed Shape Complexity Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 128. Sparse viewshed rugosity (Ns  = 32). 
Figure 129. Sparse viewshed rugosity (Ns = 64). 
Figure 130. Sparse viewshed shape complexity index (Ns = 4). 
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Figure 131. Sparse viewshed shape complexity index (Ns = 8). 
Figure 132. Sparse viewshed shape complexity index (Ns = 16). 
Figure 133. Sparse viewshed shape complexity index (Ns  = 32). 
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Figure 134. Sparse viewshed shape complexity index (Ns = 64). 
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APPENDIX C. SUMMARY OF FEATURES 
     The following tables summarize key statistics of the conflict event and road 
datasets. 
Table 12. Statistics for Road Points 
Road Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
Elevation 1500.567 894.5486 0.543728 2.420101 5059 245 
Slope 12.29649 11.22895 1.307544 4.18051 80.8767 0 
IW_convexity 50.58728 3.467145 0.27602 7.149377 100 30.52326 
IW_texture 171.7688 31.52016 -0.47859 3.251345 268 0 
Elv_rng50 17.84263 17.63961 2.342669 11.46453 314 0 
Elv_rng100 30.36374 30.16361 2.123798 9.377894 486 0 
Elv_rng350 90.69964 90.76243 1.63301 5.771874 884 5 
Elv_rng500 120.7624 120.3921 1.524657 5.201717 1067 7 
Elv_rng1000 204.5278 202.0049 1.388893 4.580955 1480 10 
Rough_50 5.734752 5.809725 2.415465 12.15683 99.49794 0 
Rough_100 8.43356 8.84612 2.235514 10.32687 141.1226 0 
Rough_350 21.28197 23.7253 1.842704 7.022945 251.019 1.071471 
Rough_500 27.38109 30.47396 1.731273 6.292839 282.6358 1.182403 
Rough_1000 43.7797 48.01696 1.566073 5.328774 362.9134 1.575278 
Visidx100-350 173.6378 94.9768 -0.13214 2.01938 360 0 
Visidx_350 200.8412 100.623 -0.22429 2.080677 392 2 
Visidx_500 336.1799 187.3552 0.108157 2.140409 820 2 
Visidx_1000 820.063 557.0581 0.643432 2.798222 3172 2 
SCID100-350 NaN NaN -0.75397 2.926884 5.352372 0.282095 
SCID_350 3.817166 1.188141 -0.87124 3.083763 5.585192 0.398942 
SCID_500 4.902237 1.649369 -0.59101 2.726625 8.077966 0.398942 
SCID_1000 7.522361 2.944933 -0.13269 2.383551 15.88772 0.398942 
Short_rad_4 87.85215 68.96896 1.87485 8.553442 1081.062 30.88748 
Long_rad_4 418.7539 325.2703 1.950796 10.20155 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_4 222.8605 150.8685 1.300956 6.354747 1860.971 30.88748 
Local_op_4 0.145411 0.178123 3.137949 21.55073 4.192637 0 
Planimtrc_4 181005.4 299234.4 6.403355 78.60991 8741126 1908.073 
Rugosity_4 0.687045 0.291456 1.559916 11.25873 6.303492 0 
SCIF_4 1.128786 0.089746 -0.1246 8.936473 3.486189 0.78235 
Short_rad_8 66.55558 46.47777 1.73964 7.199426 648.6371 30.88748 
Long_rad_8 492.7444 341.9749 1.766337 9.106218 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_8 211.2556 127.8879 1.020124 5.198145 1579.122 30.88748 
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Road Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
Local_op_8 0.147636 0.180521 3.202525 22.41808 4.528534 0.000458 
Planimtrc_8 321310.9 448361.5 5.669126 69.59668 15413320 3569.677 
Rugosity_8 0.545856 0.284494 1.308529 8.992094 5.920185 0 
SCIF_8 1.327031 0.099617 -0.36451 6.428349 3.232216 0.804348 
Short_rad_16 56.8759 36.33826 1.705347 6.641047 494.1997 30.88748 
Long_rad_16 568.9883 367.5516 1.600696 8.075665 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_16 207.2524 119.6326 0.887791 4.712483 1498.043 30.88748 
Local_op_16 0.14788 0.181114 3.247771 22.90394 4.492111 0.001172 
Planimtrc_16 620615.5 795392.7 5.303083 63.93605 28862852 6769.165 
Rugosity_16 0.471404 0.265345 1.471321 9.785589 5.613903 0 
SCIF_16 1.672743 0.134303 -0.84879 5.229183 3.840335 0.837967 
Short_rad_32 51.82218 30.52004 1.712476 6.511612 463.3122 30.88748 
Long_rad_32 646.2164 399.4636 1.455157 7.140774 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_32 206.5036 117.1211 0.833915 4.517314 1402.485 30.88748 
Local_op_32 0.148107 0.181391 3.257947 23.0757 4.51437 0.001517 
Planimtrc_32 1238309 1527504 5.130433 61.27438 51675859 13303.11 
Rugosity_32 0.451506 0.249126 1.556002 10.71974 5.414795 0 
SCIF_32 2.209487 0.198408 -1.04606 4.735505 4.030713 0.919574 
Short_rad_64 49.37544 27.3026 1.670685 6.23432 339.7623 30.88748 
Long_rad_64 716.3153 432.0182 1.331562 6.378148 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_64 206.3157 116.2885 0.812963 4.443949 1358.566 30.88748 
Local_op_64 0.148148 0.181436 3.259188 23.07553 4.519934 0.001954 
Planimtrc_64 2473714 3004681 5.068907 60.3886 95729354 26481.33 
Rugosity_64 0.458616 0.241175 1.545595 10.99351 5.373364 0.000588 
SCIF_64 2.988666 0.29893 -1.03653 4.406598 4.528361 1.07449 
Dist_pop_1 3866.659 5055.309 3.280635 18.8791 56877.3 0.799611 
Dist_pop_1k 12018.52 22347.75 2.873837 11.86605 165470.1 0.799611 
Dist_pop_10k 72976.86 73195.13 1.194508 3.810034 360925.8 0.799611 
Dist_pop_50k 131591.1 94707.11 0.848839 3.589145 494683.7 0.799611 
Dist_pop100k 165769.2 121818.8 0.882078 3.216328 566862.7 0.799611 
Min_CEA 19.97321 39.10452 12.92167 393.3227 3394 1 
Max_CEA 251.9178 416.94 6.272908 48.01058 4297 2 
Med_CEA 83.38715 132.3518 6.841458 62.75816 3431 1 
RtVisMin_1k 0.014877 0.021871 11.84692 200.5709 0.849057 0.000453 
RtVisMax_1k 0.603916 0.184814 -0.32498 2.982343 1 0.000582 
RtVisMed_1k 0.182582 0.102707 0.729848 3.292173 0.88 0.000582 
RtVisMin_500 0.03024 0.03052 9.437664 136.5116 0.977273 0.001196 
RtVisMax500 0.726549 0.182017 -0.84383 3.937267 1 0.001848 
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Road Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
RtVisMed500 0.255945 0.133704 0.56446 2.837612 0.977273 0.001848 
RtVisMin_250 0.061097 0.041276 6.2992 72.69977 1 0.003472 
RtVisMax250 0.824756 0.170423 -1.43312 5.704653 1 0.006098 
RtVisMed250 0.339879 0.161213 0.38499 2.535758 1 0.006098 
RtVisMin_100 0.15594 0.068637 2.642588 18.16312 1 0.014493 
RtVisMax100 0.924422 0.139425 -2.53312 10.72765 1 0.026316 
RtVisMed100 0.480261 0.189432 0.076296 2.37194 1 0.020833 
 
 
Table 13. Statistics for IED Events 
IED Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
Elevation 1189.741 516.1805 1.195342 3.562144 4231 284 
Slope 5.960902 6.007035 2.954775 14.20707 57.00436 0 
IW_convexity 50.50021 2.387105 0.214614 4.469146 66.27907 38.0814 
IW_texture 185.0368 23.28743 -0.40387 3.523254 261 69 
Elv_rng50 8.860173 7.52035 4.608615 37.40607 131 1 
Elv_rng100 13.89868 12.3034 4.693826 36.62869 204 2 
Elv_rng350 34.13291 36.99049 4.682419 34.68556 547 7 
Elv_rng500 44.05115 49.79456 4.384505 30.32021 663 9 
Elv_rng1000 73.97255 86.47978 3.587551 21.02291 1056 12 
Rough_50 2.810664 2.463042 4.6916 37.65946 41.45635 0.426401 
Rough_100 3.711215 3.581271 4.951779 40.19897 63.20649 0.700662 
Rough_350 7.02624 9.215696 5.019333 38.89898 154.6467 1.366325 
Rough_500 8.655027 12.0059 4.845296 36.23133 187.591 1.520224 
Rough_1000 13.58592 19.17193 4.150777 27.41496 245.6013 1.839131 
Visidx100-350 185.6878 87.87364 -0.18106 2.140015 360 0 
Visidx_350 214.4752 91.72991 -0.26132 2.227028 392 4 
Visidx_500 351.4775 180.5928 0.120343 2.1702 806 4 
Visidx_1000 811.8062 567.0791 0.73444 2.8867 2943 4 
SCID100-350 NaN NaN -0.77079 3.112951 5.352372 0.282095 
SCID_350 4.006368 1.008209 -0.8829 3.44103 5.585192 0.56419 
SCID_500 5.069513 1.506619 -0.51472 2.722967 8.00871 0.56419 
SCID_1000 7.480773 2.939417 0.00766 2.292969 15.30348 0.56419 
Short_rad_4 93.87285 70.00596 1.909031 9.484288 957.5119 30.88748 
Long_rad_4 424.1586 280.8768 1.994782 11.18061 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_4 232.2845 134.2474 1.205886 5.800196 1258.665 30.88748 
Local_op_4 0.059758 0.080886 5.322349 52.79569 1.359774 0 
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IED Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
Planimtrc_4 174157.1 244022.5 5.429662 55.67555 4540737 1908.073 
Rugosity_4 0.642722 0.216575 0.354551 4.804443 2.282296 0 
SCIF_4 1.120155 0.077516 -1.01414 4.691009 1.410832 0.798868 
Short_rad_8 72.11338 48.61465 1.698557 7.617441 555.9746 30.88748 
Long_rad_8 506.9798 299.1997 1.835823 10.03663 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_8 226.2865 117.4495 0.991791 5.003164 1077.201 30.88748 
Local_op_8 0.060769 0.082075 5.63435 61.95781 1.663295 0.001457 
Planimtrc_8 328125.1 389897.4 4.877909 56.08882 9702172 3569.677 
Rugosity_8 0.512435 0.227316 0.309122 4.177166 2.425573 0 
SCIF_8 1.317845 0.086136 -0.92441 5.105927 1.653756 0.852437 
Short_rad_16 61.38465 38.18321 1.594601 6.427533 339.7623 30.88748 
Long_rad_16 590.6188 322.0858 1.664434 8.798545 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_16 224.1002 110.6749 0.908346 4.969063 1104.227 30.88748 
Local_op_16 0.061132 0.082036 5.615595 61.46527 1.675436 0.002342 
Planimtrc_16 651005.1 727405.5 4.99593 55.56582 14577227 6769.165 
Rugosity_16 0.441361 0.209275 0.46621 4.412503 2.308768 0 
SCIF_16 1.667039 0.118685 -1.1348 5.096488 2.062202 1.042637 
Short_rad_32 55.92736 32.65441 1.610797 6.399642 277.9873 30.88748 
Long_rad_32 670.5452 348.6348 1.519722 7.758947 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_32 223.7752 108.2676 0.856616 4.84667 1008.669 30.88748 
Local_op_32 0.061157 0.082141 5.712708 64.01138 1.691624 0.002632 
Planimtrc_32 1307310 1412254 5.038128 58.74511 30304717 13303.11 
Rugosity_32 0.4264 0.195578 0.530602 5.117283 2.28104 0.002348 
SCIF_32 2.208976 0.176938 -1.21226 4.989893 2.605695 1.162805 
Short_rad_64 53.34624 29.65709 1.571263 6.196626 277.9873 30.88748 
Long_rad_64 744.8215 383.6695 1.462154 7.206687 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_64 223.5386 107.386 0.831561 4.755836 1006.256 30.88748 
Local_op_64 0.061176 0.082221 5.720145 64.28753 1.711353 0.002826 
Planimtrc_64 2616312 2791769 4.85154 53.25151 57114787 26481.33 
Rugosity_64 0.438592 0.18791 0.462449 5.409028 2.278868 0.009078 
SCIF_64 2.997456 0.264928 -1.15723 4.735597 3.545446 1.447101 
Dist_pop_1 1970.09 3025.814 6.955584 82.21161 62357.3 8.145166 
Dist_pop_1k 4775.628 12941.26 5.415877 41.72045 192750.7 8.145166 
Dist_pop_10k 44790.97 42667.25 1.00429 3.476587 230029.5 8.145166 
Dist_pop_50k 82942.68 55757.04 0.484679 2.966735 360583 38.99919 
Dist_pop100k 255149.6 129590.4 -0.71614 1.960563 557783.2 139.1335 
Min_CEA 15.98684 28.32625 7.408402 102.6326 769 1 
Max_CEA 210.9615 246.4451 5.496054 49.01561 4297 1 
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IED Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
Med_CEA 65.95197 76.60394 4.774067 40.36239 1357 1 
RtVisMin_1k 0.126199 0.261115 2.616346 8.707304 1 0.000518 
RtVisMax_1k 0.655776 0.216014 -0.06175 2.469475 1 0.004367 
RtVisMed_1k 0.251898 0.245152 2.030872 6.560558 1 0.003802 
RtVisMin_500 0.236852 0.340464 1.509931 3.722207 1 0.001678 
RtVisMax500 0.794972 0.195926 -0.81358 3.290479 1 0.007692 
RtVisMed500 0.379401 0.300473 1.125179 3.029845 1 0.006289 
RtVisMin_250 0.38808 0.388385 0.718764 1.822657 1 0.006803 
RtVisMax250 0.894392 0.159392 -1.80274 6.542154 1 0.032258 
RtVisMed250 0.52769 0.326781 0.409904 1.690512 1 0.016667 
RtVisMin_100 0.696318 0.371742 -0.55682 1.525536 1 0.023256 
RtVisMax100 0.974347 0.089017 -4.57539 28.23482 1 0.083333 
RtVisMed100 0.792028 0.283912 -0.90026 2.263288 1 0.033333 
 
 
Table 14. Statistics for Direct Fire Events 
DF Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
Elevation 1239.97 557.3591 1.172477 3.269075 4151 275 
Slope 8.178474 9.209225 2.202922 7.689192 64.3739 0 
IW_convexity 50.78444 2.767828 0.341509 4.972919 69.18605 35.75581 
IW_texture 179.9506 28.21021 -0.62173 4.025256 255 47 
Elv_rng50 11.94124 13.05931 2.970686 13.34795 116 1 
Elv_rng100 19.69348 22.53343 2.863105 12.18684 188 2 
Elv_rng350 56.02511 76.16447 2.742375 11.17331 571 7 
Elv_rng500 74.25974 103.065 2.605197 10.1242 769 8 
Elv_rng1000 126.0677 171.9339 2.249472 7.89859 1351 12 
Rough_50 3.811751 4.2688 3.014123 13.6756 40.07682 0.389249 
Rough_100 5.365653 6.525197 2.941597 12.74078 55.62539 0.552669 
Rough_350 12.44763 19.00739 2.874951 12.27379 158.8052 1.306791 
Rough_500 15.99117 25.3049 2.824251 11.9456 218.367 1.480848 
Rough_1000 25.8792 40.7347 2.487302 9.286029 337.7308 1.844114 
Visidx100-350 180.6762 91.50847 -0.18309 2.100827 360 0 
Visidx_350 208.9338 96.00504 -0.26845 2.184552 392 4 
Visidx_500 347.2455 185.3923 0.08659 2.167492 816 4 
Visidx_1000 845.3988 585.3677 0.632782 2.67354 3152 4 
SCID100-350 NaN NaN -0.7774 3.048465 5.352372 0.282095 
SCID_350 3.927529 1.095906 -0.93006 3.422014 5.585192 0.56419 
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DF Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
SCID_500 5.008353 1.596708 -0.61598 2.859334 8.058239 0.56419 
SCID_1000 7.61272 3.053154 -0.12254 2.32551 15.83756 0.56419 
Short_rad_4 91.54477 70.65889 1.916574 8.422847 679.5246 30.88748 
Long_rad_4 432.9138 323.5822 2.21322 11.68228 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_4 232.4906 147.4341 1.328615 6.070495 1413.102 30.88748 
Local_op_4 0.084963 0.12842 4.37544 32.41407 1.853502 0.000506 
Planimtrc_4 191101.9 311498.5 5.611846 54.29834 7054350 1908.073 
Rugosity_4 0.661678 0.246279 1.091447 8.373619 3.08116 0 
SCIF_4 1.12125 0.084467 -0.78846 4.821488 1.659523 0.793605 
Short_rad_8 70.05427 48.26989 1.768018 7.634148 494.1997 30.88748 
Long_rad_8 515.6846 339.143 1.95246 9.925631 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_8 223.782 124.5285 0.973981 4.845281 1343.605 30.88748 
Local_op_8 0.086389 0.131173 4.532036 34.4163 1.82922 0.001515 
Planimtrc_8 342874.2 443987.1 5.006058 59.0276 11788326 3569.677 
Rugosity_8 0.524474 0.254098 0.883732 6.585551 2.599429 0 
SCIF_8 1.319373 0.095203 -0.93913 5.47292 1.738768 0.818671 
Short_rad_16 59.66794 37.1889 1.564908 6.062438 339.7623 30.88748 
Long_rad_16 601.1742 370.5594 1.822419 9.073959 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_16 221.924 118.4034 0.940168 4.981722 1270.248 30.88748 
Local_op_16 0.086577 0.131033 4.520773 34.05139 1.865643 0.002342 
Planimtrc_16 685665.5 852809.9 4.978382 52.65761 20257471 6769.165 
Rugosity_16 0.45431 0.237426 1.042668 7.099692 2.523818 0 
SCIF_16 1.663809 0.132212 -1.23675 5.690666 2.191069 0.926427 
Short_rad_32 54.86252 32.02801 1.574108 6.080916 339.7623 30.88748 
Long_rad_32 682.435 402.3281 1.695075 8.127751 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_32 221.0894 115.7138 0.897515 4.936341 1230.673 30.88748 
Local_op_32 0.086496 0.130627 4.503245 33.54321 1.795833 0.002536 
Planimtrc_32 1367396 1639130 4.997501 55.40848 38216401 13303.11 
Rugosity_32 0.431424 0.220303 1.105502 7.612239 2.183659 0.003546 
SCIF_32 2.203323 0.197384 -1.22504 5.221941 2.72501 1.044676 
Short_rad_64 52.61044 29.49649 1.55894 6.011126 339.7623 30.88748 
Long_rad_64 759.4668 438.0354 1.558668 7.210818 2934.311 30.88748 
Mean_rad_64 220.8066 115.0348 0.875594 4.827426 1207.99 30.88748 
Local_op_64 0.086506 0.130681 4.512222 33.68811 1.819103 0.002668 
Planimtrc_64 2730956 3228337 4.916075 54.12197 73489390 26481.33 
Rugosity_64 0.4401 0.212687 1.071789 7.815886 2.198489 0.009 
SCIF_64 2.985627 0.293502 -1.19028 4.828701 3.570024 1.327981 
Dist_pop_1 1700.359 2487.212 6.552423 79.11162 60470.71 6.711227 
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DF Features Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
Dist_pop_1k 2617.723 7444.843 8.182352 87.77123 148677.1 6.711227 
Dist_pop_10k 35394.62 35869.29 1.364658 4.598799 250508.8 20.60933 
Dist_pop_50k 79040.08 47634.61 0.439541 3.084528 290180.5 45.84043 
Dist_pop100k 235779.4 137015.1 -0.41086 1.371092 504834.1 214.2961 
Min_CEA 15.15311 21.41143 4.59485 40.23002 367 1 
Max_CEA 192.7419 168.7335 5.057386 57.53948 3849 1 
Med_CEA 59.22232 55.58704 3.862144 40.28346 1166 1 
RtVisMin_1k 0.141893 0.260763 2.488321 8.165724 1 0.000726 
RtVisMax_1k 0.674881 0.214215 -0.22523 2.539017 1 0.007463 
RtVisMed_1k 0.264446 0.247878 1.862538 5.937132 1 0.003846 
RtVisMin_500 0.277799 0.340138 1.282869 3.182472 1 0.002632 
RtVisMax500 0.818447 0.189101 -1.05744 3.910993 1 0.018519 
RtVisMed500 0.41733 0.304879 0.860691 2.505724 1 0.011494 
RtVisMin_250 0.455908 0.379136 0.4267 1.576591 1 0.00885 
RtVisMax250 0.919258 0.141838 -2.28398 9.050088 1 0.045455 
RtVisMed250 0.589679 0.319247 0.081273 1.573079 1 0.015152 
RtVisMin_100 0.750182 0.339886 -0.87639 2.106256 1 0.015625 
RtVisMax100 0.983039 0.07348 -6.07345 48.09473 1 0.058824 
RtVisMed100 0.838916 0.254278 -1.33644 3.416514 1 0.02381 
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APPENDIX D. ADDITIONAL CLASSIFICATION GRAPHS 
  
b) 
a) 
c) 
Figure 135. The impact of combined geographic and temporal windows on 
classification accuracy of DF events using default parameters; a) DF SVM; b) DF 
DA; c) DF kNN. 
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b) 
a) 
c) 
Figure 136. The impact of combined geographic and temporal windows on 
classification accuracy of DF events when the cumulative variance of the PCA 
components ≤ 95% and the maximum p-value of the stepwise-selected features ≤ 
0.05; a) DF SVM; b) DF DA; c) DF kNN. 
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 137. The impact of varying cumulative variance and penter parameters on 
the classification of IED data; a) PCA with SVM linear kernel; b) PCA with SVM 
RBF kernel; c) PCA with LDA; d) PCA with QDA; e) PCA with kNN (k=1); f) 
PCA with kNN (k=3). 
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 138. The impact of varying cumulative variance and penter parameters 
on the classification of DF data; a) PCA with SVM linear kernel; b) PCA with 
SVM RBF kernel; c) PCA with LDA; d) PCA with QDA; e) PCA with kNN 
(k=1); f) PCA with kNN (k=3). 
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 139. The impact of varying cumulative variance and penter 
parameters on the classification of IED data; a) STP with SVM linear 
kernel; b) STP with SVM RBF kernel; c) STP with LDA; d) STP with QDA; 
e) STP with kNN (k=1); f) STP with kNN (k=3). 
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c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 140. The impact of varying cumulative variance and penter 
parameters on the classification of DF data; a) STP with SVM linear kernel; 
b) STP with SVM RBF kernel; c) STP with LDA; d) STP with QDA; e) STP 
with kNN (k=1); f) STP with kNN (k=3). 
f) 
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b) 
a) 
c) 
Figure 141. The impact of dimensionality reduction using PCA (cumulative 
variance <= 95%) and STP (penter <= 0.05) on classification accuracy of DF events 
when using combined geographic and temporal windows; a) DF SVM; b) DF DA; 
c) DF kNN. 
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b) 
a) 
c) 
d) 
Figure 142. The impact of dynamically varying the order of k on the classification 
of IED events; a) Classification accuracy under combined geographic and 
temporal constraints using varying k; b) Classification accuracy at various values 
of k; c) Mean order of k at various window sizes; d) Mean order of k at various 
sample sizes. 
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b) 
a) 
c) 
d) 
Figure 143. The impact of dynamically varying the box constraint C on the 
classification of DF events using SVM with a linear kernel; a) Classification 
accuracy under combined geographic and temporal constraints using varying C; b) 
Classification accuracy at various values of C; c) Mean order of C at various 
window sizes; d) Mean order of C at various sample sizes. 
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b) 
a) 
c) 
Figure 144. The impact of dynamically varying the box constraint C and the RBF 
shape parameter σ on the classification of DF events using SVM with an RBF 
kernel; a) Classification accuracy under combined geographic and temporal 
constraints using varying C and σ; b) Mean order of C at various window sizes; c) 
Mean order of σ at various window sizes. 
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c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
Figure 145. For DF events, a) Impact of the order of σ found using grid search on 
classification error; b) Impact of the order of σ found using estimation on 
classification error; c) Impact of the order of C found using grid search on 
classification error; d) Impact of the order of C found using estimation on 
classification error; e) Relationship between C and σ found using grid search; f) 
Relationship between C and σ found using estimation. 
e) 
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c) 
a) 
d) 
b) 
Figure 146. For DF events, a) Impact of sample size on the order of C found using 
grid search; b) Impact of sample size on the order of C found using estimation; c) 
Impact of sample size on the order of σ found using grid search; d) Impact of 
sample size on the order of σ found using estimation.  
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Figure 147. Weighted cost from learning machines using default parameters on 
DF data; a) SVM with geographic constraints; b) SVM with temporal constraints; 
c) DA with geographic constraints; d) DA with temporal constraints; e) kNN with 
geographic constraints; f) kNN with temporal constraints. 
c) 
a) 
e) 
d) 
b) 
f) 
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Figure 148. Weighted cost from learning machines using optimal parameters on 
DF event data; a) SVM with geotemporal constraints; b) DA with geotemporal 
constraints; c) kNN with geotemporal constraints. 
b) 
a) 
c) 
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b) 
a) 
c) 
d) 
Figure 149. Subset selection from DF data using experts; a) IED SVM; b) IED 
SVM classification error analysis; c) IED kNN; d) IED kNN classification error 
analysis. 
  
264 
 
 
b) 
a) 
c) 
d) 
Figure 150. IED event classification errors by distance from populated areas; a) 
error count by distance from populated areas with >1000 people; b) DF event 
classification error ratio over time of day using a sliding window; c) IED event 
classification errors by time of day and classifier type; d) DF event classification 
errors by time of day and classifier type. 
